The Nizkor Project: Remembering the Holocaust (Shoah)

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THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Laternser.

DR. LATERNSER: As my second witness I am going to call Field-
Marshal von Mannstein.

ERICH VON MANNSTEIN, a witness, took the stand and testified
as follows:

BY THE PRESIDENT:

Q. Will you state your full name, please?

A. Erich von Mannstein.

Q. Will you repeat this oath after me:

I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will
speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.

(The witness repeated the oath.)

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY DR. LATERNSER:

Q. Field-Marshal, what was the last position you held?

A. My last appointment was Commander-in-Chief of Army Group
South.

Q. How did you achieve that position?

A. I was given that position in November, 1942, on the
strength of an order from Hitler.

Q. The other Commanders-in-Chief were appointed in a similar
way, were they not?

A. Yes.

Q. For many years you have held important positions in the
General Staff. In which capacity?

A. In the last war I was in the General Staff with Troops.
Then in 1929 I joined the Reichswehr Ministry, and was
appointed to the First Division of the Troops Department.

Q. Was the General Staff an elite, which set the standard in
the armed forces?

                                                   [Page 41]
A. The General Staff officers were an elite as far as they
were selected on the basis of their tactical abilities and
also on the strength of their character. They did not set
the tone in the Army as their views were exactly the same as
the views of all other officers. As to the General Staff
setting the tone of the armed forces, there really cannot be
any question of that. The Navy did not have a General Staff.
As for the Air Force, as far as I can judge, the General
Staff officers may have played a smaller part than
"outsiders" like Milch, Udet, and so forth, but to begin
with the Wehrmacht (armed forces as a whole) did not have a
Wehrmacht General Staff. Therefore one can hardly speak of
the General Staff dictating the tone within the armed
forces.

Q. Did the General Staff have authoritative influence on all
military plans? And was it, shall we say, the spiritual
centre of the Army?

A. At its headquarters, that is, in the Reich Ministry for
the Armed Forces, the General Staff in its various
departments did deal with certain general questions as far
as they concerned the leading and employment of troops. On
the other hand, all other matters were in the hands of the
various departments or of the Army Inspectorates. These
offices worked in conjunction with the General Staff and as
far as the material existence of the troops was concerned,
that was dealt with in these departments.

Q. But then surely the General Staff passed an opinion?

A. The General Staff could, of course, express itself on the
questions dealt with by the departments, training and
armament, for instance. But the chiefs of the other
departments were on exactly the same level as the chiefs of
the Troops Department, and important personnel questions, in
particular, were dealt with entirely outside the General
Staff.

Q. Was the Chief of the General Staff Hitler's adviser, or
was it the Commander-in-Chief of the Army or of the Air
Force, as the case may be? Who was it?

A. One cannot possibly say that the Chief of the General
Staff was Hitler's adviser. The position of Chief of the
General Staff in the Wehrmacht of the Third Reich differed
entirely from the position held by the Chief of the General
Staff at the time of the Kaiser. In those days the Chief of
the General Staff was immediately subordinate to the Kaiser,
that is to say, he could report directly to him.

In the Wehrmacht (armed forces) of the Third Reich on the
other hand, and even of the Weimar Republic, that was
entirely different. The Chief of the General Staff of the
Army, for instance, was nothing more than the adviser of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army regarding matters of military
leadership. Between him and Hitler there was, first of all,
the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and then, as long as we
had a Minister of War, in the shape of Blomberg, there was
the Reich Minister of War, too. Thus, there was no question
at all of the Chief of the General Staff advising Hitler.
But, as regards advising the Commander-in-Chief of the Army,
he shared his work, in peace time at least, with the chiefs
of the departments, that is to say, the Personnel
Department, the Armament Department and the Defence
Department, who were all on his own level.

Q. Was there a special service channel for the General
Staff?

A. A special service channel for the General Staff did not
exist. On the contrary, that was strictly tabooed. Towards
the end of the First World War something similar was
developed when Ludendorff in practice had gained control of
military matters and always communicated with the General
Staff Chiefs who were his subordinates instead of addressing
himself to the Commanders-in-Chief themselves. This
deterioration, as I might call it, of military leadership
was radically done away with by Generaloberst von Seeckt and
a special service channel for the General Staff, as is meant
here, therefore, did not exist.

