Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-21/tgmwc-21-199.07
Last-Modified: 2000/11/14

Q. Who issued, later on, the plan to attack?

A. On 27th September, 1939, Hitler announced his decision to
attack in the West. He ordered the necessary preparations to
be made, which would have to be concluded by 12th November.

Q. What position did you and the OKH take with reference to
this plan?

A. Britain and France had declared war on Germany. Neither
power had taken advantage of Germany's moment of greatest
weakness in September. Therefore, it was questionable to me
whether they would assemble for a winter offensive now, at a
time when the Western Front was daily being strengthened.
Beyond that, I personally was in much doubt whether these
two powers seriously desired to wage war. I believed, in
view of the reception which Chamberlain had in London and
Daladier in Paris, after the Munich Agreement, that their
people would not be inclined to wage a war.

I believed that the breaches of neutrality which had been
committed by the Allies up to that time would not weigh so
heavily in the eyes of the world. Since the year 1914 I
fully appreciated the consequences of violating neutrality,
and this had been seared into my memory. In my opinion, this
would apply again in this case to the one that would be the
first really to cross the border with strong ground forces.
We had looked into the question very carefully in the OKH of
whether the crossing of the border for reasons of ground
operations

                                                   [Page 28]

would be necessary as the first step. We had reached the
conviction that this did not apply, but that we, if it was
necessary at all, could do so later.

Q. Did you call Hitler's attention to the fact that in the
event of an offensive in the West, the countries of Holland;
Belgium and Luxembourg would be drawn into hostile
activities?

A. I took the very next opportunity at which I could talk
with Hitler alone after 27th September, 1939, to tell him my
opinion. However, he was not open to any discussion and
remained steadfast in his well-known opinion.

Q. Did you try to prevent the Western offensive from being
started?

A. Before as well as afterwards, I was convinced that it
would have to be possible to eliminate politically this
entire war once and for all. I considered it madness that,
Europe once more would have to tear herself to pieces
instead of promoting development by peacefully working at
the common task.

The Wehrmacht, according to the principle, Si vis pacem,
para bellum, was in line with this. German soldiers of every
rank had been trained to defend and protect their homeland.
They did not think about wars of conquest, or the expansion
of German domination over other peoples.

It was quite clear to me that the entire question could be
cleared up only by political means, if a sincere will to
this end existed. But any political developments, of course,
need time; and I was only concerned with providing this time
for these political negotiations, matters upon which I had
no influence, however. Therefore, I asked, on 5th November,
1939, to be granted an audience with the Fuehrer. As I could
no longer put political reasons before him, I had to give
purely military reasons, and as such I used the condition of
the Army.

Hitler listened at first to my statements quietly. Then he
flew into a rage so that any further conversation was
impossible. So I left. On the evening of the same day the
order was issued to attack on 12th November, an order which
was rescinded on 7th November.

Q. Did you not even use the bad weather as a pretext to gain
time and to postpone matters?

A. I pointed out the fact that if we were to march in at
all, on account of the extremely difficult terrain, this
would only be possible if we had an extended period of good
weather. But above all the use of the Luftwaffe was
dependent on a long period of good weather.

Q. And after the address of Hitler to the generals on 23rd
November, 1939, which has been discussed here quite
frequently, you offered your resignation? How did that
happen?

A. In the evening of 23rd November, once more I was ordered
to appear before the Fuehrer. In a lengthy discussion with
him alone, he once more raised all the accusations against
the Army. In the course of this conversation I offered my
resignation, which he. rejected, by saying that I had to do
my duty and obligation just like every other soldier.
Through these incidents a breach had occurred which was
closed but was never completely mended.

Q. To what extent, in your capacity as Commander-in-Chief of
the Army, did you participate in the decision to occupy
Norway and Denmark?

A. In no way at all.

Q. Did you participate in its preparation and execution?

A. No.

Q. Then the campaign in the West started. At that time, what
was your relationship with Hitler?

A. As I have already mentioned before, it was difficult. In
the course of the campaign in the West there were a series
of smaller and larger differences. I should like to cite but
one. This concerned the stopping of the German Panzers
before Dunkirk, a matter which brought about a serious
conflict. It was as a result of that that the mass of the
personnel of the British Expeditionary Force escaped to
England across the Channel.

                                                   [Page 29]

Q. On the part of the OKH, after the conclusion of the
campaign in the West, were measures for demobilization
worked on, or were they suggested?

