Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression A. Planning to Overthrow the Versailles Treaty.
The determination and the plans of the Nazi conspirators to
remove the restrictions of Versailles, started very early.
This fact is confirmed by their own statements, their boasts
of long planning and careful execution. Hitler, in his
speech to all Supreme Commanders on 23 November 1939, stated
that his primary goal was to wipe out Versailles (789-PS).
And Jodl, as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces,
delivered an address after four years of war, on 7 November
1943, in which he traced the development of German strength
(172). The seizure of power to him meant the' restoration of fighting sovereignty, including conscription occupation of the Rhineland, and
rearmament, with special emphasis on modern armor and air
forces. In his speech, entitled "The Strategic Position at
the Beginning of the 5th Year
[Page 412]
of War," General Jodl gave a retrospective summary of the
war for the benefit of the Reich and Gau leaders. He stated:
"Introduction: Reichsleiter Bormann has requested me to
give you a review today of the strategic position in
the beginning of the 6th Year of War.
"I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I
undertook this none too easy task. It is not possible
to do it justice with a few generalities. It is not
necessary to say openly what is. No one the Fuehrer has
orderedmay know more or be told more than he needs for
his own immediate task, but I have no doubt at all in
my mind, Gentlemen, but that you need a great deal in
order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your
Gaus, after all, and among their inhabitants that all
the enemy propaganda, the defeatism, and the malicious
rumours concentrate, that try to find themselves a plan
among our people. Up and down the country the devil of
subversion strides. All the cowards are seeking a way
out, oras they call ita political solution. They say,
we must negotiate while there is still something in
hand, and all these slogans are made use of to attack
the natural sense of the people, that in this war there
can only be a fight to the end.
<>"Capitulation is the end
of the Nation, the end of Germany. Against this wave of
enemy propaganda and cowardice you need more than
force. You need to know the true situation and for this
reason I believe that I am justified in giving you a
perfectly open and uncolored account of the state of
affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure of secrets,
but a weapon which may perhaps-help you to fortify the
morale of the people. For this war will not only be
decided by the force of arms but by the will of the
whole people. Germany was broken in 1918 not at the
front but at home. Italy suffered not military defeat
but morale defeat. She broke down internally. The
result has been not the peace she expected but --
through the cowardice of these criminal traitors -- a
fate thousand times harder than continuation of the war
at our side would have brought to the Italian people. I
can rely on you, Gentlemen, that since I give concrete
figures and data concerning our own strength, you will
treat these details as your secret; all the rest is at
your disposal without restriction for application in
your activities as leaders of the people.
"The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to
all and everyone at the moment when we entered upon the
War of Liberation of Greater Germany and by attacking
parried
[Page 413]
the danger which menaced us both from Poland and from
the Western powers. Our further incursions into
Scandinavia, in the direction of the Mediterranean, and
in that of Russia -- these also aroused no doubts
concerning the general conduct of the war so long as we
were successful. It was not until more serious set-
backs were encountered and our general situation began
to become increasingly acute, that the German people
began to ask itself whether perhaps we had not
undertaken more than we could do and set our aims too
high. To provide an answer to this questioning and to
furnish you with certain points of view for use in your
own explanatory activities is one of the main points of
my present lecture. I shall divide it into three parts:
"I. A review of the most important development up
to the present.
"II. Consideration of the present situation.
"III. The foundation of our morale and our
confidence in victory.
"In view of my position as military advisor to the
Fuehrer, I shall confine myself in my remarks to
the problems of my own personal sphere of action,
fully appreciating at the same time that in view
of the protean nature of this war, I shall in this
way be giving expression only to one side of
events.
"I. Review
"1. The fact that the National Socialist movement and
its struggle for internal power were the preparatory
stage of the outer liberation from the bonds of the
Dictate of Versailles is not one on which I need
enlarge in this circle. I should like however to
mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful
regular soldiers realize what an important part has
been played by the National Socialist movement in
reawakening the will to fight [Wehrwillen] in nurturing
fighting strength [Wehrkraft] and in rearming the
German people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in
it, the numerically small Reichswehr would never have
been able to cope with this task, if only because of
its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the
Fuehrer aimed atand has so happily been successful in
bringing aboutwas the fusion of these two forces.
"2. The seizure of power in its turn-has meant in the
first place restoration of fighting sovereignty
[Wehrhoheit -- conscription, occupation of the
Rhineland] and rearmament
[Page 414]
with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a
modern armoured and air arm.
"3. The Austrian 'Anschluss' in its turn, brought with
it not only the fulfillment of an old national aim but
also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting
strength and of materially improving our strategic
position. Whereas up till then the territory of
Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way
right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of
France and an air base for the Allies, in particular
Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by
pincers.
"Its own strategic position had now become so
unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any
attack pressed home with rigour before effective aid
from the West could be expected to arrive.
"This possibility of aid was furthermore made more
difficult by the construction of the West Wall, which,
in contra-distinction to the Maginot Line, was not a
measure based on debility and resignation but one
intended to afford rear cover for an active policy in
the East.
"4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the
autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of
Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany
in such a way that it now became possible to consider
the Polish problem on the basis of more or less
favourable strategic premises.
"This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present
war, and the question which next arises is whether the
moment for the struggle with Poland -- in itself
unavoidable -- was favorably selected or not. The
answer to this question is all the less in doubt since
the opponentafter all, not inconsiderable in
himselfcollapsed unexpectedly quickly, and the Western
Powers who were his friends, while they did declare war
on us and form a second front, yet for the rest made no
use of the possibilities open to them of snatching the
initiative from our hands. Concerning the course of the
Polish campaign, nothing further need be said beyond
that it proved in a measure which made the whole world
sit up and take notice a point which up till then had
not been certain by any means; that is, the high state
'of efficiency of the young Armed Forces of Great
Germany." (L-172)
In this speech General Jodl identifies himself fully with
the Nazi movement. His own words show that he was not a mere
soldier. Insofar as he is concerned, his speech identifies
the military with the political, it also shows the
deliberation with which
[Page 415]
the Treaty of Versailles was abrogated by Germany and the
demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was militarized and
fortified.
In one of Adolf Hitler's reviews of the six-year period
between his ascendancy to power and the outbreak of
hostilities, he not only admitted but boasted about the
orderly and coordinated long-range planning. The minutes of
conference of the Fuehrer kept by Schmundt, his adjutant,
contain the following passage:
"In the period 1933-1939 progress was made in all
fields. Our military system improved enormously."
"The period which lies behind us has, indeed, been put
to good use. All measures have been taken in the
correct sequence and in harmony with our aims." (L-79)
The
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Volume
I Chapter IX
Preparation for Aggression
1933-1936
(Part 2 of 14)