Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-21/tgmwc-21-200.03
Last-Modified: 2000/11/16

Q. Was there any tactical collaboration with the
Einsatzgruppen on the part of the 11th Army?

A. Yes. The SS, SD, or the police provided us, as far as I
remember, with a number of auxiliaries. In the Jaila
Mountains of the Crimea there were at that time small
inaccessible parts of the mountains where there were
partisans. We could not get at them because we had no
mountain troops. All we could do was to try to starve out
these bands by preventing them from raiding Tartar villages
and maintaining their food supplies. For that reason we
armed the

                                                   [Page 59]

Tartars, in order to discover if these villages were
reliable in our sense, and the SD assisted us.

THE PRESIDENT: This is going into the matter in great
detail. Has it not been gone into in his evidence before the
Commission? Cannot you shorten it?

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. This brings me to my last
question and, as far as I can recollect, that question was
not put when the witness was before the Commission.

BY DR. LATERNSER:

A. Also they worked with us to discover the food storage
bases of the partisans. We had to do this because no German
forces were available, only Roumanian mountain troops who
were solely occupied with these tasks.

Q. Did it ever happen that sections of the SS, SD or
Einsatzgruppen participated in this partisan fighting and
then were decorated for their work.

A. That is quite possible. But then these were decorations
for action in a battle, not for the killing of Jews.

Q. Now, let us come to another point. The armed forces have
also been accused of looting in the occupied territories?

A. We had the strictest orders in the Army against looting,
and rigorous action was taken against looters. No separate
individual was allowed to requisition, only troop units and
then only what the unit needed for the feeding of the troops
within the ration allotments. In 1943 we co-operated in
bringing back goods which were especially needed by us for
carrying on the war. But by an express order of mine that
was limited in the Ukraine to grain, oilseeds, some small
quantity of metal and a small number of cattle which could
be driven along with us. However, all this was not looting
private property; it was a State requisitioning of State
property.

Q. Were factories dismantled by the armed forces?

A. The dismantling of factories, if it took place, was done
on orders from the Economic Staff East, because the
exploitation of industry in the occupied territories, even
in the operational area, did not come under the command of
the armies, but under the Economic Staff East.

Q. To what extent were the military leaders concerned with
the deportation of workers?

A. We merely had instructions to support the requisitioning
of labour by the Reich Plenipotentiary. We ourselves
resisted having to give up labour because we needed it
ourselves for agriculture in the occupied territories. When,
during conversations with Sauckel, I told him that methods
of coercion would make the population hostile, he said that
he himself was against the use of force. I received a report
that people had allegedly been rounded up by force in the
Reich Commissariat. When I made inquiries, Reich Commissar
Koch told me that it was not true, that he had heard these
rumours himself and had looked into the matter and found
that it was all lies. I had no evidence to counter this. At
any rate we limited ourselves to recruiting, and moreover,
the Reich Plenipotentiary presented a regulation to me
according to which foreign workers in Germany were to be
treated and fed in the same way as German workers.

Q. You mentioned Sauckel and Kock in this connection. Were
these separate conversations or were they both held
together?

A. No, in my opinion they were different conferences. Koch
once visited me with Rosenberg, and on that occasion I
mentioned that I had heard of these methods of force. He
denied it, but Sauckel was not present.

Q. And then on another occasion Sauckel visited you alone?

A. Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: The conversation that occurred with
Rosenberg, when did it occur?

                                                   [Page 60]

THE WITNESS: That I cannot remember exactly.

THE PRESIDENT: Not the exact date; approximately?

THE WITNESS: That was in 1943. Rosenberg and Koch came to
visit me. It must have been, I should think, in September or
October, but try as I may I cannot give the exact date. It
may have been earlier.

DR. LATERNSER: Field-Marshal, why did you, as a high
military leader, tolerate all these violations of
International Law and laws of humanity?

A. In my province, in my military province, I did not
tolerate such things, and whatever happened in the
ideological struggle outside of my sphere we did not get to
know about. It was taking place outside our sphere of
influence and knowledge, and we had neither the power nor
the right to prevent it, apart from the fact that we never
knew of all the abominations which have since been
disclosed.

Q. Did you believe that the duty to obey in the Army means
co-operation in everything?

A. The military duty to obey is without doubt binding. The
right or the duty to disobey I would say does not exist for
the soldier. In addition, there is a moral duty which would
come in, for instance, in such cases as the execution of
Jews. But we knew nothing about that.

