Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-21/tgmwc-21-208.04
Last-Modified: 2000/12/18

DR. LATERNSER CONTINUES:

Now I shall turn to Document Mil. 10, to which I should
especially like to call the attention of the High Tribunal.
It will be found on Pages 55 to 61 of Document Book No. I.
From this document the High Tribunal will be in a position
to see which ranks were held by the officers indicted at the
times that exceptional events took place, for instance, at
the outbreak of the war. This compilation; therefore,
permits one to draw certain definite conclusions as to how
far these officers had a decisive influence on the events.

As can be computed from the first column of list 5 on Pages
58 to 61 (the result will be found on Page 55 under figure
I) on 1st September, 1939 - that is, at the beginning of the
war - of a total of 107 generals and admirals still living
47 still had the rank of staff officers. They were majors or
lieutenant-colonels or colonels and 48 were generals of a
lower rank. And of these entire 107 who are involved in the
Indictment only seven are of the highest ranks. Five were
full generals, and there were two field-marshals. We do not
have any definite information of five of those still alive.

I shall merely call your attention to the other summaries
dealing with earlier events set out on Pages 56 and 57. The
following should be remarked concerning

                                                  [Page 326]

the composition of these alleged groups. The permanent
deputies of the Wehrmacht Staff, according to Affidavit 6 of
General Halder, Exhibit USA 533, are also accused by the
prosecution. I should like to call your attention, with
reference to the tasks and the significance of the position,
to the cross-examination of Halder before the Commission on
Page 3309 of the record. According to this, the holders of
this position did not concern themselves decisively with
strategic questions. Their position did not in any way
correspond with the positions which are included in the
Indictment.

Thus I conclude my evidence dealing with the group as it was
made up. The prosecution is of the opinion that the circle
of people as indicted consisted of an organized group. The
affidavits submitted by the prosecution to prove this point,
No. I, by General Halder, Exhibit USA 531, and No. 2; by
Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch, Exhibit USA 532, do not have
the meaning indicated to us by the prosecution. In this
connection, I should like to refer first of all to the cross-
examination of General Halder which I conducted before the
Commission, and I should like to ask the High Tribunal to
permit me to read one passage from this record so that this
point will be complete in the record.

On Page 3298 you will find the following statement:

BY DR. LATERNSER:

  "Q. In your Affidavit No. I you have used the word
  'group' four times. Did this expression 'group' emanate
  from you?
  
  "A. No; it was contained in the text, which has been
  changed several times, in which I left this word as it
  was.
  
  "Q. Had you previously used this expression 'group' in a
  similar connection, for instance; in characterising the
  military leaders as a 'group'?
  
  "A. No.
  
  "Q. What sense did you give this word 'group' at the
  moment when you signed the statement?
  
  "A. I did not hesitate to use this word. 'Group' is used
  in the sense of 'number'.
  
  "Q. You, therefore, mean several generals? Or did you
  mean a certain circle of people who had been grouped for
  a certain purpose?
  
  "A. A number of generals who perhaps might be
  characterised as leading generals.
  
  "Q. Subsequently the prosecution is now interpreting this
  expression 'group' as if an organization of military
  leaders existed. Was there an organization, or an
  organized group of that sort?
  
  "A. No."

Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch was examined by me before this
High Tribunal with regard to Affidavit 2. Concerning the
allegation that the front Commanders-in-Chief were actually
the consulting body for the High Command, the prosecution
has quoted Exhibit USA 537, Affidavit 5, by General
Blaskowitz. I should like  to refer to Affidavit General
Staff 55, which has been translated, in which General
Blaskowitz, on my request, gives an interpretation of the
affidavit. According to this affidavit the Oberbefehlshaber,
the Commanders-in-Chief, were not a consultant body, but
they were individual consultants in their own sphere, as is
true in every army. The interpretation which the prosecution
gives to Affidavit 5 is, accordingly, not correct.

Further, I should like to refer to Affidavits 1-55, which
also prove that the highest military authorities did not
form an organization-like "group." I should like you to give
your special attention to Affidavits 1-4, which have been
translated but which I do not wish to quote.

That the Navy and the Air Force did not form a "group" with
the Army generals may be seen from Affidavits 3145, 12 and
3097 of Admiral Schniewind

                                                  [Page 327]

and of the Generals Stumpf and Keller. And only from these
affidavits, particularly number 3145 of Admiral Schniewind,
can the High Tribunal infer all that which is important with
reference to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy and form
its judgement.

I should also like to refer to the testimony of all the
generals who were heard before the Commission, who all
denied the existence of a "group."

