Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-02/tgmwc-02-15.07
Last-Modified: 1999/09/14

I do not think I need trouble the Tribunal with the rest.
The next document in the bundle, PS-1541, which I offer in
evidence as Exhibit GB 117, is the directive issued for the
actual attack on Greece. Before reading it, it might be
convenient if I summarised the position of the Italian
invading forces at that time, as this is one of the factors
mentioned by Hitler in the directive. I can put it very
shortly. I again use the words in which H.M. Minister
reported:-

   "The morale of the Greek Army throughout has been of the
   highest, and our own naval and land successes at Taranto
   and in the Western Desert have done much to maintain it.
   
   With relatively poor armaments and the minimum of
   equipment and modern facilities they have driven back or
   captured superior Italian forces, more frequently than
   not at the point of the bayonet. The modern Greeks have
   thus shown that they are not unworthy of the ancient
   traditions of their country and that they, like their
   distant forbears, are prepared to fight against odds to
   maintain their freedom."

In fact, the Italians were getting the worst of it, and it
was time that Hitler came to the rescue. Accordingly, this
directive was issued on 13th December, 1940; it is Top
Secret, Directive Number 20, for the Operation Marita. The
distribution included one to the Commander of the Navy,
which, of course, would be the defendant Raeder; one to the
Commander of the Air Force, which would be the defendant
Goering; one to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,
Keitel; and one to the Command Staff, which, I take it,
would be the defendant Jodl. I shall read the first two
paragraphs and then summarise the next two, if I may:-

   "The result of the battles in Albania is not yet
   decisive. Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it
   is doubly necessary that the British
   
                                                  [Page 217]
   
   attempt to create air bases under the protection of a
   Balkan front be foiled, as this would be dangerous above
   all to Italy as well as to the Roumanian oil fields.
   
   My plan, therefore, is (a) to form a slowly increasing
   task force in Southern Roumania within the next few
   months, (b) after the setting in of favourable weather,
   probably in March, to send this task force for the
   occupation of the Aegean North coast by way of Bulgaria,
   and (c) if necessary, to occupy the entire Greek
   mainland (Operation Marita). The support of Bulgaria is
   to be expected."

The next paragraph gives the forces for the operation, and
Paragraph 4 deals with the operation Marita itself.
Paragraph 5 states:-

   "The military preparations, which will produce
   exceptional political results in the Balkans, demand the
   exact control of all the necessary measures by the
   General Staff. The transport through Hungary and the
   arrival in Roumania will be reported step by step by the
   General Staff of the Armed Forces, and are to be
   explained, at first, as a strengthening of the German
   Army mission in Roumania. Consultations with the
   Roumanians or the Bulgarians which may point to our
   intentions, as well as notification to the Italians, are
   each subject to my consent, as also are the sending of
   scouting missions and advanced parties."

I think I need not trouble the Tribunal with the rest. The
next document, PS-448, which I put in as Exhibit GB 118, is
again a "Top Secret Directive" carrying the plan a little
further; it deals with decisive action in support of the
Italian forces in Tripoli and in Albania. I read, if I may,
the first short paragraph, and then the paragraph at the
foot of the page.

   "The situation in the Mediterranean theatre of
   operations demands, for strategical, political and
   psychological reasons, German assistance, due to
   employment of superior forces by England against our
   allies."

And in Paragraph 3, after dealing with the forces to be
transferred to Albania, the directive sets out what the
duties of the German forces will be:-

   (a) To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve
   for an emergency case, should new crises arise there.
   
   (b) To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when
   later attacking with the aim of tearing open the Greek
   defence front at a decisive point for a far-reaching
   operation.
   
   (c) To open up the Straits West of Salonika from the
   rear, in order to support thereby the frontal attack of
   List's Army."

That directive was signed by Hitler, and, as can be seen on
the original which I have put in, it was initialled by both
the defendant Keitel and the defendant Jodl. Here again, of
course, a copy went to the defendant Raeder, and I take it
that the copy sent to Foreign Intelligence would probably
reach the defendant Ribbentrop.

