XIII. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

We   have  considered  and  discussed  the  information   we
collected  from the interviews, hearings, written documents,
videotapes,  and  audiotapes which  we  amassed  during  the
investigation  of  the  "Heritage  Front  Affair".  In  this
chapter, we provide our conclusions.

   13.1 Source in the Heritage Front

We found that CSIS had placed a human source in the Heritage
Front   and  its  associated  organizations.  We  concluded,
furthermore,  that  CSIS  was  correct  to  investigate  the
leadership  of the extreme right and we were satisfied  with
the level of targeting which the Service approved.

We  believe  that CSIS made the right decision when  it  re-
directed   its  Source  to  the  extreme  right   from   the
investigation   of  a  foreign  Government's   attempts   to
influence domestic activities in Canada. The Service, in our
view,  used  the investigative technique which  offered  the
best value for money when it instructed the Source to report
on  the  white supremacist targets. Consequently,  we  agree
with  the  decision  to place a human source  in  the  white
supremacist movement to investigate what we conclude was and
is a threat to the security of Canada.

We  concluded  too that the data shows that Wolfgang  Walter
Droege  founded the Heritage Front. We have  no  doubt  that
whether  Droege's  acolytes,  Gerald  Lincoln,  James  Scott
Dawson, and Grant Bristow, were present or not it was Droege
who had conceptualized the plan, and he would have acted  to
form  the  new organization; he told us that he  would  have
done so with or without their support.

The  record shows that prior to, during, and after the  trip
to  Libya, Droege wanted to establish a new group - a  group
to  be more public and to appeal to a wider population  than
previous  organizations. His new group would be designed  to
appeal, as do other white supremacist groups, to the meanest
and basest sentiments of Canadians.

We   noted  that  the  Heritage  Front  was  not  the  first
organization which Droege managed successfully; His Ku  Klux
Klan  group  thrived  fourteen years  ago,  before  Droege's
exploits  in  conspiracy, drugs and weapons  landed  him  in
American prisons (see chapter I).

   13.2 Leadership of the Heritage Front

Although  Droege seemed to operate on a more consensual,  or
at  least stable, basis than Don Andrews and the Nationalist
Party  of Canada, Droege ran, nevertheless, an authoritarian
top-down organization.

We  observed  that Grant Bristow, Gerald Lincoln  and  James
Dawson   actively  supported  Droege's  initiatives.   Grant
Bristow  as he confidante of Droege, was part of  the  inner
leadership of the Heritage Front.

We  concluded that Bristow instructed Heritage Front members
about   security  and  counter  intelligence  methods.   The
instruction  was given at the direction of Droege  and  took
the  form  of  techniques  which either  represented  simple
common sense or were ineffectual.

For  the  most  part, we think that the  Source  which  CSIS
infiltrated  into  the  Heritage  Front  did  not   initiate
programs,   though   he   would  suggest   alternatives   or
refinements. In the early years, he was involved in  counter
intelligence,  and was often given other  tasks  by  Droege.
Eric  Fischer,  formerly  of the Airborne  Regiment  of  the
Canadian   Armed  Forces,  assumed  the  physical   security
responsibilities. We learned that the Source often  provided
misleading  information  to his Heritage  Front  associates,
whether  in terms of his conduct in harassing opponents,  or
when  he  was  directed by Droege to pass on information  on
these Heritage Front "enemies."

Although  he  first  tried  to  avoid  appearing  in  public
meetings as a speaker or master of ceremonies, we noted that
the  Source was obligated to do so in order to maintain  his
credibility  within  the movement.  The  speeches  he  gave,
however, involved reporting information rather than inciting
the  audience to violence. At the meetings of which  we  are
aware,  he  did  not make racist statements. We  acknowledge
that he made crude, abrasive, and probably racist statements
in  the  presence  of  his  racist associates  in  order  to
maintain his position in the group.

