Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-05/tgmwc-05-41.09
Last-Modified: 1999/10/05

The fourth point was the re-militarisation of the Rhineland.
The Rhineland was reoccupied on 7 March, 1936. I remind the
Tribunal of the two complementary documents, 2289-PS,
Exhibit USA 56, the announcement of this action by Hitler;
and C-139, Exhibit USA 53, which is the "Operation
Schulung," giving the military action which was to be taken
if necessary. These were the acts for which the defendant
shared responsibility because of his position and because of
the steps which he took; but a little later he summed up his
views on the actions detailed above in a speech before
Germans abroad made on 29 August, 1937, of which I ask the
Tribunal to take judicial notice, as it appears in "Das
Archiv," 1937, at Page 650. I quote only a short portion of
it that appears on Page 72 of the document book.

   "The unity of the racial and national will, created
   through Nazism with unprecedented elan, has made
   possible a foreign policy through which the bonds of the
   Versailles Treaty were slashed, the freedom to arm
   regained and the sovereignty of the whole nation re-
   established. We have again become master in our own
   home, and we have produced the means of power to remain
   so for all times. The world should notice from Hitler's
   deeds and words that his aims are not aggressive war."

The world, of course, had not the advantage of seeing these
various complementary documents of military preparation
which I have had the opportunity of putting before the
Tribunal.

                                                  [Page 114]

The next section - and the next point against this defendant
- is that both as Minister of Foreign Affairs and as one of
the inner circle of the Fuehrer's advisers on foreign
political matters, this defendant participated in the
political planning and preparation for acts of aggression
against Austria, Czechoslovakia and other nations.

If I might first put the defendant's policy in a sentence, I
would say that it can be summarised as breaking one treaty
only at a time. He himself put it - if I may say so -
slightly more pompously, but to the same effect, in a speech
before the Academy of German Law on 30 October, 1937, which
appears in " Das Archiv," October 1937, Page 921, and which
the Tribunal will find in the document book on Page 73. The
underlining is mine:

   "In recognition of these elementary facts the Reich
   Cabinet has always interceded in favour of treating
   every concrete international problem within the scope of
   methods especially suited to it; not to complicate it
   unnecessarily by involvement with other problems; and,
   as long as problems between only two powers are
   concerned, to choose the direct way for an immediate
   understanding between these two powers. We are in a
   position to state that this method has fully proved
   itself good not only in the German interest, but also in
   the general interest."

The only country whose interests are not mentioned are the
other parties to the various treaties that were dealt with
in that way; and the working out of that policy can readily
be shown by looking at the tabulated form of the actions of
this defendant when he was Foreign Minister, or during the
term of his immediate successor when the defendant still was
purported to have influence.

In 1935 the action was directed against the Western Powers.
That action was the rearmament of Germany. When that was
going on another country had to be reassured. At that time
it was Austria, with the support of Italy - which Austria
still had up to 1935. And so you get the fraudulent
assurance, the essence of the technique, in that case given
by Hitler, on 21 May, 1935. And that is clearly shown to be
false, by the documents which Mr. Alderman put in. Then, in
1936, you have still the action necessary against the
Western Powers, in the occupation of the Rhineland. You
still have a fraudulent assurance to Austria in the treaty
of 11 July of that year and that is shown to be fraudulent
by the letters from the defendant von Papen, Exhibits USA 64
and 67, one of which my friend Major Barrington has just
referred to.

Then in 1937 and 1938 you move on a step, and the action is
directed against Austria. We know what that action was. It
was absorption, planned, at any rate finally, at the meeting
on 5 November, 1937 ; and action taken on 11 March 1938.

Reassurance had to be given to the Western Powers, so you
have the assurance to Belgium on 13 October, 1937, which was
dealt with by my friend Mr. Roberts. (See Part 2, pp. 198-
211).

