Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-14/tgmwc-14-132.07
Last-Modified: 2000/03/14

DR. SIEMERS: With this I should like to conclude t1he
question of the occupation of Norway. May I still submit the
approved document, Exhibit Raeder 66, which was approved for
the purpose of argument? It is an opinion expressed by Dr.
Mosler, and it can be found in Volume 4, Page 291; and in
this connection, concerning the use of flags, may I draw
special attention to (77), Page 304, from which we may see
the legal reasoning. Furthermore, may I submit Exhibit
Raeder 99, Document Book 5, Page 402, and the following
series of documents, as far as they are approved, Exhibit
Raeder 91, Admiral Darlan to the French War Minister
Daladier on the 12th of April, 1940; and 92, Page 402, which
contains the English-French note to the Norwegian Government
of the 8th of April, 1940. I have submitted this document
because this note expresses the same legal points of view as
expressed in the legal opinion of Dr. Mosler.

Then 97 and 98: No. 97 concerns the White Book and the
planning of the 7th of February, 1940, concerning the Allied
bases in Norway; and 98 is an excerpt from the War Diary
concerning the orders which, at the time of the occupation
of Norway, were found and from which it could be seen that
an English landing was imminent, and concerning the so-
called plan under the code name "Stratford Plan," which was
prepared by the British Admiralty.

BY DR. SIEMERS:

Q. Concerning Norway, may I ask you the following: During
and after the occupation did you intervene to see that the
Norwegian population was treated decently, and what was your
view of the political question in Norway with regard to the
attitude of Germany to that country?

                                                  [Page 155]


A. From the very beginning I stood out for good treatment of
the Norwegian population. I knew that Hitler had given
Gauleiter Terboven, whom he had unfortunately appointed
Reichkommissar for Norway and to whom he had entrusted the
civil administration, instructions that he, Terboven, should
establish friendly relations with the Norwegians; that is to
say, make them favourably disposed, and that he had the
intention, finally, to maintain Norway as a sovereign State
in a North Germanic Empire.

Terboven was opposed to that. He treated the Norwegian
population in a very unfriendly manner, and by his treatment
sabotaged the whole aim and purpose of Hitler. In close
understanding with Admiral Bohm, who became the Naval
Commander in Norway and who had taken Captain Schreiber, the
former Attache, on his staff as liaison officer to the
Norwegian population, I tried to counteract these intentions
of Terboven. On the basis of the reports of Admiral Bohm I
repeatedly approached the Fuehrer and told him that with
Terboven he would never achieve his purpose. The Fuehrer
then appointed Quisling Chief of the Government. I cannot
remember exactly when he became Minister President but
Terboven also sabotaged Quisling in his activities by making
it extremely difficult for him, and even discredited him
among the population. Terboven's chief reason was, in my
opinion, that he wanted to remain Gauleiter of Norway. All
our attempts were unsuccessful, in spite of the fact that
Admiral Bohm tried very hard to achieve with the help of the
Navy what Hitler had expected, that is, to win over the
Norwegian people.

I didn't understand how on the one side one wanted to gain
the sympathy of the Norwegians and on the other hand one
sabotaged Hitler's intentions.

That went on until 1942, at which time Bohm made a final
report to me, in which he explained that things could not go
on like that, and that Hitler's intentions would never be
realised. I submitted that report to Hitler, but since it
did not bring about any change - it was in the late autumn
of 1942 - this failure of mine became one of the reasons
which finally led to my retirement.

Q. Did you ask Hitler specifically to dismiss Terboven?

A. Several times. And I suggested that he should appoint
General Admiral Bohm as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces for Norway and give him far-reaching powers so that
he could carry out his - Hitler's - aims. I suggested that
the Fuehrer should as soon as possible conclude a peace with
Norway, because only in that way could he bring about co-
operation between Norway and Germany and make the population
turn to him. In this way, I told him, the attempts of
sabotage by the Norwegian emigrants would cease and possibly
those who were leaning toward England at that time could be
induced to return, because they might be afraid that they
might "miss the bus," especially from the point of view of
economic advantages. The task of defending Norway would be
considerably easier if a state of peace could be brought
about.

Q. In conclusion, may I refer to Exhibit Raeder 107 which is
already known to the Tribunal. It is the affidavit by
Schreiber under Roman Numeral II. There Schreiber has
mentioned in detail the supreme efforts of the Navy to
prevent the regrettable terror regime of Terboven, and
explained that Raeder, for the last time in 1942, used all
his efforts to get Hitler to conclude a peace between Norway
and Germany. I believe that the Navy had a good reputation
in Norway, and that I can assume this to be historically
known without my having to prove it. To be on the safe side
I applied for a witness, but consent was not given.