   13.3 Recruiting and Funding

We  concluded  that statements which portray Bristow  as  an
excellent  recruiter and fundraiser for the  Heritage  Front
are exaggerated or, when asserted by extremists, deceptive.

Bristow   exhibited  a  manifestly  abrasive  and  offensive
attitude   towards   most   of  his  extremist   colleagues,
especially  the  younger  ones. This  approach  was  both  a
reflection of his personality and was also purposely enacted
to  discourage younger racists from staying in the group, we
were  told.  We  found  no evidence that  Bristow  recruited
anyone into the Heritage Front.

Much  media  attention has focused on the funds which  Grant
Bristow  provided  to  the  Heritage  Front  and  to   white
supremacists in the United States. We have shown in  chapter
VIII that the allegations that Bristow provided funds to  US
white  supremacists  Tom  and John Metzger  are  false,  and
represent a successful attempt
to mislead the media.

The  funding which Bristow did provide to the Heritage Front
was  not  significant  and  represented  his  share  of  the
expenses  incurred, which were divided between all executive
members  of that group. We noted too that from 1989  through
to  the end of 1992, Bristow earned a modest salary from his
full  time employment and this, supplemented in a minor  way
by  the  jobs he carried out for Droege and others, did  not
allow for lavish spending.

We  concluded  that  Grant  Bristow  made  some  direct  and
indirect  contributions to the movement over  a  seven  year
period. But we also ascertained that these contributions had
no  substantial  impact  on the viability  of  the  Heritage
Front,  a group that had no office, no staff, and no capital
costs.

The  CSIS  Source, on the other hand, received little  money
for  most  of his reporting career and it was only  for  one
year  that the Service provided major funding. In this case,
as  well,  the  cost of living in Toronto, and supporting  a
family,  make  a  mockery  of  the  allegations  that   CSIS
supported the extremist group in any significant manner  The
majority  of the group's funds, we were informed, came  from
membership  and magazine subscription revenues.  During  the
heyday of the Heritage Front, Droege was earning substantial
income from his bailiff work and Gerald Lincoln was said  to
be the major financial contributor to the magazine.

   13.4 The Harassment Campaign

The  CSIS Source played a major role in the Heritage Front's
harassment campaign. This commenced with the racists and the
anti-racists gaining access to the messages on each  other's
answering machines.

We  accept the premise that the Source's activities in  this
area  began  on  the  instructions of  Wolfgang  Droege.  As
described in chapter V, the harassment campaign against  the
anti-racists in particular was, at one point in early  1993,
rapidly  escalating out of control and threatened to  result
in  physical  violence between the two groups.  The  Source,
with   the   permission  of  his  handler,  redirected   the
previously  uncoordinated  threats  of  the  Heritage  Front
members into an information collection program.

This  approach  had several results. The Source  became  the
repository  for  the  information which the  Heritage  Front
collected.  After  learning the technique from  Droege,  the
Source  would  instruct Heritage Front  members  on  how  to
collect the information from the answering machines and then
he  told  them  how  to deal with the targets  in  order  to
collect  information  about other anti-racists.  The  Source
told  others  that he had harassed some opponents  when,  in
fact, he had not; the threats to a school principal being  a
case  in  point.  The Source would also alter  some  of  the
information on Heritage Front opponents when Droege told him
to share it with other persons or groups.

We have described in chapter V how we understand the process
worked. The information which we received indicates that the
decisions  concerning the "IT" campaign  were  made  by  the
handler and the Source. If the program had been limited to a
minor level of harassment, we would not take issue with  it.
But  we  consider that the campaign did have  a  substantial
detrimental impact on those who were its targets.

The  conflicts  between the racists and the anti-racists  in
the  streets  of  Toronto were well known.  The  media  gave
considerable  attention  to these  events  and  CSIS  senior
management should have been sufficiently alert to  ask  what
was going on behind the scenes; the harassment program would
then  have  been  brought  to their  attention.  We  saw  no
evidence that this was the case.