We move forward a year and the object of the aggressive
action becomes Czechoslovakia. Or I should say we move
forward six months to a year. There you have the Sudetenland
obtained in September; the absorption of the whole of
Bohemia and Moravia on 15 March 1939.

Then it was necessary to reassure Poland; so an assurance to
Poland is given by Hitler on 20 February, 1938, and repeated
up to 26 September, 1938. The falsity of that assurance was
shown over and over again in Colonel Griffith-Jones's
presentation on Poland. (Part 2, pp. 125-176).

Then finally, when they want the action as directed against
Poland in the next year for its conquest, assurance must be
given to Russia, and so a non

                                                  [Page 115]

aggression pact is entered into on 23 August 1939, as shown
by Mr. Alderman, at Pages 1160 to 1216 (see Part 2, pp. 229-
259).

With regard to that tabular presentation, one might quote
the Latin tag, res ipsa loquitur. But quite a frank
statement from this defendant, with regard to the earlier
part of that, can be found in the account of his
conversation with the United States Ambassador, Mr. Bullitt,
on 18 May, 1936, which is on Page 74 of the document book,
Document L-150, Exhibit USA 65, and if I might read the
first paragraph after the introduction, which says that they
called on this defendant, Mr. Bullitt remarks:

   "Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German
   Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until
   'the Rhineland had been digested.' He explained that he
   meant that, until the German fortifications had been
   constructed on the French and Belgian frontiers, the
   German Government would do everything possible to
   prevent rather than encourage an outbreak by the Nazis
   in Austria, and would pursue a quiet line with regard to
   Czechoslovakia. 'As soon as our fortifications are
   constructed and the countries of Central Europe realise
   that France cannot enter German territory at will, all
   those countries will begin to feel very differently
   about their foreign policies, and a new constellation
   will develop,' he said."

I remind the Tribunal, without citing it, of the
conversation referred to by my friend, Major Barrington, a
short time ago, between the defendant von Papen, as
Ambassador, and Mr. Messersmith, which is very much to the
same effect.

Then I come to the actual aggression against Austria, and I
remind the Tribunal that this defendant was Foreign
Minister.

   First: During the early Nazi plottings against Austria
   in 1934.

The Tribunal will find these in the transcript (Part 1, pp.
214-220), and I remind them generally that it was the murder
of Chancellor Dollfuss and the ancillary acts which were
afterwards so strongly approved.

   Second: When the false assurance was given to Austria on
   21 May, 1935, and the fraudulent treaty made on 11 July,
   1936.

References to these are Document TC-26, which is Exhibit GB
19, and Document TC-22, which is Exhibit GB 20 (see Part 1,
p. 243).

   Third: When the defendant von Papen was carrying on his
   subterranean intrigues in the period from 1935 to 1937.

I again give the references so that the Tribunal will have
it in mind: Document 2247-PS, Exhibit USA 64 - letter dated
17 May 1935 - and Exhibit USA 67, Document 2246-PS - 1
September 1936. (Part 1, pp. 231, 232).

This defendant von Neurath was present when Hitler declared,
at the Hoszbach interview on 5 November, 1937, that the
German question could only be solved by force, and that his
plans were to conquer Austria and Czechoslovakia. That is
Document 386-PS, Exhibit USA 25, which the Tribunal will
find at Page 82. If you will look at the sixth line of Page
82, after the heading, you will see that one of the persons
in attendance at this highly confidential meeting was the
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, Freiherr von Neurath.

Without reading a document which the Tribunal have had
referred to them more than once, may I remind the Tribunal
that it is on Page 86 that the passage about the conquest of
Austria occurs, and the next sentence is:

   "For the improvement of our military political position,
   it must be our first aim in every case of entanglement
   by war to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria
   simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the
   flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards."

That is developed on the succeeding page. The important
point is that this

                                                  [Page 116]

defendant was present at that meeting; and it is impossible
for him after that meeting to say that he was not acting
except with his eyes completely open, and with complete
comprehension as to what was intended.

