Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-14/tgmwc-14-133.03
Last-Modified: 2000/03/14

It is a conversation between Matsuoka and von Ribbentrop on
29th March, 1941. We have already discussed this matter. In
the 8th paragraph of this document, the following is said:

  "The Reich Foreign Minister again referred to the problem
  of Singapore. Because of the fear expressed by Japan that
  there might be U-boat attacks from the Philippines and
  that the British Mediterranean Fleet and Home Fleet would
  join the attack he had discussed the situation once more
  with Admiral Raeder. The latter told him that Britain
  would be so completely occupied in the home waters and in
  the Mediterranean this year that she would not be able to
  despatch even a single ship to the Far East.
  
                                                  [Page 167]
  
  The American U-boats were described by Grand Admiral
  Raeder as being so inferior that Japan would not have to
  concern herself about them at all."

BY DR. SIEMERS:

Q. Herr von Ribbentrop, in reply to my question on 1st
April, 1946, declared that he had been mistaken, that the
statement was probably made by Hitler. Will you please
clarify this statement once and for all?

A. I can only confirm that I never discussed such questions
with Herr von Ribbentrop, for unfortunately there was no
connection between the Foreign Office and the Navy High
Command, especially since the Fuehrer had forbidden that any
information be given by the Foreign Office to the military
authorities. I would never have made such statements, since
they were in direct opposition to my own opinion, and
especially since in this case I had no basis for them.

Q. Admiral, were not, on the other hand, questions
frequently dealt with in the Navy Operational Staff as to
the industrial and military strength of the United States,
and was there not a feeling that, because of these, any
entrance of the United States was to be feared?

A. This was fully clear to us, even to the last detail.

Q. Did you at any time during the war see this document,
1877-PS, which is before you?

A. No, no.

Q. Were you advised about these discussions between Herr von
Ribbentrop and the Foreign Minister Matsuoka or the
discussion with Oshima?

A. No; I was merely told by the Fuehrer, and that is shown
in the document C-170, dealing with the results of this
discussion with Matsuoka. But I had no discussions with Herr
von Ribbentrop.

DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, I have just
been asked to correct a word which I used a few moments ago;
in order to be fair, I should like to do so. I said that
Hitler, in his directive of the 5th of March, 1941,
"commanded" that Singapore be taken. The expression is not
correct. He naturally could not give any orders to Japan.
The mistake arises because the directive starts with the
words:-"The Fuehrer has commanded the following for our co-
operation." And under (3) it says:- "The following
directives apply in this case." And among these directives
the taking of Singapore is mentioned.

BY DR. SIEMERS:

Q. Admiral, did you ever in a conversation suggest to anyone
that Japan should attack Pearl Harbour?

A. No, never.

Q. Did you hear anything about this plan before it was
carried out?

A. No, never. It was a complete surprise for me and the
Naval Operations Staff when this attack took place; and it
is a complete mistake in judging the mentality of the
Japanese to assume that they would have spoken of such a
plan to anyone, even inside Japan, who was not directly
connected with it. In 1904 they likewise attacked Russian
ships out of the blue without anyone suspecting anything at
all.

DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection
I should like to submit three documents which have been
granted me, first Exhibit Raeder 19, to be found in Document
Book II, Page 108. This document deals with the report by
the American General Marshall, which has been placed at my
disposal through the help of the Tribunal.

In this report, dated 1st September, 1945, General Marshall
stated the following, and I refer to Page 116:

  "In order to establish for the historical record where
  and how Germany and Japan failed I asked General
  Eisenhower to arrange for his intelligence officers
  promptly to interrogate the ranking members of the German
  High Command who are now our prisoners of war. The
  results of these interviews are of remarkable interest.
  They give a picture of dissension among the enemy
  
                                                  [Page 168]
  
  nations and lack of long-range planning that may well
  have been decisive factors of this world struggle at its
  most critical moments.
  
  No evidence has yet been found that the German High
  Command had any over-all strategic plan. Although the
  High Command approved Hitler's policies in principle, his
  impetuous strategy outran German military capabilities
  and ultimately led to Germany's defeat. The history of
  the German High Command from 1938 on is one of constant
  conflict of personalities in which military judgement was
  increasingly subordinated to Hitler's personal dictates.
  The first clash occurred in 1938 and resulted in the
  removal of von Blomberg, von Fritsch and Beek and of the
  last effective conservative influence on German foreign
  policy.
  