We  are mindful of the mutual harassment between racists and
anti-racists  which characterized this period. Nevertheless,
the  Source  was  involved in a campaign  which  tested  the
limits of what we believe Canadian society considers  to  be
acceptable and appropriate behaviour from someone acting  on
behalf  of  the government. We concluded, for example,  that
the around-the-clock harassment of individuals, at least one
of them a woman, tested the bounds of appropriate behaviour.
We  similarly believe that calling an employer to  discredit
an  employee, the alleged stalking of targets, and the other
examples  that  we describe in chapter V required  a  higher
level of decision making from CSIS than was evident in  this
situation.  Though  CSIS management should  have  taken  the
initiative  on this issue, it would have been  useful  if  a
fuller  account of the complexity of the situation had  been
forwarded to Ottawa from the Toronto Region.

We  do not hold the Source responsible for the omission.  He
did  the best he could under the circumstances to tranLsform
a  situation clearly headed towards violent confrontation by
transforming  it  into  a  less vicious  program.  Had  CSIS
management  seen  engaged  in assessing  the  best  possible
options,   less  harassment  and  intimidation  might   have
occurred.  We  do  not  believe that senior  management  was
sufficiently involved in what was obviously a very difficult
situation.

In  any  event,  CSIS senior management at  Headquarters  in
Ottawa  apparently knew little or nothing, at the  time,  of
the  harassment program that occurred in late 1992 and early
1993.

Jewish    organizations    and    individuals    experienced
considerably less harassment than the anti-racist activists.
When  asked  to  collect and provide information  on  Jewish
leaders and groups, the Source obtained the information from
publicly  available  sources such as telephone  books.  When
asked to provide information on residences or other personal
data,  the  Source  either equivocated or  again  gave  open
source material.

When information on the Jewish community was provided-to the
Heritage  Front by other white supremacists and  the  Source
had  access  to  it,  the material was handed  to  CSIS.  If
required,  police  agencies were alerted. We  are  convinced
that  if  he had wanted to, he could have collected personal
information on Jewish leaders. But he did not want  to  and,
to the best of our knowledge, he did not.

The Source did engage in individual acts of intimidation  or
harassment,  as  we described in chapter  V.  They  elicited
concern or fear from those who experienced the oral attacks.
The  Source said that these episodes were necessary, at  the
time,  to  support the role he was playing with the racists.
When the handler was
informed  about the incidents, he told the Source to  desist
and he did so.

We  concluded  that the Source should not  have  intimidated
members  of the Jewish community. We are also of the opinion
that  in  handing over information to CSIS, which in several
cases was then communicated to law enforcement agencies,  he
may have prevented physical violence.

Overall,  our analysis of the "balance sheet"  is  that  the
Source's efforts ultimately worked to enhance the protection
of the Jewish community against the racists.

   13.5 Infiltrating the Reform Party

Though  we  did  not conduct an intrusive  investigation  of
people  unconnected to CSIS, Bristow, or the Heritage Front,
we  did  follow  every  lead  we  discovered  regarding  the
infiltration of the Reform Party.

We  concluded  that  CSIS did not spy on the  Reform  Party.
Further,   we   saw   no  evidence  that   the   Progressive
Conservative  Government instructed CSIS to investigate  the
Reform Party of Canada.

An  issue was whether Grant Bristow signed up Heritage Front
members  and other undesirables for the Reform Party.  Those
persons who are closely associated with the fringe right  or
the   extreme  right  have  stated  that  Bristow   actively
encouraged  Heritage Front people to join the Reform  Party.
Private information exchanged between Droege and his trusted
cohorts clearly shows that Droege and Overfield wanted their
associates to join the Reform Party as a means to  encourage
white  supremacist  policies (Overfield) or  to  effectively
discredit the Party (Droege).

The  statements  made by Droege and his  associates  to  the
media  and to the Review Committee that Grant Bristow signed
people  up,  whether  at  Paul  Fromm's  C-FAR  meeting   or
elsewhere,  are  contradicted  by  reliable  information  we
obtained.

