Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-12/tgmwc-12-118.07
Last-Modified: 2000/01/29

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I would like to say that I should
have told the Tribunal I would make no objection to
Documents 53 and 54, because they do deal with the
chartering of Greek steamers by the British Government.

THE PRESIDENT: But you made no objection to them; you did
not object to 53 or 54.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I wanted to make clear that I do not
object to them.

THE PRESIDENT: There is no objection on the paper. What you
are dealing with, Dr. Siemers, is 63 and 64, not 53 and 54?

Oh, I beg your pardon, I see it further on. Yes, I see. will
you please strike that out.

DR. SIEMERS : There is no objection to 53 and 54?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: No, no objection. My Lord, my friend
was dealing with the Greek fleet.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes; I beg your pardon, I misheard.

DR. SIEMERS: The same things, as I have already stated
regarding Documents 101 and 107, apply also to Document 71.

                                                  [Page 428]

Number 99 belongs really to Group 6, to the Norwegian
documents, and I should like to refer to these collectively
and then refer again later to 99. All these documents
concern Norway, that is, the planning by the Allies with
respect to Norway. These documents deal positively with the
planning of the landing in Narvik, the landing in Stavanger,
the landing in Bergen and the absolute necessity of having
Norwegian bases. The documents mention that Germany should
not be allowed to continue getting ore supplies from Sweden.
They also deal in some measure with Finland - there are
likewise documents which support the same plan after the
Finnish-Russian war had already been concluded.

I should like to quote from these documents to prove their
relevancy. Since the Tribunal has told me that I cannot do
that, I ask that these brief references be considered
sufficient. The facts contained in these documents agree,
point for point, with those reports which Grand Admiral
Raeder received from September, 1939, until March, 1940,
from the Intelligence Service of the German Wehrmacht, which
was headed by Admiral Canaris. These plans agree with the
information which Raeder received during the same six months
through the Naval Attache in Oslo, Lieutenant Commander
Schreiber, and with the information which he received in a
letter from Admiral Carls at the end of September, 1939.

The information from these three sources caused the
defendant Raeder to point out the great danger, if Norway
were to fall into the hands of the Allies, which would mean
that Germany had lost the war. Therefore, that is a purely
strategic consideration. The occupation of Norway did not,
as contended by the British Prosecution, have anything to do
with the prestige or desire for conquest, but was concerned
solely with these positive pieces of information.

I must therefore prove, first of all, that the defendant
Raeder did receive this information and, secondly, that
these reports were objective.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, you are dealing with 99, are you
not?

DR. SIEMERS: Yes, 99, and all of Group 6.

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know what you mean by Group 6; 99 is
in Group B.

DR. SIEMERS: The group under the letter "I", which Sir David
called Group 6, the last on the page.

THE PRESIDENT: The objection of the prosecution to that
document was that it was a document of 27 April, 1940, at a
time after Germany had invaded Norway. You have not said
anything about that.

DR. SIEMERS: I wanted to avoid dealing with each document
singly, because I believe that these can be treated
generally. However, in this specific case ...

THE PRESIDENT: I do not want you to deal with each document
separately. I thought you were dealing with Document 99. If
you can deal with them in groups, by all means do so.
However, you are taking up a great deal of the Tribunal's
time.

DR. SIEMERS: This document, number 99, is the minutes of the
ninth meeting of the Supreme Council, that is, the military
operational staff of England and France on 27 April. Beyond
a doubt the heading shows that it was after the occupation
of Norway. However, that is only a formal objection. The
contents of the document show that at this session the
participants discussed the happenings during the period
before the occupation, and the most important leaders of the
Allies took part in this meeting. Chamberlain, Halifax,
Churchill, Sir Samuel Hoare, Sir Alexander Cadogan, etc.,
and, on the French side, Renault, Daladier, Gamelin and
Darlan were present, and these gentlemen discussed the
previous plans which, I admit, had misfired because of the
German occupation of Norway. But they did discuss how
necessary it was that the iron-ore deposits in Sweden should
come into the hands of the

                                                  [Page 429]

Allies and what was to be done now to prevent Germany
getting this ore and how the destruction of these iron-ore
deposits could be brought about. I believe, therefore, that
even though this happened at a later date, the train of
thought I have presented is of significance.