  The campaigns in Poland, Norway, France, and the Low
  Countries led to serious disagreements between Hitler and
  the General Staff about the details of execution of
  strategic plans. In each case the General Staff favoured
  the orthodox offensive, while Hitler stood out for an
  unorthodox attack with objectives deep in enemy
  territory. In each case Hitler's views prevailed and the
  astounding success of each succeeding campaign raised
  Hitler's military prestige to the point where his
  opinions were no longer challenged. His military self-
  confidence became unassailable after the victory in
  France, and he began to disparage substantially the ideas
  of his generals, even in the presence of junior officers.
  Thus no General Staff objection was expressed when Hitler
  made the fatal decision to invade Soviet Russia."

And on page 118, there is an extract dealing with Germany
and Japan. I quote:

  "Nor is there evidence of close strategic co-ordination
  between Germany and Japan. The German General Staff
  recognized that Japan was bound by the neutrality pact
  with Russia but hoped that the Japanese would tie down
  strong British and American land, sea, and air forces in
  the Far East.
  
  In the absence of any evidence so far to the contrary, it
  is believed that Japan also acted unilaterally and not in
  accordance with a unified strategic plan."

And further, in the documents which were also granted me,
Exhibits Raeder 113 and 114, in Document Book VI, Pages 491,
497 -

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, I think you should ask the
witness whether he agrees with General Marshall's opinions.

DR. SIEMERS:

Q. Admiral, do you agree with the opinions of the American
General Marshall?

A. I have not completely absorbed them. In general they
coincide with our ideas on the matter, but I cannot vouch
for each single point. In order to speak with certainty I
would like to have a look at them or they would have to be
read to me again.

DR. SIEMERS: I believe your agreement in general is
sufficient.

In Exhibit Raeder 113, I should like to refer to the
heading:-

  "Army Foresaw Japan's Move, Marshall Says:
  
  Washington, 11th December (AP)-General George C.
  Marshall, formerly Army Chief of Staff, acknowledged last
  night that the Army knew more than ten days before 7th
  December, 1941, that a Japanese move toward Pearl Harbour
  might take them past the deadline where the American
  chiefs believed the US should fight."

In order to save time I shall not read the particulars; but
it can be gathered from the report by Marshall that the
American Army had some information about the Japanese move
as early as November 25th or 26th. In addition, Marshall
testifies that preparations had been worked out in the
United States before the war for the construction of landing
ships for American bombers in Raboul, Port Moresby and
Singapore.

                                                  [Page 169]

In Exhibit Raeder 114, which I am also submitting, Henry L.
Stimson, the former United States Secretary of War, made a
statement under date of 21st March.

   "Henry L. Stimson, former US Secretary of War, disclosed
   that the late President Roosevelt's War Cabinet had
   discussed and rejected - nine days before Japan's attack
   on Pearl Harbour - an American attack on the Japanese
   forces without further warning.
   
   Stimson recounted this in a statement that on 28th
   November, 1941, he had received information of Japanese
   movements along the Asiatic Coast. On the same day, he
   said, the Cabinet met and discussed the possible meaning
   of the Japanese move.
   
   He further said that if the Japanese got into the
   Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight, and that if the
   British fought, we would have to fight."

According to this, Admiral, did the United States know about
these Japanese plans before you did?

A. Apparently, yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Then I shall turn to the last accusation by the
prosecution, and that concerns Brazil.

In this connection, the prosecution has submitted Document
1807-PS, Exhibit GB 227, to be found in Document Book 10A of
the British Delegation, Page 288. This is Jodl's diary, the
entry of 16th June, 1942. 1 have to beg your pardon, I am
told it is Page 287, not 288. This entry reads:-

  "The Naval Operations Staff applied on 29th May for
  permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. It
  considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval
  and merchant ships is expedient at this moment when
  defensive measures are still incomplete and there is the
  possibility of surprise, since Brazil is to all intents
  and purposes waging naval warfare against Germany."

The prosecution is accusing you of violating neutrality and
violating International Law because you made that proposal
at a time when Brazil was neutral. I call your attention to
the fact that the war with Brazil broke out two months later
on 22nd August, 1942. Please tell me briefly from memory
just how you came to make this proposal.

A. Relations between Brazil and Germany at this time could
not have been worse. The Germans were very much persecuted
and treated very badly. Germany's economic interests were
heavily damaged. The Brazilians were already completely on
the side of the United States. They had allowed United
States air bases to be established along the Brazilian
coast, and also intelligence stations. They themselves
confirmed that they had destroyed a German U-boat; and, on
the other hand, the German U-boats had attacked Brazilian
ships, for the Brazilian ships were not illuminated
according to regulations and consequently could not be
recognized as such. Germany had previously asked all the
South American countries to illuminate their ships in such a
way that their nationality could be distinguished at night.
Then there were air attacks on U-boats of the Axis Powers,
and they could have been carried out only from Brazilian
bases. At the request by the Naval Operations Staff to the
Fuehrer, the latter decreed that once again we should ask
the Italians what intelligence reports they had received,
and Italy in turn confirmed that some weeks before, Italian
U-boats, which had been operating together with ours, had
been attacked near the Brazilian coast. Likewise the
Brazilian Air Ministry had made known the fact that
Brazilian or United States aircraft coming from Brazilian
air bases had attacked Axis U-boats.