As  regards Grant Bristow and the Conservative Party, he did
work for David Crombie in the mid-1980s. As a favour to  his
supervisor,  Bristow worked for several hours  in  the  1988
election campaign for Otto Jelinek. His activities on behalf
of  Jelinek  were marginal at best, according to people  who
worked on Jelinek's campaign.

The  initiative  to  establish a security  team  to  provide
protection  for  major  Reform  Party  rallies   and   small
constituency  association meetings in Ontario was  developed
and  carried  out  by Alan Overfield. His objective  was  to
increase his influence within the Reform Party in pursuit of
a  racist  agenda.  His  intention  was  to  take  over,  if
possible, some twelve constituency associations in order  to
persuade  the Party to implement white supremacist policies.
Overfield  was  elected  to  the  Beaches  Woodbine   riding
executive.  The  President of the constituency  association,
knowingly  or  otherwise, permitted  Overfield  to  exercise
considerable  influence over him; to the extent  that  other
Heritage Front members or associates also joined or tried to
join the executive.

Overfield  has  been involved with racist groups  since  the
1970s and he and some of his associates were determined that
they would not repeat the mistakes which previously resulted
in  their  being  expelled from the national  Social  Credit
Party  of Brnest Manning. Overfield enlisted the support  of
his long-time friend and employee, Wolfgang Droege, to staff
the  security team. Among those Droege asked to  participate
were key members of the Heritage Front including the Source.
But the Source was not instrumental in forming the group; on
the  contrary, we have seen evidence that he objected to the
involvement of Heritage Front members in this activity.  The
Source  said that he attended four Reform Party meetings  or
rallies in total.

Toronto  Region was advised by the Source that  Bristow  was
involved  with  the security group after the first  Beaches-
Woodbine  constituency information meeting in 1991.  At  the
large   rally   in   Mississauga,  Grant  Bristow   provided
protection  for  Preston Manning but he  was  not  privy  to
sensitive  Party discussions. Mr. Manning's Press  Secretary
and  others  have confirmed this categorically. Mr.  Manning
himself does not remember meeting Bristow.

Our  review  of the documentation at CSIS and our interviews
of employees have established beyond a reasonable doubt that
the   CSIS  Source  did  not  report  on  any  Reform  Party
activities.  There was absolutely no credible evidence  that
CSIS was acting on the basis of political direction when its
Source  reported on the activities of the Overfield security
group. This is not to say there were no politically oriented
plots at work by others.

We  concluded that Wolfgang Droege had a plan which differed
from  A1  Overfield's. Droege saw the Reform  Party  as  his
competition and his statements and actions, right  from  the
inception  of  the  security  group,  were  directed  toward
eventually
discrediting that Party before the 1993 federal election.

It   was  early  August  1991  before  Service  Headquarters
instructed  Toronto  Region that  the  Source  was  to  have
nothing  more  to do with the Reform Party. In our  opinion,
the  two  month  time lag was too long. We  think  that  the
Source  should  have  been  instructed  to  cease  all  such
activity during the same month that Headquarters learned  of
it.

As  mentioned above, the Source was instructed to cease  all
activity  with  the  Reform Party in early  August.  Yet  he
participated  with  Overfield's group at  the  January  1992
Pickering  rally.  Both the Source and the  handler  stated,
convincingly,  that such activity immediately  stopped  when
the instruction arrived to that effect.

We  concluded  that the August instruction from Headquarters
was  not  sufficiently precise. The message reiterated  that
there was to be no reporting on the Reform Party, but it did
not  explicitly  state  that the Source  was  to  leave  the
security
group.  The  managers  at  CSIS HQ and  Toronto  Region  all
interpreted the August communication to mean security  group
activity  was  to stop, but the Source read his instructions
differently, and we can see why.

We examined the reasons why CSIS did not inform the Minister
that  Heritage  Front  members had  infiltrated  the  Reform
Party.  We  took into account the fact that  the  period  in
which  the decision was made was one of transition  for  the
executive level of the Service, and that the Deputy Director
of Operations was the Acting Director for most of the Summer
and Fall of 1991.

