Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-16/tgmwc-16-157.10
Last-Modified: 2000/06/23

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I think I gave your Lordship the
references yesterday. The reference to the affidavit,
Document 1760-PS, is Document Book

                                                  [Page 346]

II, and Page 22 is the relevant part; and the other
affidavit, Document 2385-PS, is Document Book IIA, Page 24.
This is rather shorter.

BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:

Q. I think the one that I would like you to look at,
defendant, is 1760-PS, and I think it begins on Page 3. I
want you to refer to the part in the affidavit - and I am
afraid I cannot give you the exact German place - where he
deals with yourself.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: It is Page 22, my Lord.

Q. (Continuing): The paragraph begins:

   "That the policy of Anschluss remained wholly unchanged
   was confirmed to me by Franz von Papen when he arrived
   in Vienna as German Minister."

Have you got the passage, defendant?

A. No.

Q. It was Page 12 of the German translation.

A. Page 12?

Q. Page 12, right in the middle of the page.

A. Yes, page I2; I have it.

Q: Look and see if you can find the paragraph that begins:
"That the policy of Anschluss remained wholly unchanged was
confirmed to me by Franz von Papen."

Can you find that? It is about the middle of the page.

A. Yes.

Q. Now, if you look down a few lines in Mr. Messersmith's
statement, he says:

  "When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation he
  greeted me with: 'Now you are in my Legation and I can
  control the conversation.' In the baldest and most
  cynical manner he then proceeded to tell me that all of
  South-East Europe, to the borders of Turkey, was
  Germany's natural hinterland, and that he had been
  charged with the mission of facilitating German economic
  and political control over all this region for Germany.
  He blandly and directly said that getting control of
  Austria was to be the first step. He definitely stated
  that he was in Austria to undermine and weaken the
  Austrian Government, and from Vienna to work towards the
  weakening of the governments in the other States to the
  South and South-East. He said that he intended to use his
  reputation as a good Catholic to gain influence with
  certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer, towards
  that end. He said that he was telling me this because the
  German Government was firmly resolved on this objective
  of getting this control of South-Eastern Europe and there
  was nothing which could stop it, and that our own policy
  and that of France and England was not realistic."

Then Mr. Messersmith says that he told you that he was
shocked, and that you merely smiled and said that, of
course, this conversation was between you and Mr.
Messersmith, and you would not talk so clearly to other
people.

Then he says:

   "I have gone into this detail with regard to this
   conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute
   frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials
   spoke of their objectives."

Now, you have told the Tribunal that you said nothing like
that to Mr. Messersmith. Apart from whether you said it to
Mr. Messersmith or not, do you deny that these were your
aims and intentions?

A. Yes; I absolutely deny that my purposes and aims were
those which Mr. Messersmith is describing in his affidavit
here. I told the Tribunal yesterday -

Q. Now I just want to deal with these quickly. Would you
just refer back to the document you were looking at a short
time ago, which is Document 2248-PS.

That is Page 96, my Lord. It starts there, in IIA, and I
want to pass on to Page 97. That is Page 81 of the German
book.

                                                  [Page 347]

Now, defendant, this was your view in 1935, if you will look
at the beginning of Page 81 of the German text.

My Lord, it is the first break on Page 97.

  "The great historical speech of the Fuehrer on 21st May
  of this year, and later the Naval Treaty, caused an
  appreciable diminution of the strained relations in the
  field of foreign policy as regards England. But the clear
  and final definition of the attitude of National
  Socialism to the Soviet doctrine of the State naturally
  doubled Franco-Russian attempts to cripple us in the East
  and South-East without at the same time achieving a
  detente in the other direction by clearly renouncing the
  annexation or Anschluss of Austria.
  
  "Any attempt at an economic and, even more so, at a
  political offensive by the newly formed Third Reich in
  the direction of South-Eastern Europe must inevitably
  come up against a front formed by the whole of Europe."

Who put into your mind the question of a commercial or a
political offensive in the direction of South-Eastern
Europe? Had you discussed that with the defendant von
Neurath?

A. No, not at all.

Q. Do you think you spoke for yourself?

A. Certainly. I am making a negative assertion, Sir David,
namely that an advance into the South-Eastern area would
come up against a front formed by all of Europe. I am thus
voicing a warning of that.