A. At that time two measures were taken. A commission for
demobilization was established, and secondly a number of
generals were asked whether they wished to remain in the
Army after the conclusion of peace.

Q. And what was your collaboration in the decision to
intervene in Greece and Yugoslavia?

A. I did not participate in any way in these decisions.
When, with the Chief of the General Staff, Generaloberst
Halder, I was ordered by the Fuehrer to appear before him,
he received us with the words, "I have decided to destroy
Yugoslavia." And then he stated the reasons for his
decision. I believe they are well known here already.

Q. At that time, was there a plan for any interference in
Yugoslavia or Greece?

A. No, neither a plan nor any preparation existed. We did
not even have maps.

Q. And where were you to get these divisions from? From all
parts of Germany?

A. The divisions had to be brought in from all parts of
Germany and the occupied territories.

Q. Is the assertion of Field-Marshal Paulus true that the
occupation of the Balkans was one of the prerequisites of
the campaign against the Soviet Union?

A. That is a mistake on the part of Field-Marshal Paulus.
The Yugoslavian question was the direct consequence of the
overthrow there. Shortly before that time Yugoslavia had
joined the Tripartite Pact, and this question was the result
of the British landing in Greece and the catastrophic
position of the Italians in Albania.

Q. Now, let us turn to the Eastern campaign. What was your
attitude with reference to the Trade Agreement with the
Soviet Union?

A. The Trade Agreement with the Soviet Union was concluded
in September, 1939, and we had hailed it joyfully. In this
step we saw the prerequisite to the fact that from then on a
period of mistrust was ended, and that, above and beyond
that, Germany would be able to take up once more the
position of a bridge, according to her situation in the
heart of Europe.

Q. Did any military leader suggest the thought of attacking
the Soviet Union?

A. No, never.

Q. When did Hitler tell you for the very first time that the
possibility of war with the Soviet Union would be
considered?

A. In August of 1940 he made a remark to me to the effect
that he was worried, that the attitude of Russia might
change. Thereupon, I talked with the Chief of the General
Staff and told him that we would have to collect the data
required, for in this connection we had not done anything up
to that time.

Q. Were there any maps in existence?

A. Neither maps nor anything else. In the month of September
Hitler ordered that the question of Russia would have to be
investigated. In my opinion, no decision to put the plan
into effect was in existence; in any event, it was not
mentioned. All the work which was done was work for the
General Staff, consisting of the preparatory and
precautionary measures that are universally taken in such a
case.

Q. Did the transfer of some of the divisions into the
territory of the Government

General, which you ordered after the conclusion of the
Western campaign, have any connection with the start of the
Eastern campaign, or what were the reasons for this transfer
of divisions?

A. The transfer of the divisions had already started. The
reasons for it were quite different ones. The guarding of
the Russian-German demarcation line in Poland was mainly
carried out by the Zolldienst (Customs service). Border
crossings had been ascertained in innumerable cases. The
Zollgrenzschutz

                                                   [Page 30]

(Frontier Guard) was urgently needed at other places. The SS
intended to take over the border work of the Zolldienst
(Customs service) and for that reason they wanted to create
new units. But that I wanted to prevent, and, therefore,
Hitler was requested to have divisions transferred from the
West to the East. In addition to that, we wanted to relieve
France of the burden of the many divisions which were
stationed in France.

Q. Did the OKH, in the conference of 3rd February, 1941,
have any misgivings about a war with the Soviet Union?

DR. LATERNSER: I refer to Document 872-PS, Exhibit USA 134,
my Lord.

A. According to the statement made by Hitler in the case of
Russia, we were concerned with the fact that if a war had to
arise at all, it was to be a preventive war. In the
conference I limited myself to the purely military
misgivings. General Halder and I reported on three points.
Point one was the size of the Russian area which even today
cannot be bridged by motor vehicles alone. The second point
was the size of the population, and the large number of
picked reserves which were at their disposal, and the quite
different level of education and enlightenment of the
Russian population as compared with the years 1914-1918,
matters which I could see for myself when I was a guest of
the Red Army in the year 1931. Point three was the high
armaments potential of Russia. According to our estimate,
Russia at that time had at her command approximately 10,000
tanks. Hitler must have given some thought to these
problems, for he answered immediately and refuted the first
two points; namely, by saying that the domination of the
Soviets was so much in disfavour among the Russian
population that the system would collapse. Everything would
depend only on the decisiveness of the first successes. As
far as the third point was concerned, the point of armament,
he mentioned, on the basis of detailed figures that he had,
as always, at his finger-tips, that the armament of Russia
could not be at the level which we imagined it to be. Exact
proof, however, we did not have at our disposal.