The  Acting Director at the time believed that there was  no
obvious threat to the security of Canada. However, our  view
is  that  the decision was of major importance,  and  should
have  been taken by the Director himself, not his second-in-
command.  We  are  not  prepared to second  guess  what  the
Director's decision should have been; he may well have  come
to the same conclusion as his Deputy Director Operations and
Analysis.

In  any  event,  the Solicitor General of the  day  was  not
informed about the infiltration issue.

Our  investigation revealed that in the Summer  of  1991,  a
person  known  to  some Reform Party  officials  as  a  CSIS
employee raised doubts about Wolfgang Droege's participation
in the Overfield security team. In addition, Wolfgang Droege
was  identified as a supporter of the Reform Party  on  June
19, 1991, in the "Toronto Star". The information that Droege
was  a white supremacist was brought to the attention of  at
least  two  Ontario  Reform Party officials.  Overfield  was
apparently  confronted about the information  and  confirmed
Droege's  white  supremacist credentials.  We  think  it  is
likely  that the Executive Council of the Reform  Party  was
not  given  the  information by its Ontario officials.  Some
members of the Party started to investigate infiltration  by
racists  in  early 1992, but an investigative committee  was
not established until the media expose of February 1992.

In  the  course  of  our  review, we investigated  the  many
questions  posed  by  the  Heritage  Front's  activities  in
relation  to  the Reform Party. We learned that  lawyer  and
former Reform Party member Louis Allore paid Droege $500  to
try  to  enter  an  Oshawa meeting at which Preston  Manning
appeared, in order to embarrass
him.  Michael Lublin, a former Reform Party member, probably
was involved in and definitely knew of the transaction.

We  believe that Michael Lublin suggested to Droege that  he
attend John Gamblets Reform Party nomination meeting in  the
Don  Valley West riding to demonstrate support. That gesture
would  again  serve  to discredit the Reform  Party.  Lublin
informed  us  that he alerted the media in  advance  of  the
event.

We  believe that Lublin and Droege communicated on a  number
of  occasions in order to enhance their credibility in their
respective communities.

We conclude that Conservative Party officials were certainly
interested in what the Reform Party was doing and,  further,
that  a number of Reform dissidents were formerly associated
with  the Conservatives. We saw no evidence, however,  of  a
Conservative   Party  conspiracy,  with  or  without   CSIS'
participation, to discredit the Reform Party through the use
of  the Heritage Front. Nor did we see any evidence that the
Reform  Party  used the Heritage Front to  discredit  Reform
dissidents   who   were  previously  associated   with   the
Conservative Party.

   13.6 The Reform Party and a Foreign Government

During  our  investigation  of  the  Service's  actions   in
relation to the Reform Party of Canada, we learned of a CSIS
investigation which took place from October 1989 to  January
1990. See chapter VII.

We   concluded  that  the  Service  had  an  obligation   to
investigate  whether the Government of the  foreign  country
was  involved  in attempting to influence the outcome  of  a
Canadian election.

   13.7 Maguire and Metzger

In  the wake of the allegations in August 1994 that CSIS had
an  informant in the Heritage Eront, considerable  attention
was  paid by the media to alleged CSIS interference  in  the
police  arrests of Sean Maguire and of Tom and John Metzger,
all notorious American white supremacists.

In  the  arrest of Sean Maguire, we concluded that CSIS  did
not  intervene to protect Grant Bristow. A CSIS  Source  had
informed the Service that Maguire was in Bristow's  car  and
that  there  were  guns in his car trunk.  When  the  police
arrested  Maguire,  they found the guns  and  they  detained
Bristow.  He  was  subsequently  released  when  the  police
concluded that he had not broken the law.