May I also submit Exhibit Raeder 108, Document Book 41, Page
473, a letter from Raeder to General Admiral Bohm of 23rd
October, 1942. Raeder writes:

  "To my regret I have to send you enclosed, for your
  personal information, a letter from Reich Minister Dr.
  Lammers to Minister-President Quisling."

On Page 476 there is the letter from Lammers to Quisling
which says - I quote only one sentence:-

                                                  [Page 156]

  "The Fuehrer, therefore, desires that during the war
  there shall be no conferences or discussions concerning a
  final or a temporary peace between the Greater German
  Reich and Norway, or concerning other measures fixing or
  anticipating Norway's position to the Reich after the end
  of the war."

This is the letter which the witness mentioned, which
finally brought to naught all his attempts and those of
General Admiral Bohm.

Admiral, you had little to do with France, and therefore we
can be very brief, May I merely ask you, did you attempt at
any time to influence the political relations between
Germany and France?

A. Such as I had, was in the first place directed as much as
possible towards improving the defence of the country. In
the second place, and this is important, there were
humanitarian reasons. I often visited naval and submarine
bases in France. During these journeys I got some knowledge
of conditions in France. I saw that in 1940 and 1941 the
population lived just as if it were at peace, completely
undisturbed. Consequently, I believed, since the Fuehrer had
shown so much moderation on the occasion of the Armistice,
that a basis could be found which would draw France - whose
government was after all collaborationist - closer to us.

I was informed that Laval was really sincere in his opinion
that only co-operation between France and Germany could
guarantee a lasting peace in Europe for the future.
Therefore I suggested to him, that he himself should try to
do something in that direction, but he clearly had no
intention to do this, and I referred to it again, when I
heard that Admiral Darlan was trying to work more closely
with our Naval Commander in France, Admiral Schulze. That
object was first achieved in the field of Intelligence,
where his services were very useful to us.

At the end of the year 1941 Admiral Schulze told me that
Darlan would like to have a talk with me. I told Hitler of
this, and recommended such a conversation because I thought
it would do some good.

Q. It would do what?

A. That it might bring some advantage. The Fuehrer approved
and instructed me as to his views. The meeting took place
near Paris on the occasion of an official trip which I made
to the French bases at the end of January or beginning of
February, 1942. I had the impression that the meeting was
very satisfactory, inasmuch as Darlan was of the opinion
that a peace would be of advantage to both nations and he
also appeared to be inclined to co-operate. He stressed,
however, that the whole political situation would have to be
settled before peace could be concluded. I also showed that
I was prepared to meet him over the negotiations with the
Armistice Commission with respect to heavy guns for big
French ships. I reported to the Fuehrer about the results of
the meeting. But in this case too the Fuehrer was again
hesitant and loath to make a decision. He said he had to see
first how the war went before he could decide upon his final
attitude toward France. Besides, that would be a precedent
which might have an effect on other nations. So that also
was a failure - I did not obtain the relief in the defence
of France which I had hoped for, and this failure was the
second reason which contributed later to my asking for my
release, because I could not carry my plans through.

Q. Now I come to the next case, in which accusations are
made against you, and that is Russia. When did you hear for
the first time that Hitler intended to wage war against
Russia, although he had concluded a non-aggression pact with
that country?

A. May I first remind you that in the summer of 1940, that
is to say, July, August and September, we in the Navy were
very much occupied with preparations for a landing in
England; therefore it never entered our heads that there
could be any plans for action in another direction. In
August, I heard from some army officer, possibly the
Commander-in- Chief, that considerable troop transports were
going to the East. I asked Hitler what that meant and he
told me it was a grandiose

                                                  [Page 157]

camouflage of his intentions to invade England. He knew that
I would be against it right away if he were to speak about
any undertaking against Russia. In September - I cannot
recall the date exactly - he finally admitted to me that he
had certain intentions against Russia. In September I
reported to him at least twice, my more important report
being on 26th September, when I did everything I could to
dissuade him from any undertaking against Russia. In that
report, which I made in the presence of Keitel and Jodl, I
emphasized particularly the strategic military side; first,
because I could do that with complete clarity, and in the
presence of other people, and also because I assumed that
such military reasons, that is, the possibility of failure
of an operation against Russia at a time when the struggle
was on against England, would impress him and dissuade him
from that plan. On 26th September, after making this
official report, I asked for a personal conference alone
with Hitler. Keitel and Jodl can testify that I always did
this when I wanted to discuss something particularly
important with the Fuehrer, where I had to go beyond the
conventional procedure, a thing which I could only do if
nobody else was present. One could tell Hitler a lot of
things if one was alone with him, but one could not do this
with a number of other people present. Field Marshal Keitel
and Colonel-General Jodl know that very well, particularly
well, because they were the ones who in such cases always
had to leave the room. On that occasion I gave Hitler my
views in detail. First, I pointed out that it was not
possible to break the pact with Russia, that it would be
morally wrong, that it would serve no purpose, because the
pact gave us great advantages and was a basis for a sound
policy for Germany later on. Then I told him that under no
circumstances could he start a two-front war, as it was he
who had always emphasized that he would not repeat the
stupidity of the government of 1914 and that, in my opinion,
it could never be justified. Then I put to him again the
difference of the forces on each side, the absolute
necessity for the Navy to concentrate on the war against
England, particularly at that moment, when all resources
were strained to the utmost to carry out the invasion.