Q. In the case of the Commissar Order, if all the Commanders-
in-Chief had refused, would it not have caused Hitler to
amend it?

A. He would certainly not have done that. On the contrary,
it would perhaps have been a desirable opportunity for him
and the others to remove us. Apart from that, an open
refusal to obey in order to coerce a dictator is an entirely
useless method. Under a dictatorship, a dictator cannot
permit himself to be forced, because the moment he gives in
to such force, his dictatorship ends.

Q. Was it not possible to make him depart from his decisions
by counter-propositions?

A. As regards basic political decisions, decisions for war,
etc.; it certainly was not. He announced his decisions in
speeches or by means of orders, and no discussion and no
protest was possible.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness has been over this subject
already.

Q. Did you have any military influence on Hitler?

A. In questions of purely military leadership, he listened
to me in certain respects. Indeed, on this question I had
constant arguments with him. My written suggestions to him
or to the Chief of General Staff for submission to Hitler
would fill a large volume. In decisive matters of purely
operational leadership I probably succeeded, generally
speaking, in carrying my point. In other cases, as soon as
we left the subject of military command, he cut short any
discussion. On three occasions, however, I tried, in
personal talks with him; to get him to alter the supreme
military command, that is, in plain German, to surrender the
supreme command, if not in name, at least in fact.

THE PRESIDENT: What have we got to do with this? What have
we got to do with these matters which are matters of
strategy? The High Command is not being accused of anything
in connection with strategy.

BY DR. LATERNSER:

Q. Do you know, Field-Marshal, whether other military
leaders too had differences with Hitler?

A. These differences were, no doubt, very numerous. That
becomes apparent from the following facts alone.

Of 17 Field-Marshals who were members of the Army, 10 were
sent home during the war and three lost their lives as a
result of the 20th July. Only one Field-Marshal managed to
get through the war and keep his position as Field-Marshal.

                                                   [Page 61]

Of 36 Colonel-Generals, 18 were sent home and five died as a
result of the 20th July or were dishonourably discharged.
Only three Colonel-Generals survived the war in their
positions.

Q. Out of 36?

A. Yes, out of 36. I believe there is no profession which
can show so many victims of conviction, for all these
leaders were highly qualified officers, militarily speaking.
They could not have been sent away because they were
incapable. They were sent away because Hitler distrusted
them and also because he did not think they were harsh
enough in operational strategy.

Q. Did the circle of men concerned with the 20th July get in
touch with you? The witness, Gisevius, has said something
about that.

A. I did not come to know of that. I once received a letter
from Colonel-General Beck. It was in the winter of 1942, and
he discussed the strategical situation on the basis of the
experience at Stalingrad. He said that it was hardly likely
that the war would come to a good end. I replied to him that
I could not contradict his statement but that one defeat was
no reason to consider the war lost, and that a war was only
lost if you yourself considered it lost. I went on to say
that I had so many worries on my front that I could not
begin a lengthy discussion about these matters.

Now, afterwards, it has become clear to me that several
other attempts to make contact were made in order to find
out my attitude. On one occasion General von Jahrsdorff
visited me and, as he told me afterwards, he had letters on
him from Goerdeler, I believe, and Popitz, which he was
supposed to show to me if he gained the impression that I
could be enlisted for a coup d'etat. As it was always my
point of view, however, that the removal or the
assassination of Hitler during the war would lead to chaos,
he never showed me these letters. That these were supposed
to be attempts to make contact with me is something which
only became clear afterwards. I had never; therefore, made a
promise to anyone to participate in such affairs.

Q. Did you receive any personal gifts?

A. No, I did not.

Q. When and for what reason were you relieved of your post?

A. I was relieved of my post at the end of March, 1944. The
reason given to me by Hitler was that large-scale operations
for which he needed me could no longer be carried out and
that it was merely a question now of holding out stubbornly
and that a new man would have to be put in my place. I never
believed that this was the true reason. The true reason was
without doubt that he distrusted me too. After all, he was
the revolutionary and I was the old Prussian officer. Then,
too, as the Chief of the General Staff, General Breitler
told me at the time there was a continuous campaign of
hatred against me on the part of Himmler, and all manner of
statements were made, namely, that a Christian like myself
could not be faithful; and it is certain too that other
elements joined in this campaign.

Q. I shall now come to my last question, Field-Marshal. What
can you say to the accusation by the prosecution that the
military leadership was criminal?