After  talking  to  the  Police  of  jurisdiction,  we   are
convinced  that  had Bristow's possession  of  the  firearms
proved  to  be  illegal,  he would have  been  arrested  and
charged.  No  infractions were associated with the  properly
stored  firearms in his car. The Toronto police file on  the
incident  is thin because Maguire was arrested on a  federal
Immigration  warrant which did not involve  a  local  police
investigation.

We   concluded   that   the  media's  allegation   of   CSIS
interference in the arrest was wrong. We also noted that the
Maguire took place on the basis of CSIS information.

The  arrest of John and Tom Metzger is a more complex  case.
Neither  CSIS  nor the Source had details of  their  illegal
entry  into Canada. When the Service learned that  they  had
arrived,  the  police  were informed  and  a  joint  Police-
Immigration task force arrested them after a Heritage  Front
meeting. As in the Maguire arrest, the persons found in  the
car   with  the  Metzgers  were  released,  Wolfgang  Droege
prominent among them.

The  Metzgers  were the subject of an Immigration  alert  in
advance of their arrival, but they slipped across the border
from  the  United States. After their arrest, they  appeared
before  an adjudicator and, ninety minutes later, they  were
deported.  The Source informed CSIS that Bristow took  their
luggage  to  them  in  Buffalo, New  York,  prior  to  their
departure  for  California. The Source stated that  Bristow,
who  had  to  work the next day, spent approximately  thirty
minutes with them.

The intense media interest following the "Toronto Sun" story
on  August  14,  1994 led to Tom Metzger appearing  on  "The
Fifth  Estate"  television program.  He  stated  that  Grant
Bristow  came to California to give him money and the  names
of  leftists  and  Jewish community leaders.  The  broadcast
provided  an  uncritical forum for Metzger and  other  white
supremacists  to  freely publicize their activities  and  to
seriously frighten the Jewish community in Canada.

We learned of discussions that took place between Droege and
Tom  Metzger prior to the CBC interviews. We concluded that,
as a result of Droege's instructions, Tom Metzger lied about
receiving money and information on Jewish groups from  Grant
Bristow. The broadcast aired uncorroborated information from
notoriously   violent  and  unreliable  sources.   Metzger's
statements were prepared in consultation with his  neo  Nazi
associate in Canada, Droege, and the comments were  designed
to  - and had the effect of - increasing the climate of fear
within the Canadian Jewish community.

Despite  allegations to the contrary,  the  Service  had  no
advance notice that synagogues in the Toronto area would  be
defaced after the Metzgers were arrested. As we mentioned in
chapter IX, CSIS issued a Threat Assessment which warned  of
vandalism,  but this is standard practice after the  extreme
right  suffers a blow, and police forces are well  aware  of
the risk to Jewish and other
institutions in such cases.

We  further  believe that most of the other  comments  aired
during   the  CBC  broadcast  were  provided  by  a   former
Immigration  Officer  who provided confused  and  ultimately
misleading information. This approach discredited CSIS,  the
Government  of  Canada, and the various  Police  Forces  and
other  agencies  involved in opposing the racist  groups  in
Canada. Not incidentally, the television program provided an
unprecedented opportunity for violent racists  in  both  the
United  States  and  Canada  to be  portrayed  as  credible,
honest, and truthful witnesses.[1]

   13.8 Spying on the CBC

We   concluded  that  the  information  which  the   Service
collected  concerning  the  CBC was  obtained  in  a  lawful
investigation. Of greater importance, CSIS did  not  spy  on
the  CBC,  its journalists, or any of its other  staff.  The
information  reported  to  the  Solicitor  General  was  not
obtained by the Source.

Taking   into   consideration   all   of   the   extenuating
circumstances concerning the information requirements of the
Minister and the nature of the information collected, we are
of  the  opinion that some of the information collected  and
reported was not "strictly necessary." If the Service wanted
to  update  the Minister on the threat to national  security
presented  by  white  supremacists  in  the  Canadian  Armed
Forces,  it could have done so without reference  to  a  CBC
program.

