Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-04/tgmwc-04-28.05
Last-Modified: 1999/09/19

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Taylor, did you read paragraph 5 (1) on Page 10?

COLONEL TAYLOR: 5 (1) on Page 10? I read the first passage,
your Honour. If you would like it in full

THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps you might go to the end of it.

COLONEL TAYLOR:

   "Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the lunatic
   asylums necessitated operations of the Security Police.
   Many institutions had been robbed by the retreating
   Russians of their whole food supply. Often the guard and
   nursing personnel had fled. The inmates of several
   institutions broke out and became a danger to the
   general security;
   therefore, in Aglona (Lithuania), 544 lunatics, in
   Mariampol (Lithuania), 109 lunatics, and in Magutowo,
   near Luga, 95 lunatics were liquidated."

Passing back to Page 17, the first paragraph on that page:

   "When it was decided to extend the German operations to
   Leningrad and also to extend the activities of Einsatz
   Group A to this town, I gave orders on 18th July, 1941,
   to parts of Einsatz Commands 2 and 3 and to the Staff of
   the Group, to advance to Novosselje, in order to prepare
   these activities and to be able to advance as early as
   possible into the area around Leningrad and into the
   city itself. The advance of the forces of Einsatz Group
   A, which were intended to be used for Leningrad, was
   effected in agreement with and on the express wish of
   Panzer-Group 4."

The final quotation from this document is Page 18, last
paragraph:

   "Einsatz Commands of Einsatz Group A of the Security
   Police participated from the beginning in the fight
   against the nuisance created by Partisans. Close
   collaboration with the Armed Forces and the exchange of
   experiences which were collected in the fight against
   Partisans, brought about a thorough knowledge of the
   origin, organisation, strength, equipment and system
   used by the Red Partisans as time went on."

Now, in the light of these documents, I would like to turn
to some of the remaining affidavits which are before the
Tribunal in Document Book 1. These affidavits have been
furnished by responsible officials in both the Wehrmacht and
the S.S., and fill in much of the background for the
documents.

Affidavit number 12 is an affidavit by Schellenberg, which,
in view of the fact that its contents have been covered in
Schellenberg's and Ohlendorf's testimony, I do not propose
to read. It covers much of the same ground, and I see no
reason to take the time of the Tribunal by reading it. I
should like to have it considered, subject to the usual rule
that Schellenberg can be questioned on any of these matters
by the defence. The affidavit itself is available in French
and Russian as well as in English, and in German for the
defence, so I will pass over that one.

I turn to Affidavit number 13, which will be Exhibit USA
558. Schellenberg's affidavit will be 557. This is an
affidavit by Wilhelm Scheidt, a retired captain of the
German army, who worked in the War History Section of the
O.K.W. from 1941 to 1945. It sheds considerable light on the
relations between. the Wehrmacht and the S.S. at the top
with respect to anti-Partisan warfare I will read this
affidavit:

   "I, Wilhelm Scheidt, belonged to the War History Section
   of the O.K.W. from the year 1941 to 1945.

                                                   [Page 20]


   Concerning the question of Partisan Warfare I state that
   I remember the following from my knowledge of the
   documents of the Operations Staff of the O.K.W., as well
   as from my conversations in the Fuehrer's headquarters
   with Generalmajor Walter Scherff, whom the Fuehrer had
   appointed to compile the history of the War.
   
   Counter-Partisan warfare was originally a responsibility
   of Reichsfuehrer S.S. Heinrich Himmler, who sent police
   forces to handle this matter.
   
   In the years 1942 and 1943, however, counter-Partisan
   warfare developed to such an extent that the Operations
   Staff of the O.K.W. had to give it special attention. It
   proved necessary to conduct extensive operations against
   the Partisans with Wehrmacht troops in Russian, as well
   as Jugoslavian territory. Partisan operations for a long
   while threatened to cut off the lines of communication
   and transport routes that were necessary to support the
   German Wehrmacht. For instance, a monthly report
   concerning the attacks on the railroad lines in occupied
   Russia revealed that in, the Russian area alone from 800
   to 1,000 attacks occurred each month during that period,
   causing among other things, the loss of from 200 to 300
   locomotives.
   