I pass to C-134, the next document in the bundle, which
becomes Exhibit GB 119. This records a conference which took
place on 19th and 2oth January between the defendant Keitel
and the Italian General, Guzzoni, and which was followed by
a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, at which the
defendants Ribbentrop, Keitel and Jodl were present.

I need not trouble the Tribunal with the meeting with the
Italians, but if you would pass to Page 3 of the document,
there is a paragraph there in

                                                  [Page 218]

the speech which the Fuehrer made, which is perhaps just
worth reading - the speech by the Fuehrer on 20th January,
1941, in the middle of Page 3. It sets out that the speech
was made after the conference with the Italians, and then
shows who was present.

On the German side I would call your attention to the
presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Chief of
the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, and the Chief of
the Armed Forces Operational Staff. These are, of course,
the defendants Ribbentrop, Keitel and Jodl; and on the
Italian side, the Duce, Ciano and the three Generals.

It is the last paragraph that I would wish to read:-

   "The massing of troops in Roumania serves a threefold
   purpose:
   (a) An operation against Greece.
   (b) Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey.
   (c) Safeguarding the guarantee to Roumania.
   
   Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces,
   altogether, therefore, very strong forces whose
   deployment far from our base requires a long time.
   
   Desirable that this deployment is completed without
   interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game
   as late as possible. The tendency will be to cross the
   Danube at the last possible moment and to line up for
   attack at the earliest possible moment."

I pass to the next document, PS-1746, which I offer as
Exhibit GB 120. That document is in three parts. It
consists, in the first place, of a conference between Field
Marshal List and the Bulgarians, on 8th February.

The second part and the third part deal with later events,
and I will, if I may, come back to them at an appropriate
time.

I would read the first and the last paragraphs on the first
page of this document.

   "Minutes of questions discussed between the
   representatives of the Royal Bulgarian General Staff and
   the German Supreme Command - General Field Marshal List
   - in connection with the possible movement of German
   troops through Bulgaria and their commitment against
   Greece and possibly against Turkey, if she should
   involve herself in the war."

And then the last paragraph on the page shows the plan being
concerted with the Bulgarians:-

   Paragraph 3: "The Bulgarian and the German General
   Staffs will take all measures in order to camouflage the
   preparation of the operations, and to assure in this way
   the most favourable conditions for the execution of the
   German operations as planned.
   
   The representatives of the two General Staffs consider
   it suitable to inform their Governments that it will be
   advisable, of necessity, to take secrecy and surprise
   into consideration when the Three Power Treaty is signed
   by Bulgaria, in order to assure the success of the
   military operations."

I pass then to the next Document, C-59. I offer that as
Exhibit GB 121. It is a further Top Secret Directive of 19th
February. I need not, I think, read it. All that is set out
of importance is the date for the Operation Marita. It sets
out that the bridge across the Danube is to be begun on 28th
February, the river crossed on 2nd March, and the final
orders to be issued on the 26th February at the latest.

                                                  [Page 219]

It is perhaps worth noting that on the original, which I
have put in, the actual dates are filled in the handwriting
of the defendant Keitel.

It is perhaps just worth setting out the position of
Bulgaria at this moment, Bulgaria adhered to the Three-Power
Pact on 1st March -

THE PRESIDENT: What year?

COLONEL PHILLIMORE: 1941. And on the same day the entry of
German troops into Bulgaria began in accordance with the
Plan Marita and the directives to which I have referred the
Tribunal.

The landing of British troops in Greece on 3rd March, in
accordance with the guarantee given in the spring of 1939 by
His Majesty's Government, may have accelerated the movement
of the German forces; but, as the Tribunal will have seen,
the invasion of Greece had been planned long beforehand and
was already in progress at this time.