On the basis of that confirmation, the Fuehrer permitted the
use of weapons against Brazilian ships along the Brazilian
coast. A plan was worked out, according to which a certain
wave of U-boats, which left the French coast in June to
proceed into the Atlantic, were to go to the Brazilian
coast. The Fuehrer had ordered in particular that this was
not to be mere pin-pricks but rather a serious enterprise.
This operation was later stopped and, I am sorry that I am
not able to say for what reason it was not carried out. But
it can be seen from our document which gives the statements
made in the War Diary.

                                                  [Page 170]

DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I believe that the
entire accusation of the prosecution regarding this planning
would not have been raised if Document 1807-PS, Jodl's diary
entry of 16th June, had been submitted in toto. Only the
first part was submitted. Therefore, I submit this entry as
Exhibit Raeder 115, to be found in Document Book VI, Page
500. From the further statements made by General Jodl in his
diary we may conclude that the situation was correctly
investigated.

The first part, which was submitted by the prosecution, that
is, the first two sentences, I have already read. The rest
of the entry is as follows:-

  "Ambassador Ritter of the Foreign Office declares that an
  intensification of the conflict with Brazil is
  undesirable in view of the attitude of Argentina and
  Chile and that, previous to any war measures against
  Brazil, consultations must be held with Italy and Japan.
  Acting on the proposal of the Chief of the Armed Forces
  Operations Staff, the Fuehrer has ordered, on 30th May,
  that the Naval Operations Staff is to ascertain, by
  inquiring in Rome, whether the Brazilian reports about
  war-like actions against Axis U-boats are correct. The
  inquiry by the Naval Operations Staff shows that Italian
  U-boats were attacked on 22nd and 26th May at the north-
  east corner of Brazil by planes which beyond a doubt had
  started from a Brazilian air base. The Naval Operations
  Staff transmit, moreover, the text of the official
  communique of the Brazilian Air Ministry about the
  fighting and propose to put into action near the main
  Brazilian harbours during the period 3rd-8th August the
  ten U-boats due to sail during the period 22nd June-4th
  July from ports in Western France, along with the tanker
  U-460. The order for execution must be given to the U-
  boats by 15th June at the latest. After the Commander-in-
  Chief of the Navy had reported this to the Fuehrer at the
  Berghof on the afternoon of 15th June, the Fuehrer
  declared himself in agreement with the intentions of the
  Naval Operations Staff but ordered that, before any final
  decision was taken, the political situation should be
  examined once again by the Foreign Office."

I believe that this proves that we were careful enough; and
I refer further to Exhibit Raeder 116 which I should like to
submit herewith. It is on Page 503 of the same document
book, and is an extract from the War Diary. Under date 6th
June there is an entry which states that the development has
gone so far that a latent state of war is practically in
existence. (Brazil entirely on the side of USA; most severe
damage to all German interests; single Brazilian steamers
not properly illuminated sunk by U-boats; increasing
agitation in Brazil; Brazilians claim they have already sunk
German U-boat while patrolling the coast.)"

And a further extract from the War Diary, Exhibit Raeder
117, which I should like to submit herewith, to be found in
the same document book, Page 509. I ask the High Tribunal to
take notice of this document and its contents and I refer
only to (3) and (4) in detail. Under (3) it reads:-

  "When Brazilian ships began to provide themselves with
  camouflage paint and to arm, the order was given on 15th
  May, 1942, to use arms at once against recognizable armed
  South Americans."

And under (4) it says:-

  "On the basis of the fact that Axis submarines were
  attacked by vessels along the Brazilian coast and that
  the Brazilian Air Ministry officially made known that
  attacks had been made by the Brazilian Air Force, the
  Naval Operations Staff on 29th May, 1942, in Document
  12938/42 Top Secret, asked the Wehrmacht Operations Staff
  for permission to use arms against Brazilian military
  forces and merchant ships."

I submit also Exhibit Raeder 118, Document Book VI, Page
510. I ask the High Tribunal to take notice of this
document. I do not wish to quote it, since it repeats the
facts we have already heard. I believe that (4) of Raeder
117, which I have just read, clarifies the matter completely
and refutes every accusation against the Navy.

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