Of special importance seems to me the testimony of General
von Buttlar, who, on Pages 11285-286 of the English text of
the official record, testified as to how nominations to
these positions covered by the Indictment were effected.

Mr. President, thus I conclude my evidence on the question
of whether a "group" actually existed or not.

Now I shall turn briefly to my proof dealing with the common
attitude of the generals involved.

Their general attitude described in the opening speech by
Mr. Justice Jackson is based on rather doubtful premises.
Document 1947 was referred to by Mr. Justice Jackson in this
connection. This document. 1947-PS, which is of basic
significance to his statement, is a letter allegedly written
by General von Fritsch on 11th December, 1938, to a Baroness
von Schutzbar-Milchling, in which he is said to have
declared that three battles would have to be won: the first
against the workers, the second against the Catholic Church,
and the third against the Jews.

Despite several demands I received neither the original nor
a photostatic copy of this document. I was told that I would
have access to it if and when it could be found.

I should like to refer in my refutation to the affidavit
deposed by Baroness von Schutzbar-Milchling, in which she
states that the alleged letter by General von Fritsch was
never received by her.

If the key Document 1947-PS cannot be submitted until the
end of this proceeding - I should like to emphasize it has
not been submitted until now but used all the same - then -
and I make a special application for this - that part of the
opening speech by Mr. Justice Jackson, which refers to this
document, which after all has not been submitted, should be
struck from the record.

THE PRESIDENT: If the document has not been proved the
Tribunal will pay no attention to it. If it is not in
evidence then it is quite unnecessary to produce the
document denying its existence. We will take no notice of
it.

What I understand you to be saying is that Mr. Justice
Jackson referred to a letter. That letter has not been
offered in evidence. If it has not been offered in evidence
then the Tribunal takes no notice of anything Mr. Justice
Jackson said about it in his speech, and it is unnecessary
for you to produce an affidavit denying the existence of the
letter. Is that clear?

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but, Mr. President, it has been used.
Mr. Justice Jackson -

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have pointed out to us now that it
ought not to have been used because it is not in evidence.
We wish to be strict in these matters and only to allow
factual documents to be referred to which have been offered
in evidence.

DR. LATERNSER: Concerning the mistrust which Hitler had of
the military leadership, that is a matter which has been
stated and proven several times in these proceedings.

I should like to refer the Tribunal to Affidavit 200,
deposed by Lt.-General Engel, an officer who, for a
considerable time, was in the closest proximity to Hitler
and could observe the latter's growing mistrust. I will not
read from that affidavit.

                                                  [Page 328]

In this connection I should also like to refer to Affidavit
3182, deposed by General Warlimont, who reproduced
significant, statements made by Hitler and, in order to be
brief, I shall merely refer to it.

Regarding the attitude taken by the military leaders to the
Party and its methods, I should like to refer, as an example
only, to Affidavit 175, which has been translated. The
officer who at that time was competent, Major-General
Seegers, describes the opposition of the Military Leaders to
the removal of Jewish officers. I should further like to
refer to the contents of Affidavits 160 to 177, which
contain many particulars of the unpolitical attitude taken
by the military leadership.

Dealing with the question of rearmament, I should like to
refer to Affidavit 126, in which General Berlin testifies
that the General Staff eliminated from its armament
programme for 1933-34 the construction of heavy artillery,
and explicitly states that Germany did not want to wage
aggressive wars.

I should like to refer further to Affidavit 127, deposed by
Major-General Hesselbach, from which it may be seen that at
the beginning of the war the equipment and weapons provided
for units in case of mobilization were insufficient. As far
as the rest of the interesting contents of this document is
concerned, I shall merely refer your attention to it.

Dealing with rearmament in the Luftwaffe, the prosecution
submitted Document L-43, Exhibit GB 29, which allegedly
shows the rearmament intentions of the Luftwaffe.

I should like to refer to the contents of Affidavit 101 of
the then Chief of the General Staff, General Stumpf, who
expressly testifies that this was' a private organisational
study set up by General Kammhuber.

Continuing, I refer to the contents of Affidavits 102 to
152. Through details of the most various sorts we can see
that the military leadership, at any event, did not
seriously take into consideration aggressive wars when
carrying through the rearmament programme.

I should further like to refer to the contents of Affidavits
181 to 205, from which we can see, as is corroborated by
many details, that foreign officers participated in certain
training courses and exercises; that manoeuvres were only of
a defensive nature, and that the military academy which
existed for the training of general staff officers mainly
had courses in defence tactics.