   It was well known that Partisan warfare was conducted
   with cruelty on both sides. It was well known that
   reprisals were inflicted on hostages and communities
   whose inhabitants were suspected of being Partisans or
   of supporting them. It is beyond question that these
   facts must have been known to the leading officers in
   the Operations Staff of the O.K.W. and in the Army's
   General Staff. It was further well known that Hitler
   believed that the only successful method of conducting
   counter-Partisan warfare was to employ cruel punishments
   as deterrents.
   
   I remember that at the time of the Polish revolt in
   Warsaw, S.S.-Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein reported to
   Generaloberst Guderian and Jodl about the atrocities of
   the Russian S.S.-Brigade Kaminski, which fought on the
   German side."

Now, the foreign documents and the testimony of Ohlendorf
and Schellenberg relate to the arrangements which were made
between the O.K.W., O.K.H., and Himmler's headquarters with
respect to anti-Partisan warfare. They show conclusively
that these arrangements were made jointly, and that the High
Command of the Armed Forces was not only fully aware of, but
was an active participant in these plans.

Turning now to the field, I would like to read three
statements by General Hans Rottiger, which will be
Affidavits numbers 15 and 16, Exhibits USA 559 and 560.
General Rottiger attained the rank of General of Panzer
Troops, the equivalent of a Lieutenant-General in the
American Army, and was Chief of Staff of the German Fourth
Army, and later of Army Group Centre on the Eastern front,
during the period of which he speaks.

The first statement is as follows:

   "As Chief of Staff of the Fourth Army from May, 1942 to
   June, 1943, to which was later added the area of the
   Ninth Army, I often had occasion to concern myself
   officially with anti-Partisan warfare. During these
   operations the troops received orders from the highest
   authority, as, for example, even the O.K.H., to use the
   harshest methods. These operations were carried out by
   troops of the Army Group and of the Army, as, for
   example, security battalions.
   
   At the beginning, in accordance with orders which were
   issued through official channels, only a few prisoners
   were taken. In accordance with orders, Jews, political
   Commissars and Agents were delivered up to the S.D.
   
                                                   [Page 21]
   
   The number of enemy dead mentioned in official reports
   was very high in comparison with our own losses. From
   the documents which have been shown to me I have now
   come to realise that the order from the highest
   authorities for the harshest conduct of the anti-
   Partisan war can only have been intended to make
   possible a ruthless liquidation of Jews and other
   undesirable elements, by using for this purpose the
   military struggle of the Army against the Partisans."

The second statement:

   Supplementary to my above declaration, I declare: "As I
   stated orally on 28th November, my then Commander-in-
   Chief of the Fourth Army instructed his troops may times
   not to wage war against the Partisans more severely than
   was required at the time by the position. This struggle
   should only be pushed to the annihilation of the enemy
   after all attempts to bring about a surrender failed.
   Apart from humanitarian reasons we necessarily had an
   interest in taking prisoners, since very many of them
   could very well be used as members of native volunteer
   units against the Partisans.
   
   Alongside the necessary active combating of Partisans,
   there was propaganda directed at the Partisans, and also
   at the population, with the object of causing them by
   peaceful means, to give up Partisan activities. For
   instance, in this way the women too were continually
   urged to get their men back from the forests or to keep
   them by other means from joining the Partisans, and this
   propaganda had good results. In the spring of 1943 the
   area of the Fourth Army was as good as cleared of
   Partisans. Only on its boundaries, and then only from
   time to time, were Partisans in evidence, when they
   crossed into the area of the Fourth Army from
   neighbouring areas. The Army was obliged for this
   reason, on the orders of the Army Group, to give up
   security forces to the neighbouring army to the South."