Q. Therefore, Hitler did not listen to any of the misgivings
which you had?

A. He would not enter into any further discussion.

O. When did you tell the Commanders-in-Chief of the army
groups and armies under your command about the plans with
regard to Russia?

A. On 18th December, 1940, the OKW issued the order and
subsequently, the end of December, the first directives went
to the army groups.

Q. What was your relationship with Hitler during the Russian
campaign?

A. During the Russian campaign the difficulties increased
more and more. should like to mention only two of the very
numerous incidents that occurred. The Army had, in the areas
occupied by it, restored the churches to public use as far
as this was desired by the population. German chaplains had
frequently given their ministrations at the request of the
population. However, Hitler prohibited this, and now the
remarkable picture was offered by the chaplains of the
Roumanian, Hungarian, Italian and other divisions
officiating while the Germans could not do so. The second
point, a weighty one, was the question of the operational
conduct of the war. Once you had started the war, the
measures for the continuance of the war in the following
year had to be taken then and there, and in my opinion and
that of the High Command, the area around Moscow - not the
city itself - played a decisive role. It is the traffic
centre of the whole country, and accordingly was the
required site for the setting up and distribution of the
main reserves. There were numerous armament installations
which made it possible to carry out the equipment of .the
new formations. The OKH, therefore, was of the opinion that
after the Dnieper-Smolensk-Lake Peipus line had been
reached, one would then have to come into possession of the
entire Moscow region. Hitler was of a different opinion. He
put the decisive importance on Leningrad and then he
demanded the offensive at Kiev. It was he who took the
decision in this matter. And then afterwards it was too
late.

                                                   [Page 31]

The offensive in the Moscow region was doomed to fail
because of weather conditions.

Q. Regarding the Eastern campaign, I should like to clear up
certain matters of subordination. Do you know of an
agreement between the Quartermaster-General of the Army,
General Wagner, and Heydrich concerning the use of the
Einsatz groups?

A. It was reported to me that a conference between General
Wagner and the Chief of the SS Hauptamt, Heydrich, did take
place. According to an order of the High Command this
conference was to settle those questions which were
necessary to regulate the commitment of the Einsatz units in
the operational region of the Army, as ordered by Hitler.

It was reported to me that the problems involved were things
such as the matter of boundary violations, the questions of
economic supply and the right of way on the roads. Nothing
else was reported to me, and whether anything else was
discussed I do not know, but the only thing that might .have
been of concern was that perhaps the question was discussed
that if detachments of that nature in front areas were sent
into action in the battle zone, then they would come under
the command of the local military commander. All directives
for these detachments were issued through the usual channels
by the Reichsfuehrer SS. At the request of the Army, army
groups and armies were given liaison detachments. They had
only the task of informing these units about the objective,
etc., of the operations as far as it applied to them. In
this order of the OKW it says, regarding the purpose and the
task of these detachments:

  "It is intended that the occupied territories, as soon as
  possible, shall be made into political States. In order
  to prepare the measures, these Einsatzkommandos are to be
  used. This was the only information received by the OKH."

Did General Wagner report to you that through these Einsatz
groups mass exterminations would be carried out?

A. No.

Q. The witness SS Fuehrer Schellenberg was interrogated
here, and he stated that he was of the conviction that the
OKH knew of mass exterminations and had reported this to the
Commanders-in-Chief through official channels. Is this
right?

A. He is speaking of a conviction, not of a certainty, and
this conviction is not right.

Q. To whom were these units subordinated?

A. The subordination of the Einsatzkommandos, as I have
mentioned, was set up in such a way that all orders emanated
solely from the Reichsfuehrer SS. They were not subordinated
to the Army in any way.

Q. How about supply? Were they subordinated to the Army in
that way?

A. No, not even in that way. They were instructed to obtain
their supplies from the Army for there was no other way of
supplying rations or fuel.

Q. Did you receive official reports from these Einsatz
groups?

A. No.

Q. Now, the subordination of the Waffen SS will have to be
cleared up as well. Just what was the subordination of a
Waffen SS division to the Army?

A. The Waffen SS was subordinated to the Army only for
tactical purposes. It was subordinated to the Army neither
for discipline nor for judicial matters. The Army had no
influence on promotion or demotion of people, and so forth.

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