Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression The Rainer report sets forth the situation a little later in 1936:
"The principles of the construction of the organization
were: The organization is the bearer of the illegal
fight and the trustee of the idea to create a secret
organization, in a simple manner, and without
compromise, according to the principle of organization
an elite to be available to the illegal land-party
council upon any emergency. Besides this, all political
opportunities should be taken and all legal people and
legal
[Page 464]
chances should be used without revealing any ties with
the illegal organization. Therefore, cooperation
between the illegal party organization and the legal
political aides was anchored at the top of the party
leadership. All connections with the party in Germany
were kept secret in accordance with the orders of the
Fuehrer. These said that the German state should
officially be omitted from the creation of an Austrian
NSDAP; and that auxiliary centers for propaganda,
press, refugees, welfare, etc. should be established in
the foreign countries bordering Austria.
"Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer Seyss-
Inquart, who had connections with Dr. Wachter which
originated from Seyss Inquart's support of the July
uprising. On the other side Seyss-Inquart had a good
position in the legal field and especially ell-
established relations with Christian-Social
politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of
the 'Styrian Heimatschutz' and became a party member
when the entire 'Styrian Heimatschutz' was incorporated
into the NSDAP. Another personality who had a good
position in the legal field was Col. Glaise-Horstenau
who had contacts with both sides. The agreement of 11
July 1936 was strongly influenced by the activities of
these two persons. Papen mentioned Glaise-Horstenau to
the Fuehrer as being a trusted person." (812-PS)
The Rainer report thus discloses the dual tactics of the
Austrian Nazis during this period of keeping quiet and
awaiting developments. They were maintaining their secret
contacts with Reich officials, and using "front"
personalities such as Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart.
The Nazis made good use of such figures, who were more
discreet in their activities and could be referred to as
"Nationalists". They presented, supported, and obtained
consideration of demands which could not be negotiated by
out-and-out Nazis like Captain Leopold. Seyss-Inquart did
not hold any public office until January 1937, when he was
made Councillor of State. But Rainer, describing him as a
trustworthy member of the Party through the ranks of the
Styrian-Heimatschutz, points him out as one who strongly
influenced the agreement of 11 July 1936.
That the Nazis, but not the Austrian Government, did well to
trust Seyss-Inquart, is indicated by a letter, dated 14 July
1939, addressed to Field Marshal Goering (2219-PS). The
letter ends with the "Heil Hitler" close and is not signed,
but it was undoubtedly written by Seyss-Inquart. It was
found among Seyss-Inquart's personal files. On the first
page of the letter there
[Page 465]
appears a note in ink, not indicated in the partial English
translation, reading: "Air Mail. 15 July, 1515 hours,
Berlin, brought to Goering's office."
The main text of the letter consists of a plea for
intercession behalf of one Muehlmann, who unfortunately got
in Buerckel's bad graces. An extract from the letter, which
shows Seyss-Inquart as one whose loyalty to Hitler and the
aims of the Nazi conspiracy led him to fight for the
Anschluss with all the means this disposal, reads:
At Present In Vienna, 14 July 1939
"To the General Field Marshal
*******
"If I may add something about myself, it is the
following: I know that I am not of an active fighting
nature, unless final decisions are at stake. At this
time of pronounced activism (Aktivismus) this will
certainly be regarded as a fault in m,y personality.
Yet I know that I cling with unconquerable tenacity to
the goal in which I believe. That is Greater Germany
(Grossdeutschland) and the FUEHRER. And if some people
are already tired out from the struggle and some have
been killed in the fight, I am still around somewhere
and ready to go into action. This, after all, was also
the development until the year 1938. Until July 1934 I
conducted myself as a regular member of the party. And
if I had quietly, in whatever form,, paid my membership
dues the first one, according to a receipt, I paid in
December 1931. I probably would have been an
undisputed, comparatively old fighter and party member
of Austria, but I would not have done any more for the
union. I told myself in July 1934 that we must fight
this clerical regime on its own ground in order to give
the Fuehrer a chance to use whatever method he desires.
I told myself that this Austria was worth a mass. I
have stuck to this attitude with an iron determination
because I and my friends had to fight against the whole
political church, the Freemasonry, the Jewry, in short,
against everything in Austria. The slightest weakness
which we might have displayed would undoubtedly have
led to our political annihilation; it would have
deprived the Fuehrer of the means and tools to carry
out his ingenious political solution for Austria, as
became evident in the days of March 1938. I have been
fully conscious of the fact that I am following a path
which is not comprehensible to the masses and also not
to my party comrades. I followed it calmly and would
with-
[Page 466]
out hesitation follow it again because I am satisfied
that at one point I could serve the FUEHRER as a tool
in his work, even though my former attitude even now
gives occasion to very worthy and honorable party
comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. I have never paid
attention to such things because I am satisfied with
the opinion which the FUEHRER and the men close to him
have of me." (2219-PS)
A letter from Papen to Hitler dated 27 July 1935 shows how
Papen thought the doctrines of National Socialism could be
used to effect the aim of Anschluss. It consists of a report
entitled "Review and Outlook, One Year after the Death of
Chancellor Dollfuss." After reviewing the success that the
Austrian Government had had in establishing Dollfuss as a
martyr and his principles as the patriotic principles of
Austria, Papen stated:
"National Socialism must and will overpower the new
Austrian ideology. If today it is contended in Austria
that the NSDAP is only a centralized Reich German party
and therefore unable to transfer the spirit of thought
of National Socialism to groups of people of a
different political makeup, the answer must rightly be
that the national revolution in Germany could not have
been brought about in a different way. But when the
creation of the people's community in the Reich will be
completed, National socialism could, in a much wider
sense than this is possible through the present party
organizationat least apparently, certainly become the
rallying point for all racially German units beyond the
borders. Spiritual progress in regard to Austria cannot
be achieved today with any centralized tendency. If
this recognition would once and for all be stated
clearly from within the Reich, then it would easily
become possible to effect a break-through into the
front of the New Austria. A Nurnberg Party Day
designated as 'The German Day' as in old times and the
proclamation of a national socialistic peoples' front,
would be a stirring event for alI beyond the borders of
the Reich. Such attacks would win us also the
particularistic Austrian circles, whose spokesman, the
legitimistic Count Dubsky rote in his pamphlet about
the 'Anschluss': The Third Reich will be with Austria,
or it will not be at all. National Socialism must win
it or it will perish, if it is unable to solve this
task ***" (2248-PS)
Other reports from Papen to Hitler, hereinafter mentioned,
show that he maintained covert contact with the National
Socialist groups in Austria. From the very start of his
mission Papen was thinking of ways and means of using the
principle of National Socialism for "National Germans"
outside the borders of Germany. Papen was working for
Anschluss, and although he preferred to use the principles
of National
[Page 467]
Socialism rather than rely on the party organization, he
was prepared to defend the party organization as a
necessary means of establishing those principles in the
German Reich.
The
original plaintext version
of this file is available via
ftp.
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Aggression Against Austria
(Part 5 of 19)