   13.9 Spying on the Postal Workers/Union

We reviewed the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation exposes of
CSIS  spying  on  postal workers or the  Canadian  Union  of
Postal Workers which aired in September and October 1994. We
concluded  that  the  allegations  were  completely  without
foundation.

We believe that one or more CBC journalists misread a leaked
Housebook Card to the Minister.

Following the completion of its own investigation,  the  CBC
has, in effect, withdrawn its allegation that CSIS spied  on
the Postal Workers.

   13.10 The Media and the Heritage Front Affair

We  could  not fail to notice the intense media interest  in
the  wake  of  allegations that a CSIS informant infiltrated
the  Heritage  Front.  We  have taken  all  the  allegations
seriously, because we have a responsibility to the people of
Canada to do so.

In  several  cases where the print and broadcast media  have
made  mistakes  and we have asked for corrections,  we  were
pleased to find them responsive to our requests.

In  some  cases, the media have produced stories about  "The
Heri  tage Front Affair" which attempted to place issues  in
context  and they clearly sought to corroborate the  sources
they   used.  We  acknowledge  the  considerable   obstacles
attendant  on  any  story  which involves  the  intelligence
community.  Nevertheless,  most  journalists  have,  in  our
opinion,  behaved  responsibly in producing  their  stories,
despite  the disadvantages imposed by the secrecy associated
with the case.

That  said, we feel obligated to point out that one  edition
of  "The  Fifth Estate" about the Heritage Front Affair  was
not balanced.

This  edition of "The Fifth Estaten broadcast presented  the
testimony  of  violent racists without any serious  attempt,
that we could determine, to corroborate the statements.

   13.11 Ministerial Direction - CSIS and Polies Concerning

All  human  source activities are governed by the limits  of
the  CSIS Act and direction issued by the Solicitor  General
under  section 6(2) of the CSIS Act. It is also governed  by
CSIS  internal direction in the CSIS Operational Manual.  In
their directions to sources, CSIS officers are bound by  the
limits of sections 2 and 12 of the CSIS Act.

Under  the  CSIS  Act,  the  Minister  can  provide  written
direction  to  the Service. On October 30,  1989,  the  then
Solicitor General released comprehensive guidelines for  the
use  of Human Sources. In the direction, the Minister  notes
that "a special responsibility rests with the Service to  do
everything   reasonable  to  ensure  that  its  confidential
sources operate within the law, and do not behave so  as  to
bring discredit on the Service or the Government".

The  Minister further stated that confidential sources shall
be  instructed  not  to  engage  in  illegal  activities  in
carrying  out their work on behalf of the Service  and  that
they   should   be   instructed  not  to  act   as   'agents
provocateurs'  or  in  any way incite or  encourage  illegal
activity.

However,  the  level of policy guidsnce  available  to  CSIS
officers is, we believe, seriously deficient.

We  believe Direction and Policy in this area should be  re-
examined. It should at a minimum provide full assistance  to
CSIS  staff by providing thoughtful answers to a  number  of
important questions. Among them:

   * what kind of a proactive role is acceptable
     for a source in an organization targeted by
     CSIS?

   * is it appropriate to have a source direct or
     be a leader within an organization or movement?

   * should sources be engaged in counter measures
     which would serve to destroy, rather than
     maintain terrorist groups or movements?

   * do the benefits of maintaining a source
     outweigh the benefits to be gained by taking
     measures (i.e. with Police Forces) to destroy
     the group?

We  recognize  that the answers to these questions  are  not
simple.  As  we  have stated in our report, the  members  of
racist  groups,  for  example, go from one  organization  to
another for a variety of reasons and the groups form and re-
form under different names. Today's Heritage Front member is
tomorrow's Nationalist Party of Canada member or a  follower
of  Ernst  Zundel  or, more likely in view of  recent  court
cases in North America, an aggressive racist who claims that
he  belongs  to  no  particular  group  in  order  to  avoid
prosecution.