A. I have been a soldier for forty years. I come from a
family of soldiers and I have grown up with military
conceptions.

The example from amongst my nearest relatives which I had
before me was the old Hindenburg. We young officers
naturally considered the glory of war as something great,
and I do not wish to deny that I was proud that during this
war an army was entrusted to me. But our ideal, and that
applies to my comrades too, did not lie in the conducting of
war but in the education of our youth to be honourable
citizens and decent soldiers. Under our orders that youth of
ours a went to death by the million.

                                                   [Page 62]

And if I may say something personal: my eldest song died as
a lieutenant in the infantry, when he was 19; two of, my
sons-in-law, who grew up in my house, died as young
officers; my best comrades in this war, my young adjutant
and my young chauffeur, were killed. Nearly all the sons of
my brothers and sisters were killed. That we, the old
soldiers, should have led into war for a criminal purpose
that youth of ours which was so dear to us, would far exceed
any wickedness of which man could be thought capable: It is
possible that a man without a family and without tradition,
who is obsessed with fanatical belief in a higher mission,
may go beyond the limits of human law, but we, the old
soldiers, purely from a human point of view, would not have
been able to do so. We could not lead our youth into crime.

DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions, Mr. President.

(A recess was taken.)

BY DR. GAWLIK (counsel for the SD):

Q. Witness, you have repeatedly mentioned the  SD. What is
your conception of the SD?

A. What I understand by the SD is an institution within the
framework of the SS, which came under Himmler and had
special police tasks.

Q. Then if I now tell you that here the Departments III and
IV of the RSHA are being indicted under SD, then I ask you,
did you understand that those organizations came under SD?

A. The conception of the SD is only known to me as it was
probably known to most Germans; that is to say, as some sort
of special police. I do not know what departments in the
RSHA belonged to it, because the organization and tasks of
the RSHA are unknown to me.

Q. Then as a former Commander-in-Chief you do not know
either which departments in the RSHA dealt with police
tasks?

A. No, I have no idea of that, nor did it ever interest me.

Q. Can you answer the question with yes or no whether by SD
you meant Departments III and IV?

A. No.

Q. Your defence counsel and you yourself have talked here
about the Einsatzgruppen of the SD. Was that designation
correct, or what were these Einsatzgruppen called?

A. The name Einsatzgruppen was made clear to me only here.
Previously, during the time I was a Commander-in-Chief, I
only knew that Higher SS and Police Leaders existed, and
that sections of the SD had been given the special task of
keeping a watch on the population. Let me say, therefore,
that the conception of the Einsatzgruppen as it has been
explained here, only became perfectly clear to me here.

Q. But as a former Commander-in-Chief you must have known
the correct designation of these Einsatzgruppen.

A. It may be that I already knew the name Einsatzgruppen.
But I never thought of it as anything special: I merely
considered it to be a part of the SD, which was under
Himmler, and which had been given special tasks.

Q. Did you not know that these Einsatzgruppen were called
Einsatzgruppen A, B, C, and D?

A. No. I had never heard of Einsatzgruppen A, B, or C, and
whether the Einsatzgruppe which worked in my territory was
called "D" or not, I cannot say today. It may be or it may
not be. I just do not know.

Q. You did not know either what title Ohlendorf had?

A. Ohlendorf? I cannot tell you whether he was an SS
Gruppenfuehrer or SS Oberfuehrer.

Q. No. I do not mean that. I mean what title he had as the
leader of Einsatzgruppe D.

                                                   [Page 63]

A. No, I do not know that even today.

Q. Did you not know that his title was Deputy to the Chief
of the Security Police and of the SD with Army Group 3?

A. No, I did not know that, because an Army Group 3 did not
exist at the time, as far as I know.

Q. Or that this was his title in the Army?

A. No, I did not know that.

DR. GAWLIK: Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR:

Q. Witness, did you leave the General Staff of the OKH in
February of 1938?

A. May I ask you to repeat the question? I am afraid I did
not understand.

Q. Did you leave the General Staff of the OKH in February,
1938?

A. Was I a member of the OKH? Yes, yes.

Q. What was your rank when you left the OKH General Staff in
1938?

A. I was a major-general.

Q. That is the lowest grade of general officers in the
German Army, is it not?

A. Yes.

Q. And after you left the General Staff of the OKH, you
became a divisional commander?

A. Yes.

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