The third statement by Rottiger, number 16:

   "During my period of service in 1942-43 as Chief of
   Staff of the Fourth Army of the Central Army Group, S.D.
   units were attached in the beginning, apparently for the
   purpose of counter-intelligence activity in frontline
   areas. It was clear that these S.D. units were causing
   great disturbances among the local civilian population,
   with the result that my commanding officer asked the
   Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group, Field Marshal von
   Kluge, to order the S.D. units to clear out of the
   frontline areas. This was done immediately. The reason
   for this, first and foremost, was that the excesses of
   the S.D. units, in the form of execution of Jews and
   other persons, assumed such proportions as to threaten
   the security of the Army in its combat areas, because of
   the infuriated civilian populace. Although, in general,
   the special tasks of the S.D. units were well known and
   appeared to be carried out with the knowledge of the
   highest military authorities, we opposed these methods
   as far as possible, because of the danger which existed
   for our troops."

I would like now to offer one final document, the last
document, 1786-PS, which will be Exhibit USA 561. This is an
extract from the War Diary of the Deputy Chief of the Armed
Forces Operational Staff, dated 14th March, 1943. I propose
to read the last two paragraphs, which deal with the problem
of shipping of suspected Partisans to concentration camps in
Germany.

The Tribunal will see, from the extracts which I will read,
that the Army was chiefly concerned with maintaining
sufficiently severe treatment for suspected Partisans
without, at the same time, obstructing the procurement of
labour from the occupied territories.

                                                   [Page 22]

I will read the last two paragraphs:

   "The General Quartermaster, together with the Economic
   Staff, has proposed that the deportees should be sent
   either to prison camps or to training centres in their
   own area, and that deportation to Germany should take
   place only when the deportees are on probation and in
   less serious cases.
   
   In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, this
   proposal does not take sufficient account of the
   severity required, and leads to a comparison with the
   treatment meted out to the 'peaceful population' which
   has been called upon to work. He recommends, therefore,
   transportation to concentration camps in Germany which
   have already been introduced by the Reichsfuehrer S.S.
   for his sphere, and which he is prepared to introduce
   for the Armed Forces in the case of an extension to the
   province of the latter. The High Command of the Armed
   Forces therefore orders: that Partisan helpers and
   suspects who are not to be executed, should be handed
   over to the competent Higher S.S. and Police Leader, and
   that the difference between 'punitive work' and 'work in
   Germany' is to be made clear to the population."

Finally, I would like to offer a group of four affidavits
which show that the anti-Partisan activities on the Eastern
front were under the command of and supported by the
Wehrmacht, and that the nature of these activities was fully
known to the Wehrmacht.

The first of these is Affidavit No. 17, Exhibit USA 562, by
Ernst Rode, who was an S.S. Brigadefuehrer and Major General
of the Police, and was a member of Himmler's personal
Command Staff from 1943 to 1945:

   "I, Ernst Rode, was formerly Chief of the Command Staff
   of the Reichsfuehrer S.S., having taken over this
   position in the spring of 1943, as successor to former
   S.S. Obergruppenfuehrer Kurt Knoblauch. My last rank was
   Generalmajor of Police and of the Waffen S.S. My
   function was to furnish the forces necessary for anti-
   Partisan warfare to the higher S.S. and police leaders,
   and to guarantee the support of Army Forces. This took
   place through personal discussions with the leading
   officers of the Operations Staff of the O.K.W. and
   O.K.H., namely, with General Warlimont, General von
   Buttlar, Generaloberst Guderian, Generaloberst Zeitzler,
   General Heusinger, later General Wenk, Colonel Graf
   Kielmannsegg and, later, Colonel von Bonin. Since anti-
   Partisan warfare also was under the sole command of the
   respective Army Commander-in-Chief in operational areas
   - for instance, in the Central Army Group under Field
   Marshal Kluge and later Busch - and since police troops
   for the most part could not be spared from the Reich
   Commissariats, the direction of this warfare lay almost
   always entirely in the hands of the Army. In the same
   way orders were issued not by Himmler but by the O.K.H.
   S.S. and police troops transferred to operational areas
   from the Reich Commissariats to support the Army Groups
   were likewise under the latter's command. Such transfers
   often resulted in harm to anti-Partisan warfare in the
   Reich Commissariats. According to a specific agreement
   between Himmler and the O.K.H., the direction of
   individual operations lay in the hands of the troop
   leader who commanded the largest troop contingent. It
   was therefore possible that an Army General could have
   S.S. and Police under him, and, on the other hand, that
   army troops could be placed under a General of the S.S.
   and Police. Anti-Partisan warfare in operational areas
   could never be ordered by Himmler. I could merely
   request the O.K.H. to order it, until 1944, mostly
   through the intervention of Generalquartiermeister
   Wagner, or through State Secretary Ganzenmuller. The
   O.K.H. then issued corresponding orders to the army
   groups concerned, for compliance.
   