If  CSIS  were to use only 'wpassive" sources in the  racist
right, then the quality of the information available to  the
intelligence  community  and  to  police  forces  would   be
considerably less useful at best or useless at  worst.  Most
good  sources are active. In the case of the present Source,
the  information  he provided contributed to  eighty  Threat
Assessments  over  five  years,  hundreds  of  reports,  the
deportation   of   no   fewer  than   five   foreign   white
supremacists,  and  the  weakening of  some  racist  efforts
against Jewish groups, anti-racists, and minority groups.

We  note too, in response to the question of "countering" or
eliminating extremist groups, that the 1981 Royal Commission
under  Mr.  Justice D.C. McDonald took a dim  view  of  RCMP
Security Service practices.[2]

While the Commission referred specifically to direct actions
by  employees  of  the  old Security  Service,  we  are  not
inclined to support such activities if performed by a source
of  the  CSIS. We are also cognizant of the danger  that  in
destroying one group, as opposed to watching it, another one
which is worse may be created.

Our investigation of the Heritage Front Affair made us aware
of  the  fact  that there was insufficient policy  direction
available.  For  example,  we observed  no  clear  direction
concerning  what  was  taking  place  in  relation  to   the
harassment campaign; there was no "global picture"  of  what
was going on.

We  co  nsider that the Service should regularly draw  up  a
"balance  sheet  "  on the benefits of a  particular  source
operation.  In  other  words,  the  management   and   staff
associated  with a high level source should regularly  stand
back from day-to-day transactions to assess the operation in
its  totality. To a certain extent this takes  place  during
the   application  process  for  the  renewal  of  targeting
authorizations. But in the current case, a major activity of
the Source, the "IT" campaign, was not brought before Senior
Management and so was not discussed; we think that this  was
an important oversight.

Our conclusion is that current directions from the Solicitor
General and the Director should be expanded and improved  to
deal with some of the issues we have described.

We  realize that the best way to avoid criticism  is  to  do
nothing.  Therefore, we do not advocate detailed rules  that
would  unduly limit CSIS in its duty to protect the Canadian
public   and   State.  We  recommend,  rather,   Ministerial
guidelines  that require CSIS management to carefully  weigh
the  benefits and the dangers of each human source operation
on a regular basis; taking due account
of the special circumstances of each case.

We  believe  that  the actions of sources should  not  bring
discredit  to  the  Service, nor  the  Government,  nor  the
society in which we live. That said, we understand that, for
the  most  part,  targets of CSIS or of the Police  are  not
generally  among  the highest moral levels of  our  society.
Employing   any  source,  whether  among  drug  dealers   or
terrorists, becomes a risk management situation in which the
intelligence benefits must be weighed against  the  risk  of
disclosure and any inappropriate activities of the source.

   13.12 Overview

There  is  some direct or indirect criticism in this  report
about  elements of the Heritage Front Affair, but  there  is
one  aspect of the operation that deserves praise.  That  is
the work of the Source in close cooperation with the Toronto
Investigator who was his contact with CSIS.

The  work of sources is important and sometimes vital to the
well  being of Canadian Society. We are satisfied that  both
the  Source  and  his  handlers in this naffairn  discharged
their duties in a competent and responsible manner.

Both  men,  throughout this period, believed that they  were
doing valuable work helping to protect Canadian society from
a cancer growing within. They deserve our thanks.

Finally,  we would like to put on the record our unshakeable
conviction that the Government of Canada, through all  means
at its disposal, should continue to ensure that it is always
aware  of what is going on within extreme right wing  racist
and Neo-Nazi groups. Canadians should never again repeat the
mistakes of the  past by underestimating the potential for harm 
embodied in hate-driven organizations.

1. A Fifth Estate producer said: "the implication that we just
   accepted their (white supremacists') statements is false - we did
   everything humanly possible ... but we don't want to make any
   further comment on anything that will affect the outcome of the
   report.."
2. Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal
   Canadian Mounted Police (McDonald Commission). Second report -
   Volume 1, Freedom and Security Under the Law, August 1981, page 270.

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