I had the impression that Hitler was inclined to listen to
my argument, because later on that day, or on the next, the
naval adjutant, Captain von Putkammer, reported to me that
Hitler had spoken in very much the same vein as I had, and
had appreciated my argument.

That went on for several months. I presented many such
reports, returning always with the same arguments. I
believed again in November that I had been successful. To my
utter surprise, however, on 18th December, Directive No. 21
(Barbarossa) came out, which dealt with the case of a war
with the Soviet Union before the termination of the war
against England. It is true, of course, that it was a
directive for an eventuality. It is Document 446-PS, Exhibit
USA 31, of 18th December, 1940.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, that is in Document Book 10-A,
Page 247.

BY DR. SIEMERS:

Q. Admiral, the prosecution asserted that the Navy and you
assisted in the drawing up of this directive. Is that
correct?

A. That is in no way correct. Such directives were drafted
in the OKW after the Fuehrer had made his political
decision, in the Operations Staff; and in that Operations
Staff there was also one naval officer and one or more air
force officers who, under the Chief of the Operations Staff,
dealt with matters concerning the Navy and Air Force when
such directives were being drafted. The directive then went
to the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces and they were
ordered, for their part, to work out and present suggestions
for the execution of the order of the Fuehrer. They had no
influence on the directive itself and did not see it at all
beforehand.

May I add one more thing? I have been accused by the
prosecution of using my influence with the Fuehrer not for
moral and ethical reasons, but because I was anxious to try,
cynically, first, to settle the account with England and
then to assail

                                                  [Page 158]

Russia. I have said before that I told all my reasons to the
Fuehrer whenever I had the chance, but that I could not do
that in a public meeting or in the presence of other people,
nor could I write them down in my war diary, because the
harsh words which might be used there must not become known
to other people by their entry therein. Beyond that I would
like to say - and I want to point to Document C-170, Exhibit
USA 136, which dates from the 25th August, 1936, to 22nd
June, 1941, and it is a compilation of many excerpts from
the war diary of the Naval War Command, and from my minutes
of conferences with Hitler, in which the Russian question
was dealt with - this is not a literal reproduction of my
statements or word for word excerpts from the war diary, but
is a summary of excerpts by the naval archivist, Admiral
Assmann. I will not read details from these many entries,
but I should like to point out that in particular this
document, C-170, shows in a large number of its entries
that, since the beginning of the war in 1939, I continuously
used my influence with the Fuehrer to bring about good
relations with Russia for the reasons which I have
previously mentioned. It would lead us too far if I were to
start quoting several entries here. But the document, I
would like to emphasize, is entirely convincing.

Q. You had nothing to do with Directive 21, which is signed
by Hitler, Keitel and Jodl?

A. Absolutely nothing.

Q. But following that, you made some preparations in
accordance with the directive? As they concerned the Navy
they were in any case not so important here.

A. Yes. We had the first conference in January, as can be
seen from one of the entries, in Document C-170. I had
reported to the Fuehrer on 4th February about our
intentions, and in March the Navy began with certain
preparations. I have said already that the Navy throughout
the first period was not concerned with major operations,
but only with the cutting off of the Gulf of Finland by
mines and light naval forces. I do not know, whether that is
in Directive 21 or somewhere else, but the Fuehrer, at my
urgent request, had ordered that the centre of gravity of
the naval warfare should still be in the direction of
England. Consequently we could use only relatively small
forces for the war against Russia.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we had better break off now. The
Tribunal rather understood that you hoped to finish by mid-
day today. We realize that you had two hours of today taken
up with your documents, but when do you think you will be
able to finish now?

DR. SIEMERS: I believe I will need only about three-quarters
of an hour, between half an hour and an hour.

THE PRESIDENT: Tomorrow at 1000 o'clock we shall deal with
the documents of Seyss-Inquart, and we are told that will
only last thirty minutes.

(The Tribunal adjourned until 18th May, 1946, at 1000 hours.)

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