Then the next point. During the actual Anschluss he received
a note from the British Ambassador dated 11 March, 1938.
That is Document 3045-PS, Exhibit USA 127. He sent the reply
contained in Document 3287-PS, Exhibit USA 128. If I might
very briefly remind the Tribunal of the reply, I think all
that is necessary - and of course the Tribunal have had this
document referred to them before - is the at top of Page 93.
I wish to call attention to two obvious untruths.

   The defendant von Neurath states in the sixth line: "It
   is untrue that the Reich used forceful pressure to bring
   about this development, especially the assertion, which
   was spread later by the former Chancellor Schuschnigg,
   that the German Government had presented the Federal
   President with a conditional ultimatum. It is a pure
   invention."

According to the ultimatum, he had to appoint a proposed
candidate as Chancellor to form a Cabinet conforming to the
proposals of the German Government. Otherwise the invasion
of Austria by German troops was held in prospect.

   "The truth of the matter is that the question of sending
   military or police forces from the Reich was only
   brought up when the newly formed Austrian Cabinet
   addressed a telegram, already published by the Press, to
   the German Government, urgently asking for the dispatch
   of German troops as soon as possible, in order to
   restore peace and order and to avoid bloodshed. Faced
   with the immediate threat of the danger of a bloody
   civil war in Austria, the German Government then decided
   to comply with the appeal addressed to it."

Well, as I said, My Lord, these are the two most obvious
untruths, and all one can say is that it must have, at any
rate, given this defendant a certain macabre sort of humour
to write that, when the truth was as the Tribunal know it
from the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Burckel, which has
been put in before the Tribunal as Document 812-PS, Exhibit
USA 6 1, and when they have heard, as they have done at
length, the transcripts of the defendant Goering's telephone
conversation with Austria on that day, which is Document
2949-PS, Exhibit USA 76, and the entries of the defendant's
Jodl's diary for 11, 13 and 14 February, which is Document
1780-PS, Exhibit USA 72.

In this abundance of proof of the untruthfulness of these
statements, the Tribunal may probably think that the most
clear and obvious correction is in the transcription of the
defendant Goering's telephone conversations, which are so
amply corroborated by the other documents.

The prosecution submits that it is inconceivable that this
defendant who, according to the defendant Jodl's diary - may
I ask the Tribunal just to look at Page 116 of the document
book, the entry in the defendant Jodl's diary for 10 March
so that they have this point clear? It is the third
paragraph, and it says

   "At 1300 hours General Keitel informs Chief of
   Operational Staff and Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is
   being detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign
   Office."

I submit that it is inconceivable, when this defendant had
taken over the of Foreign Office, was dealing with the
matter and, as I shall show the Tribunal in a moment, co-
operating with the defendant Goering to suit the
susceptibilities of the Czechs, that he should have been so
ignorant of the truth of events, and what really was
happening, as to write that letter in honour and good faith.

His position can be shown equally clearly by the account
which is given of

                                                  [Page 117]


him in the affidavit of Mr. Messersmith, Document 2385-PS,
Exhibit USA 68. If the Tribunal will look at Page 107 of the
document book, I remind them of that entry, which exactly
describes the action and style of activity of this defendant
at this crisis. Two-thirds of the way down the page the
paragraph begins:

   "I should emphasise here in this statement that the men
   who made these promises were not only the dyed-in-the-
   wool Nazis, but more conservative Germans who already
   had begun willingly to lend themselves to the Nazi
   programme.
   
   In an official dispatch to the Department of State from
   Vienna, dated October 10, 1935, 1 wrote as follows :
   
   'Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath,
   Papen and Mackensen are not dangerous people, and that
   they are diplomats of the old school. They are in fact
   servile instruments of the regime, and, just because the
   outside world looks upon them as harmless, they are able
   to work more effectively. They are able to sow discord
   just because they propagate the myth that they are not
   in sympathy with the regime.'"

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

(The Tribunal adjourned until 24th January 1946 at 1000
hours)

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