Then we turn to Document 100. This deals with the session of
the French War Committee of 9 April, 1940, which concerns
the same problem: what the Allies planned and what could be
planned now that the report had just come in about the
action on the part of Germany. Documents 102 to 107 have
already been dealt with.

For Document 110 the same statements apply as for Documents
101 to 107.

Document 112 is a document which shows that Churchill as
early as May, 1940, expected active intervention on the part
of America. I wanted to present this in connection with the
accusation raised against the defendant Raeder, that in the
spring of 1941 he was instrumental in bringing about a war
against the U.S.A. by way of Japan. For me this document is
not nearly so important as those basic documents which I
have referred to at greater length. Therefore I leave this
completely to the discretion of the prosecution or the
Tribunal.

The next group consists of documents which were turned down
in the case of Ribbentrop. I should like to point out that I
did not have the opportunity in the Ribbentrop case to
define my position as to the justification and relevancy of
these documents. Therefore I consider it sufficient simply
to state in summary that these documents were refused in the
case of Ribbentrop, that the charges against Ribbentrop ...

THE PRESIDENT: We have already carefully considered the
arguments and have decided those documents were
inadmissible.

DR. SIEMERS: I believed, that the decision applied only to
the Ribbentrop case, since during those proceedings no other
point of view was discussed, namely, that of the charges
raised against Raeder, in which connection it is expressly
said in Document C-152 that Raeder brought about the
occupation of the whole of Greece. That is an accusation
that was not made against Ribbentrop but only against
Raeder. How can I refute this accusation if these documents
are denied me?

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal knows the documents
and knows the charges against Raeder, and it does not desire
to hear any further argument on it. It will consider the
matter.

DR. SIEMERS: I beg the pardon of the Tribunal. In these
circumstances I am compelled to ascertain whether all these
documents were covered in Ribbentrop's case. My notes, as I
told the prosecution this morning, do not agree with the
statements of the prosecution. Perhaps after the session, if
I am unable to do so at the moment, I might point out
whether or not the documents are identical.

It is really a fact that in Ribbentrop's case these
documents were not presented in their entirety and that the
Tribunal, therefore, does not know them in their entirety.
Whether Dr. Horn had marked exactly the same passages as I
wish to use, I am not able to say as far as each individual
document is concerned. I know only that in the large
majority of cases Dr. Horn did not present the entire
document, because he was presenting it only from the point
of view of the Ribbentrop case.

THE PRESIDENT: Presumably you have submitted your extracts
to the prosecution. The prosecution tells us that those
extracts are the same that were rejected in Ribbentrop's
case.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, we have only a list of
those documents so far. We have not seen the extracts.

(Brief consultation between Sir David and an associate.)

My Lord, I am sorry. I spoke too quickly. We have seen the
extracts in

                                                  [Page 430]

German but we have not had them translated. We have done the
best we could in German.

THE PRESIDENT: 24 and 25, at any rate, are both speeches in
English.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes, my Lord, some of them are. I am
sorry, my Lord; these are. Your Lordship is quite right.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, as I understand it, Dr. Siemers
says that these are not the same passages of evidence, or
suggested evidence, as were rejected in Ribbentrop's case.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I did not do the actual
checking myself. It was Major Barrington who checked the
Ribbentrop documents, went through these and compared the
two, and he gave me that which forms the basis of our note.
That is the position. I cannot tell your Lordship that I
have actually checked these myself.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers is telling us that that is
untrue?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: As I understood Dr. Siemers, he was
saying that he did not know whether they were the same
extracts . . .

DR. SIEMERS: May I just make one remark in connection with
that, please? I am not quite certain that I can say in each
specific case which extracts were contained in the
Ribbentrop case. But that they are not the same - I know for
certain that they are not the same because in order to
relieve the work of the translation department I compared
the numbers, and in the few cases in which they were the
same I told the translation department that these documents
were identical, so that they would not be translated a
second time. But I am sorry to say that a large number of
the documents were not the same, as they were asked for by
Dr. Horn and Ribbentrop from a completely different point of
view.