As far as the deliberate participation of the military
leaders in wars of aggression is concerned, the prosecution
has been trying to prove that the military leaders at an
early date had been advised and informed of Hitler's plans,
and in this connection they produced the Hoszbach record of
5th November, 1937, Document 386-PS, Exhibit USA 25.

I should like to refer to the affidavit of the author of
this record, General Hoszbach, dealing with the background
and the origin of this document. General Hoszbach in his
Affidavit 210, which he sent to me, expressly states that he
did not take notes at the conference and that he only wrote
down this record several days later. This document has been
translated.

THE PRESIDENT: Does he say in this affidavit whether he was
shown a copy, of the notes or whether he had any comments to
make on them?

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I must state quite frankly
that in view of the great bulk of material I cannot give you
this information at the moment. In any event I would have
asked for a recess now. I shall check on these matters and I
shall be able to tell the Tribunal afterwards. In addition,
I should like to condense the material a little and I am
sure this will have beneficial results later on.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, may I say something briefly
about the order in which the final speeches for the
organizations will be delivered? I am sub-

                                                  [Page 329]

mitting a list drawn up after brief consultation with my
colleagues. According to this, counsel for Political Leaders
and Gestapo could deliver his final plea on Thursday or
Friday; on Monday counsel for the SS and SD, on Tuesday for
the General Staff and Reich Cabinet, and on Wednesday for
the SA. In the second column I have indicated by what date
these documents can be turned in for translation; and in the
last column I have given the time when the speeches could
presumably be delivered. If there is no session on Saturday,
Friday could be devoted to the Political Leaders and the
Gestapo. That is what I wanted to say.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean Friday this week could be taken up
with the Political Leaders?

DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, and then the Gestapo. If there is no
session on Saturday, the SS could begin on Monday so that
there would be no interruption. The difficulty lies in
whether the Translating Division can keep up with this pace.

THE PRESIDENT: I suppose that the difficulty in the
Translating Division is partly due to their having nothing
to translate.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the Tribunal wanted
information on whether the Hoszbach document was made
available for information. As is shown in the document
itself, Hoszbach told Hitler of the existence of this
document and gave it to him twice to read; but Hitler
refused to do so. General Hoszbach does not recall whether
he presented the record to Colonel-General von Fritsch; but
he certainly did show it to Colonel-General Beck. He also
says that this record was not signed by the participants in
the conference.

THE PRESIDENT: I see he says it was initialled by Blomberg.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, initialled but not signed. May I
continue, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, certainly.

DR. LATERNSER: Affidavits 213A, B and C show that the most
important agencies were not informed of this conference of
5th November, 1937. Numerous officers offered evidence that
the nature of the equipment and training of the Wehrmacht
eliminated any possibility of there being any idea of a war
of aggression; that is shown in Affidavits 223 to 225, 220
and 277. General Adam, in Affidavit 211, discusses the
entirely diverse views on the situation held by the
Wehrmacht, on the one hand, and by Hitler on the other.
Field-Marshal von Weichs, in Affidavit 215, rebuts the
opinions of Field-Marshal von Blomberg in his Affidavit 3,
Exhibit USA 536. Field-Marshal Sperrle reports in Affidavits
237 and 237A that he and Reichenau did not know the purpose
of their visit to the Berghof during the Schuschnigg
conference in February, 1938. Only later did Hitler comment
on this event.

The surprising order to march into Austria caused the troops
to improvise measures, as is shown by Affidavits 238 to 244.
The same is true of the occupation of Czechoslovakia; on
this subject I refer to Affidavits 246, 252 and 254.

General Warlimont, in Affidavit 217, describes how, up to
the day of the attack on Poland, a peaceful outcome of the
tension bad been expected. This is corroborated by
Affidavits 227, 246 and 255 to 257. Hitler's statements
confirming this view of the generals are discussed in
Affidavits 219, 211, 212 and particularly 277. The surprise
which the final order to march against Poland caused is
shown in Affidavits 228 to 231, as well as 255, 256 and 257.

In July, 1939, Grand Admiral Raeder had told the Navy that
the political leaders had assured him clearly that in the
next few years there would be no hostilities. That is shown
in Affidavit 3115 of Rear-Admiral Katzenberg. At the
beginning of the war the German battleship Gneisenau had
written orders that no hostilities were to be expected; at
that time it was on a training trip near the

                                                  [Page 330]

Canary Islands, without ammunition supplies. That is shown
from the affidavit of Admiral Forste, No. 3114.

According to Admiral Backenkoehler, in Affidavit 3116,
preparations for production had been so inadequate that in
August, 1940, there was still a lack of torpedoes for the
small number of U-boats available at that time.

Only a few officers learned of the preparations for the
Norwegian campaign.

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