Q. And what about the privilege of recording varying
opinions?

                                                   [Page 42]

A. In the old Army, every Chief of the General Staff had the
right, if he was of an opinion that differed from that of
his commander, to record that dissenting opinion, although,
of course, he had to carry out the order of his commander.
In the armed forces of the Third Reich on the other hand
that was expressly discontinued with the agreement of the
Chief of the General Staff, General Beck.

Q. Was the OKW, shall we say, the central brain of the armed
forces?

A. The OKW, of course, in the form in which it is now being
mentioned, only came into being in 1938 as a working staff
for Hitler. Before that, Blomberg was Reich Minister of War,
and his position was one which dealt with all matters
affecting the armed forces, which he represented to both
State and Party. In his hands, too, was the distribution of
funds for the various branches of the armed forces, and for
rearmament purposes. Gradually, no doubt, Blomberg was
trying to achieve a more outstanding leadership of the armed
forces, but in that connection he soon got into considerable
difficulties, particularly with the OKH, for the reason that
in the opinion of the OKH, Blomberg was too lenient with the
Party. He then attempted himself to establish a sort of
tactical leadership staff which later became the leadership
staff of the Wehrmacht, but that was only in its beginnings.
Then came his dismissal and subsequently the
Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab (Armed Forces Leadership Staff) was
created under Hitler. This is, however, not to be regarded
as a sort of head of the three General Staffs of the armed
forces or as the dome of the structure; it was nothing else
than the practical Leadership Staff of the Fuehrer.

Q. Did the headquarters of the armed forces branches or the
General Staff nevertheless agree with the OKW in their aims?

A. Naturally the three branches of the armed forces were in
agreement with the OKW that the national element should be
kept up. Furthermore, that they were there to uphold the
idea of national honour, of equality, and most of all of
security for Germany, which they considered their task.
Apart from that, one can hardly speak of a unified
determination. As an example I should like to say, for
instance, that the Army had one basic thought, that under no
circumstances could Germany ever again fight a war on two
fronts. The Navy, in my opinion, always had the one leading
thought: never again war with Britain. What Goering, as the
reigning head of the Air Force, wanted personally, I cannot
judge. But I do not suppose that he was interested in
jeopardising the position of the Third Reich and his own
position in another war.

Q. And the OKW?

A. As far as the OKW is concerned, if it had had a will of
its own, it did not, in my opinion, have the opportunity
seriously to bring that will into effect in opposition to
Hitler.

Q. What was the significance of the Schleiffen Club and what
were its aims?

A. The Schlieffen Club was generally speaking a club of
elderly gentlemen who were ex-members of the General Staff.
Apart from that, General Staff officers and subordinates to
leaders of the young Wehrmacht were in it, too. They met
once a year at an annual dinner preceded by a so-called
business meeting, during which the treasurer's report was
read; and that was about the principal business. Then, of
course, the Schlieffen Club had a Council of Honour, which
usually had to occupy itself with settling quarrels between
the older members resulting from Ludendorff's attitude
toward Hindenburg.

We younger ones did not go to those discussions any more;
and apart from that we did not come under this Council of
Honour. Any political or military aims on the part of this
club did not exist. You must not consider it as being a club
where intellectual schooling or training was being carried
out, instead of by the General Staff.

Q. What were the connections between the 129 military
leaders affected and the OKW and the General Staff?

                                                   [Page 43]

A. The bulk of them, according to their position, were in no
relationship to it at all.

Q. A little more slowly, Field-Marshal.

A. Only four of them belonged to the OKW: Keitel, Jodl,
Warlimont and Winter; and only the Chiefs of the General
Staffs of the Luftwaffe and the Army belonged to the General
Staff, although they were changed frequently. I think there
are five of each of the Wehrmacht branches. All the others
belonged neither to the General Staff nor to the OKW.

Q. But who else were these military leaders?

A. They were the holders of the highest positions in the
military hierarchy, as they are in every country.

Q. Did not these military leaders, according to their views,
represent an entity with a uniform will?

A. Naturally, as far as the conception of their work was
concerned, they agreed; that is a matter of course. Also
they agreed regarding the view of the necessity of Germany's
being strong because it was surrounded by three neighbours
from whom one might, after all, expect anything. Over and
above that, however, such a uniformity of thought cannot be
spoken of. I want to say that, horizontally considered, the
three branches of the armed forces were on the same level;
and each branch had different military thoughts and aims
which quite often worked against the other. Considered
vertically, these 129 officers must be subdivided according
to the military hierarchy into four steps, shall we say, in
the relation of command to obedience. The highest step was
the Fuehrer and his working staff, the OKW. On that level
there was the entire military and political responsibility
which, according to military principles, can always lie only
in the hands of the highest leader.