Q. You appreciate, Herr von Papen, that I cannot make any
comments at the moment. I can merely draw your attention to
matters. All that I am asking you is whether you had got
that idea from, say, the Foreign Minister, or whether it was
your own idea. You say it was your own idea.

Just look on Page 82.

A. Yes.

Q. Page 82. There is a paragraph - my Lord, it is the same
page, 97, in the English version - you go on to say:

  "This realistic political survey of the European States
  shows immediately that the German-Austrian problem
  cannot, at least in the near future, be successfully
  approached from the direction of foreign politics. We
  must for the time being be content with not allowing
  Austria's international status to deteriorate in view of
  a later solution. In this connection the danger of a
  non-intervention pact with bilateral treaties of
  assurance seems to be successfully prevented. The
  maturing of a solution was and still remains dependent on
  nothing but the evolution of German-Austrian relations."

Why were you so afraid of a non-intervention pact, if your
idea was that there should be only an evolutionary solution
of Austria based on Austria's will? Why were you afraid of a
non-intervention pact which would bind the Reich to not
interfering in Austria?

A. For a very simple reason. All political combinations
which our opponents were making at the time had only one
end, that Austria should be pushed into such a situation,
whether it was a Danube Pact or a pact with Italy and
France, which would make it impossible to advance the idea
of the Anschluss. For that reason it had to be and remain
our natural political aim that the international status of
Austria should not be allowed to deteriorate, as I have
expressed it here.

Q. Yes. That is the answer which I thought you would have to
give. Now, just lock at Page 83, in the very next paragraph:

  "The German nation has for centuries had to tread a rough
  path of suffering in order to secure its unity. With the
  dawn of National Socialism and the founding of the Third
  Reich by means of the final overthrow of all
  particularism, an opportunity, unique and never to be
  repeated, seemed to present itself to complete Bismarck's
  work and to bring relations between Germany and Austria
  nearer to a solution, as a dynamic result of internal
  events in Germany."

                                                  [Page 348]

I will see if I can put quite shortly what you mean by the
completion of this man's work, because I hope we shall not
disagree about ancient history, whatever we do about the
present. As I understand, your view is that Bismarck's
setting up of the German Empire in 1881 was merely an
attempt at a solution which left the Hapsburg empire
separated from Germany, and the final completion of his work
was that the old Hapsburg dominions should be re-formed with
the States which had been in the Holy Roman Empire. Is that
roughly the truth?

A. Quite right; not all the Hapsburg States, but Austria,
the German part.

Q. The original Hapsburg domains?

A. Yes.

Q. Quite right. I hope I am putting it objectively enough.

A. Oh, yes.

Q. With regard to that, what did you mean by saying that the
solution of the relations between Germany and Austria should
be brought about as a "dynamic result of internal events in
Germany"? What did you mean by that?

A. By that I mean the following: Never in Germany's history
had it happened that a large party whose aim was Germany's
unity existed in both nations. That was a unique historical
event. And I wished to state that the dynamic force of this
movement in the two countries, which was urging unity, gave
promise of a solution.

Q. You see, defendant, the difficulty that I want you to
explain is: How do you square an approval of centralising in
Germany with a Nazi government of whose unscrupulous nature
you were aware after the affairs from the 30th of June, 1934
- how do you square an unscrupulous centralised Germany with
an evolutionary solution of the Austrian problem?

That is what that paragraph is saying, you know. What I am
suggesting is that it means a much simpler thing than you
have told us. It means that you were out to get an
annexation of Austria at the earliest opportunity under the
National Socialist Reich.

A. Of course, I had to reckon with existing conditions, and
I did reckon with them, as any realistic politician would. I
wanted to attempt, with the help of the factors present in
the National Socialist Party in both lands, to come to a
solution. But I see no contradiction, Sir David. You are
saying, how could I achieve my aim by centralisation. But if
you would be good enough to look at the end of this report
of mine, then you will find that I am proposing
decentralisation to Hitler.

Q. At the moment, you see, I was really asking you for an
explanation of what you meant by the expression "dynamic
result of internal events in Germany." In short, I want you
to realize, defendant - I am not going to argue with you,
because I ought not to - the first point of Mr. Messersmith
was a question of this action in South-Eastern Europe. The
second point, that Austria was the first line, the first
thing to be dealt with. Now, I wonder if you will be good
enough to take the same bundle of documents and turn over to
Page 102, which is a report of your own, dated 18th October,
1935. I want you to deal with Mr. Messersmith's third
suggestion against you, which you deny, that you were going
to work in Austria by a weakening of the regime.

