Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-06/tgmwc-06-56.11
Last-Modified: 1997/11/19

DR. NELTE (counsel for defendant Keitel): Mr. President, to
my regret I must present the same objections to this
document submitted by the prosecutor of the Soviet Union
under USSR 149, and must submit the same request which I
made this morning. As far as I know, the High Tribunal have
not yet made a decision in regard to this question.

THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, Dr. Nelte. The Tribunal
has already made a decision, which governs this case. They
pointed out the other day to counsel for the Soviet Union
that documents which were not identified as authentic
documents, must be identified as authentic, and the Soviet
prosecutor at that time undertook to certify that all
documents which he made use of were certified as authentic
documents. And if they are not so certified, they will be
struck out of the record. That ruling applies to this
document.

This document is a document which appears to be a letter or
report to the Government of the Soviet Union, but it does
not contain upon its face any certification showing that it
is an authentic document. The counsel for the Soviet Union
said before we adjourned that he undertook -- as he had
already undertaken -- to produce a certificate that the
document was an authentic document; that is to say, that it
was written by the person who purported to write it, and in
those circumstances, the Tribunal accepts the document
provisionally.

If no such certificate is forthcoming, then the document
will be stricken from the record.

DR. NELTE: If I understand you correctly, the Tribunal will
accept a letter written to the Soviet Government or a
statement as documentary evidence for the contents of this
statement.

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. I have already said, provided that
it is certified as an authentic document. I have said that
more than once.

DR. NELTE: In this way, every letter sent to the prosecution
or the Government of the Soviet Union or to any other
prosecution would become documentary evidence by the
certification that it has actually been written by the
person who signed it, which would make it impossible for the
defence to cross-examine the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: That depends on where the witness is. We are
dealing with witnesses who are scattered all over the globe,
and as we are informed that it is not the practice in the
Soviet Union for affidavits to be made in such cases, the
Tribunal considers such a document to fall within Article 19
-- provided it is an authentic document.

We are affording the defendants' counsel the greatest
assistance in bringing witnesses to this Court, but we
cannot undertake to bring witnesses from all over the world
upon questions which are very often of very little
importance.

DR. NELTE: I quite appreciate the difficulties, and I am
grateful to the Tribunal for their willingness to assist us.
Therefore I only request that it be ascertained in each case
where the person who has made that statement has his
residence, so that the defence may try to reach him.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. If the witness is in, or in the
immediate vicinity of, Nuremberg, the Tribunal would think
that it was only fair, if such a document as this were to be
put in evidence, that he should be produced for examination
or cross-examination by the defendants' counsel, but we do
understand that the man who wrote this letter is not in the
vicinity of Nuremberg. We have no reason to think he is, and
I am reminding defendants' counsel that they can

                                                  [Page 248]
                                                            
always apply, if they think right, to issue interrogatories
which would be put to any such person as this who has
written such a document as this.

DR. NELTE: Thank you.

MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: I have availed myself of the recess to
make inquiries about General Mueller. He is in a prisoner-of-
war camp, No. 27, in Krasnogorsk, in the Moscow region. May
I continue my statement?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: All the material, your Honours, which I
have mentioned to date emanated from circles of the High
Command of the German Army. If I can so express myself,
General Mueller belonged to the central link of the body of
German generals. He was Chief of Staff of the Army, he
commanded an Army Corps. His testimony reflects a series of
events which may be considered worthy of attention, since
they explain the circumstances accompanying Germany's
preparations against the Soviet Union.

I wish to refer to Page 46 of the document book. There you
will find the first page of General Mueller's statement. The
first paragraph, Page 1, of the statement is marked with red
pencil. I now proceed to quote from it:

     "The preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union
     began as early as July, 1940. At that time I was Chief
     of Staff of `C' Army Group at Dijon in France. General
     Field-Marshal von Leeb was in command. This Army Group
     consisted of the 1st, 2nd and 7th Armies, which were
     occupation armies in France. Besides this, Army Group
     `A' (Rundstedt), whose task was to prepare Operation
     `Sea Lion' (the invasion of England) and Army Group `B'
     was transferred to the East (Poznan). The staff of Army
     Group `B'  was given the following forces, transferred
     from France (part of the armies of occupation): The
     12th, 4th and 18th Armies, plus some other corps and
     about 30 divisions. Of this numbere, some of the
     divisions were taken from Army Group `B.'
     