The second step consisted of the three Commanders-in-Chief
of the branches of the armed forces. They were responsible
for the military tasks of that branch of the armed forces
which was under their command. There, at that level of
command, they, of course, had entire responsibility. They
were, of course, to a certain extent Hitler's advisers too,
if he asked their advice in military matters.

Step 3, which, in the shape of the 129 officers, only
existed in war, were the Commanders of Army Groups. And then
below that, step 4, the Commanders of Armies. The Commanders
of Army Groups were responsible for the leadership of the
operations which they were to carry out. The same part
responsibility for their armies was in the hands of the Army
Commanders below them, who also exercised territorial
authority in their operational areas. The third and fourth
steps were in no connection, shall we say, as far as ideas
were concerned, with the Fuehrer, because in between there
was the step of the Commanders-in-Chief. They received
orders and had to obey them. As in all phases of military
life the relationship is that of one who gives orders and
one who carries them out.

Q. How could anyone responsible in the way you just
described it, how could he possibly give his opinion on
Hitler's plans?

A. To state one's view about Hitler's plans was quite out of
the question at the third and fourth levels, because they
would only learn of them when they appeared in the shape of
an order. If in individual cases the Commanders-in-Chief
were called to a conference with Hitler, then here again it
was the announcement of a decision already arrived at, which
could not be altered. These Commanders-in-Chief of the armed
forces branches could, of course, when they were previously
asked by Hitler, though I cannot give any instances, state
their views, their opinions. How far they might have
succeeded in that is entirely another question.

Q. Now, did not nearly all these military leaders come from
the General Staff, and was it not for that reason that these
leaders formed an entity.

A. I agree, a certain number of these leaders did come from
the General Staff.

In the case of the Army, the proportion of the 94 Army
officers who are supposed

                                                   [Page 44]

to belong to the so-called organization is that 74 had been
General Staff officers; 20 on the other hand were not. In
the case of the Air Force there were, as far as I know, only
9 out of 17 ex-members of the General Staff; and the Navy,
of course, did not have any. Uniformity, let us say, as far
as it existed at all, was therefore due to the fact that
they had the same military training, the same military
career in the General Staff, but no more.

Q. So that the conceptions of OKW and General Staff on one
side and these 129 officers on the other were entirely
different?

A. Yes, of course they were quite different. They were
mainly the military leaders, and not the General Staff, and
not the OKW; and you can neither ideally, nor materially,
nor practically, nor theoretically call them one unified
organization.

Q. Were certain SS leaders also amongst that group. Was not
the SS the fourth branch of the armed forces?

A. No, it certainly was not a fourth branch of the armed
forces. Quite certainly a large portion of the leaders of
the Waffen SS, and during the war the mass of the Waffen SS
units, wished to be incorporated into the Army. But,
naturally, considering the opposing will of the Fuehrer, and
of Himmler, it was not to be thought of. The units of the
Waffen SS fought during the war very bravely as our comrades
at the front; but they were not the fourth branch of the
armed forces. Quite on the contrary, Himmler prohibited
everything which could have exerted any influence of the
armed forces on the SS. For individual leaders of the SS to
have been incorporated amongst the group must be described
as grotesque, considering Himmler's personality; because if
there ever had been a deadly enemy of the Army, it was
Himmler.

Q. Why do you say Himmler was a deadly enemy of the Army?

A. Without any doubt whatever Himmler wanted his SS to take
the place of the Army; and in my opinion the generals of the
Army were particularly pursued by him with his hatred and
libel. I know about it myself at any rate from an entirely
reliable source: I know that it was very much due to
Himmler's manoeuvres, which included the use of wicked
libel. As far as the other leaders are concerned, I only
know that some of them had formerly been in the Reichswehr
and had been dismissed from it, so that they were not
exactly in favour of us, and did not feel they belonged to
us, that is pretty clear.


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