Now I will just read the first sentence so that you will get
the point into your mind. The report that I am dealing with
is of 18th October, 1935. You are dealing with the Austrian
Government re-shuffle, and you are saying My Lord, this is a
new document. It is Exhibit GB 502. It is in Document Book
IIA, Page 102. It begins:

  "Yesterday's cabinet re-shuffle resembles a bloodless
  insurrection led by Prince Starhemberg and the Heimwehr
  (Austrian Home Defence Organization). It is clear that
  Minister Fey heard early of his intended dismissal and
  that as early as yesterday afternoon he had the public
  buildings in Vienna occupied by the Viennese Heimwehr,
  which is loyal to him. The government

                                                  [Page 349]

  countered this measure by simultaneously reinforcing the
  occupation by police forces."

Now you go on to discuss the matter. That is at the
beginning of the report. Then, if you turn to the next page,
102, you will see about half-way down the page that you say
this:

  "In spite of the Vice-Chancellor's clear victory and of
  the strenuous efforts of the Austrian Press to make it
  appear plausible that the cabinet reshuffle was carried
  out for reasons of internal consolidation, the feeling of
  moving towards a completely uncertain development
  prevails among the Austrian public, also in the Heimwehr
  circles.
  
  From our point of view the change of affairs is only too
  welcome. Every new weakening of the system is of
  advantage, even if at first it seems, in fact, to be
  directed against us. The fronts are starting to move and
  it will have to be our task to keep them moving."

Now, defendant, by that it is quite clear, is it not, that
you meant that so long as there is political uncertainty or
political trouble in the Austrian State, it does not matter
whether the move may be an anti-German one, so long as the
struggle results in distrust spreading? That was an
advantage to Germany, and that is what you wanted. That is
what the lines mean, is it not?

A. No, not quite.

Q. Not quite?

A. I should like to make the following remarks about your
explanation, Sir David. Here in this report we are concerned
with a change in the Austrian Government with Prince
Starhemberg and the Heimwehr involved. You know that
Starhemberg and the Heimwehr had allied themselves with
Mussolini against the German Reich. A loosening up of this
inner-political front which was working against the
interests of a union could be only advantageous, in the
light of my policy.

Q. But what I do not understand is this. You see, you have
said, "In spite of the Vice-Chancellor's clear victory and
of the strenuous efforts of the Austrian Press ..." And you
go on to say, "Every new weakening of the system is of
advantage." You see, Prince Starhemberg and the Italian
party, according to you, had won, because you say, "In spite
of" - this - "clear victory."

Then you say, "Every new weakening of the system ..." That
could not be Starhemberg's alliance because that had been
successful. By "the system" you mean the government of
Austria, do you not? You cannot mean anything else.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, perhaps I should not
continue the argument. But it is a somewhat, complicated
subject.

THE WITNESS: Yes, it is.

THE PRESIDENT: I was thinking that you should, perhaps draw
attention to the few remaining sentences.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes, my Lord, certainly I will read
on:

  "The continuation of negotiations for a settlement which
  I had renounced since the Geneva Declaration, seems to be
  entirely superfluous for the time being. It will be a
  good thing to continue the increasingly excited public
  feeling against the Italian trend by clever and tactful
  handling via the Press without, however, giving the
  Government justifiable cause for having recourse to the
  desperate measure of starting a new propaganda campaign
  against us. I would be very grateful if the Reich
  Minister for Propaganda were to put a few experienced
  journalists to work in this connection.
  
  For the rest, we can confidently leave further
  developments to the near future. I am convinced that the
  shifting of powers on the European chessboard will permit
  us in the not too distant future to take up actively the
  question of influencing the South-Eastern area."

                                                  [Page 350]

Extraordinary - if I may say so - extraordinary how Mr.
Messersmith had got your ideas if you had never had this
conversation with him, was it not?

My Lord, perhaps this will be a convenient time to adjourn.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time.

THE WITNESS: But may I come back to that question tomorrow?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

(The Tribunal adjourned until 19th June, 1946, at 1000 hours.)

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