                                                   [Page 23]

   The severity and cruelty with which the intrinsically
   diabolical Partisan warfare was conducted by the
   Russians had already resulted in Draconian laws being
   issued by Hitler to deal with it. These orders, which
   were passed on to the troops through the O.K.W. and
   O.K.H., were equally applicable to army troops as well
   as to those of the S.S. and Police. There was absolutely
   no difference in the manner in which these two
   components carried on this warfare. Army soldiers were
   exactly as embittered against the enemy as were those of
   the S.S. and Police.
   
   As a result of this embitterment orders were ruthlessly
   carried out by both components, a thing which was also
   quite in keeping with Hitler's desires or intentions. As
   proof of this, an order of the O.K.W. and O.K.H. can be
   adduced which directed that all captured Partisans, for
   instance, Jews, agents and political Commissars, should
   without delay be handed over by the troops to the S.D.
   for special treatment. This order also contained the
   provision that in anti-Partisan warfare no prisoners
   except the above-named be taken. That anti-Partisan
   warfare was carried on by army troops mercilessly and to
   every extreme, I know as the result of discussions with
   army troop leaders, for instance with General Herzog,
   Commander of the 38th Army Corps, and with his Chief of
   Staff, Colonel Pamberg, in the General Staff, both of
   whom support my opinion. Today it is clear to me that
   anti-Partisan warfare gradually became an excuse for the
   systematic annihilation of Jewry and Slavism."

Your Lordship, I am told that I misread and said "Hitler"
instead of "Himmler."

I next wish to offer another and shorter statement by Rode,
which shows that the S.D.-Einsatzgruppen were under
Wehrmacht command. This is Affidavit number 18, Exhibit USA
563:

   "As far as I know, the S.D. Combat Groups with the
   individual Army Groups were completely subordinate to
   them, that is to say tactically as well as in every
   other way. The Commanders-in-Chief were therefore
   thoroughly cognisant of the missions and operational
   methods of these units. They clearly approved of these
   missions and operational methods, for apparently they
   never opposed them. The fact that prisoners, such as
   Jews, Agents and Commissars who were handed over to the
   S.D., underwent the same cruel death as victims of so-
   called purifications, is a proof that the executions had
   their approval. This also corresponded with what the
   highest political and military authorities wanted.
   Frequent mention of these methods were naturally made in
   my presence at the O.K.W. and O.K.H., and they were
   condemned by most S.S. and police officers, just as they
   were condemned by most army officers. On such occasions
   I always pointed out that it would have been quite
   within the scope of the authority of the Commanders-in-
   Chief of Army Groups to oppose such methods. I am of the
   firm conviction that an energetic and unified protest by
   all Field Marshals would have resulted in a change of
   these missions and methods. If they should ever assert
   that they would then have been succeeded by even more
   ruthless Commanders-in-Chief, this, in my opinion, would
   be a foolish and even cowardly dodge."

I would like next to read the final affidavit, number 24, in
Document Book
1.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Taylor, unless you are going to
conclude this particular part, I think we had better adjourn
now.

COLONEL TAYLOR: I will conclude with two affidavits, your
Honour, but it will take probably ten minutes.

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