I might also point out that the numbers under Group D which
are enumerated here as Ribbentrop Documents 29, 51, 56, 57,
60, 61, 62, although I made every effort to find them, could
not be found in the Ribbentrop Document Book. And the list
does not show which numbers they should be in the Ribbentrop
Document Book.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, that is not suggested. What
is said is that they are in the same series which deals with
the same subject - that is, the question of Greece and the
Balkans - as those documents which the Tribunal ruled out in
the case of Ribbentrop.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, I think the best course
would be for you to go through these documents this
afternoon under the heading C and find out whether they are
the same as those rejected in Ribbentrop's case, and if they
are not, indicate exactly in what they differ from the
documents rejected in Ribbentrop's case, so as to show they
have some relevance to your case, and we shall expect to
have that by five o'clock.

Now will you go on with the others?

DR. SIEMERS: May I perhaps make one remark about what Sir
David said regarding Group "13"? They were not objected to
because they have already been mentioned in Ribbentrop's
case, but only because they deal with the same subject
matter, that is true. The same subject matter, namely,
Greece, is dealt with: and I can only reply that the
prosecution has charged the defendant Raeder in C-152 with
having brought about the occupation of the whole of Greece.
The facts concerning this statement of three lines I can
present only if I am allowed some documents referring to
Greece, and only if these are not refused on the grounds
that the documents concerning Greece were turned down in
Ribbentrop's case.

Now, I come to Group "E", which begins with Document 26. The
same statements apply which I have already set forth in
regard to Documents 101 to 107. The attacks planned by the
Allies on the oil regions in neutral Roumania and in the
neutral Caucasus, as I should like to remark in parenthesis,
have

                                                  [Page 431]

already been dealt with in these proceedings. The Tribunal
will remember that I asked Goering during his examination
about entries in Jodl's war diary pertaining to this
question and that he has given information about the reports
received by Germany. This testimony, too, concerns only the
subjective side, that is what was known by Germany. I must
prove that the objective side, the fact that this had
actually been planned, agrees exactly with the subjective
side, that is, with these reports. These Documents, 26, 30
to 32, 36, 37, 39, 40 to 44, are to prove that. Then comes
No. 99, which has already been dealt with, which seems to be
here in duplicate, 101, and 110, which also seem to be
duplicates.

I turn now to Group 6, which is supposed to be irrelevant,
dealing with the attack on Norway. I have already set forth
my reasons. I beg the Tribunal not to deny me these
documents in any circumstances. If I am not granted these
documents I shall simply not be in a position to present
evidence in a reasonable manner without relating everything
myself. I can present proof in regard to a question of such
importance only if documents are granted me just as they are
granted the prosecution. But if all the documents concerning
this question are refused, then I do not know how I am to
treat such a question. I believe that the Tribunal will wish
to assist me in this matter.

I am requesting this especially for the following reasons:
When I gave my reasons for wanting to present this
particular evidence, I asked that those files of the British
Admiralty be brought in which dealt with the preparations
and planning regarding Scandinavia, that is, Norway. Sir
David did not object at that time, but said he would have to
consult the British Admiralty. The Tribunal decided
accordingly and granted my application. In the meantime the
British Admiralty has answered, and I assume that Sir David
will agree to my reading the answer which has been put at my
disposal. This answer is as follows - it concerns, if I may
say that in advance ...

THE PRESIDENT: We have had the answer, I think, have we not?
We have had the answer and transmitted it to you.

DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. From this reply it can be
seen that the files will not be submitted, that I cannot get
the necessary approval. It can also be seen that certain
facts, which will be important for my presentation of
evidence, will be admitted by the British Admiralty, but in
reality I am not in a position to prove anything by means of
documents. Since I am unable to make use of this evidence, I
ask at least to be allowed the other means of presenting
evidence, that is, the documents contained in the German
White Books. These are documents recognised as being
correct. In all cases they are facsimiles. They can be
carefully examined and I believe ...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we are dealing with your
application for particular documents. We are not dealing
with any general argument or general criticism that you have
to make. We are only hearing you in answer to certain
objections on behalf of the British Prosecution.

DR. SIEMERS: Your Honour, if I am not very much mistaken, in
which case please correct me, Sir David, with a few
exceptions, defined his position regarding these documents
under "F" - this is a large number, from 59 to 91 - as a
whole, and not his position regarding each individual
document. But I have to say the same thing to practically
each document and asked only that I be granted those
documents as a whole, for I cannot make much headway without
these documents.

THE PRESIDENT: You were not referring to these documents.
You were referring to the fact that the British Admiralty
was not prepared to disclose its files to you. It has
nothing to do with these documents at all.

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