     Directly after the campaign in the West, the O.K.H.
     gave the order for the demobilisation of 20 divisions.
     This order was cancelled, and the 20 divisions were not
     demobilised. Instead of this, after their return to
     Germany they were sent on leave, and thus kept ready
     for rapid mobilisation.
     
     Both measures, the transfer of about 500,000 men to the
     Russian frontier and the cancellation of the order
     disbanding about 300,000 men, show that already in
     July, 1940, plans existed for war operations in the
     East.
     
     The next order which gives evidence of Germany's
     preparations for attacking the Soviet Union, was the
     written O.K.H. order issued in September, 1940,
     regarding the formation in Leipzig of a new Army (The
     11th), severeal corps and about 40 infantry divisions.
     The formation of these units was carried out from
     September, 1940, onwards, by the Commander of the
     Reserve Army (Colonel-General Fromm), partly in France,
     but mainly in Germany. Towards the end of September,
     1940, the O.K.H. called me to Fontainebleu. The
     Quartermaster-General of the 1st General Staff of the
     Land Forces, Lieutenant-General (afterwards Field
     Marshal) Paulus, informed me, at first orally, of the
     order that my staff (the staff of Army Group `C') was
     to be transferred to Dresden by 1st November, and the
     staff of the 2nd Army (Colonel-General Weichs), which
     formed part of this Army Group, to Munich, also by 1st
     November."
     
I omit several lines of General Mueller's statement and pass
to the second page of the document, which corresponds to
Page 41 of the document book:

     "In accordance with this order, confirmed later on a
     written order signed by the Chief of the General Staff
     Halder, the transfer of these units was carried out on
     time."
     
                                                  [Page 249]

Thus initiated, the preparation for the attack on the Soviet
Union was carried out at a heightened tempo and with
customary German pedantry.

I would, your Honours, remind the Tribunal that the witness,
Paulus, stated at this session that in August, 1940, the
elaboration of the previous plan of attack on the Soviet
Union, known as Case "Barbarossa," was already so far
advanced as to render possible the conducting of two
manoeuvres under the direction of Paulus.

THE PRESIDENT: General, I don't think it is necessary to
read the statement of Field Marshal Paulus, as he has
already given the evidence in the witness box.

MAJOR-GENERAL ZORYA: I am not reading it into the record. I
am merely referring to a circumstance which will enable me
to proceed to General Mueller's statement that this system
of manoeuvres, which originated in the General Staff of the
German Army, eventually spread over the entire Army and that
the entire armed forces participated in the execution of
these manoevres which, per se, were already a preparation
for the attack on the Soviet Union. I am reading into the
record that passage of the statement which is underlined in
blue pencil, Pages 2 and 3 of the Russian text; Page 41 of
the bundle of documents:

     "Insofar," General Mueller states, "as in the future
     the Army was to attack the Soviet Union, the first plan
     was to train soldiers and officers.
     
     Towards the end of January, 1941, I received
     telegraphic orders from the Chief of the General Staff
     Halder to attend the military exercises at St. Germain
     (near Paris) of Rundstedt's Army Group. The object of
     this military exercise was the attack and advance from
     Roumania and South Poland in the direction of Kiev. The
     plan had in mind the intention also of the
     participation of Roumanian troops. In the main these
     military exercises anticipated the conditions of the
     future order concerning the strategic deployment of
     forces, to which I will refer later.
     
     The director of the military exercises was the Chief of
     Staff of the Rundstedt Army Group. There were present:
     Rundstedt, Halder; the Chiefs of Staff: of the 6th
     Army, Colonel Heim; of the 11th Army, Colonel Weler,
     and of Kleist's Tank Group, Colonel Zwickler and
     several generals of the Armoured Forces. The military
     exercises were held in the area occupied by Rundstedt's
     Army Group, approximately between 31st January and 2nd
     February, 1941. The exercise demonstrated the necessity
     for a strong concentration of tank forces."
     
The documents I have presented to date characterise the
measures of the Military Command of the German Armed Forces
for the preparation of the strategic deployment of the
German Armies for launching an attack against the Union of
the Soviet Socialist Republics.

As for time, these measures embraced a considerable period
of 1940 and were put into action at least six months prior
to the appearance on the scene of directive No. 21
concerning the Case "Barbarossa."

Home ·  Site Map ·  What's New? ·  Search Nizkor