I pass now to the next document in the bundle, C-167, which
I put in as Exhibit GB 122. 1 am afraid it is not a very
satisfactory copy, but the original, which I have put in,
shows that both the defendants, Keitel and Jodl, were
present at the interview with Hitler which this extract
records. It is a short extract from a report by the
defendant Raeder on an interview with Hitler, in the
presence of the defendants Keitel and Jodl. It is perhaps
interesting as showing the ruthless nature of the German
intention.

"The C.-in-C. of the Navy asks for confirmation that the
whole of Greece will have to be occupied even in the event
of a peaceful settlement.

Fuehrer: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any
settlement."

The above document-

THE PRESIDENT: Is it dated ?

COLONEL PHILLIMORE: It took place on the 18th March at 1600
hours.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that on the original document?

COLONEL PHILLIMORE: Yes, on the original document.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

COLONEL PHILLIMORE: The document I have referred to shows,
it is submitted, that the Nazi conspirators, in accordance
with their principle of liquidating any neutral who did not
remain disinterested, had made every preparation by the end
of January and were, at this date, in the process of moving
the necessary troops to ensure the final liquidation of
Greece, which was already at war with and getting the better
of their Italian allies.

They were not, however, yet ready to deal with Yugoslavia,
towards which their policy accordingly remained one of
lulling the unsuspecting victim. On 25th March, 1941, in
accordance with this policy, the adherence of Yugoslavia to
the Three-Power Pact was secured. This adherence followed a
visit on 15th February, 1941, by the Yugoslav Premier
Cvetkovic and the Foreign Minister Cinkar-Markovic to the
defendant Ribbentrop at Salzburg and subsequently to Hitler
at Berchtesgaden, after which these ministers were induced
to sign the Pact at Vienna on 25th March. On this occasion
the defendant Ribbentrop wrote the two letters of assurance,
which are set out in the next document in the bundle, PS-
2450, which I put in as Exhibit GB 123. If I might read from
half-way down the page:-

   "Notes of the Axis Governments to Belgrade.
   
                                                  [Page 220]
   
   At the same time, when the protocol on the entry of
   Yugoslavia to the Tri-Partite, Pact was signed, the
   governments of the Axis Powers sent to the Yugoslavian
   Government the following identical notes:
   
   'Mr. Prime Minister.
   
   In the name of the German Government and at its behest I
   have the honour to inform Your Excellency of the
   following:
   
   On the occasion of the Yugoslavian entry today into the
   Tri-Partite Pact the German Government confirms its
   determination to respect the sovereignty and territorial
   integrity of Yugoslavia at all times.'"

That letter was signed by the defendant Ribbentrop, who, you
will remember, was present at the meeting in August, 1939,
when he and Hitler tried to persuade the Italians to invade
Yugoslavia. In fact it was 11 days after this letter was
written that the Germans did invade Yugoslavia and two days
after the letter was written that they issued the necessary
order.

If I might read the second letter

   "Mr. Prime Minister.
   
   With reference to the conversations that occurred in
   connection with the Yugoslavian entry into the Tri-
   Partite Pact, I have the honour to confirm to Your
   Excellency herewith in the name of the Reich Cabinet
   (Reichsregierung), that in the agreement between the
   Axis Powers and the Royal Yugoslavian Government, the
   Governments of the Axis Powers during this war will not
   direct a demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or
   transportation of troops through Yugoslavian national
   territory."

The position at this stage, the 25th March, 1941, was,
therefore, that German troops were already in Bulgaria
moving towards the Greek frontier, while Yugoslavia had, to
use Hitler's own term in his letter to Mussolini, "become
disinterested" in the cleaning-up of the Greek question.

The importance of the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three-
Power Pact appears very clearly from the next document in
the bundle, PS-2765, which I put in as GB 124. It is an
extract from the minutes of a meeting between Hitler and
Ciano, and, if I might just read the first paragraph

   "The Fuehrer first expressed his satisfaction with
   Yugoslavia's joining the Tri-Partite Pact and the
   resulting definition of her position. This is of special
   importance in view of the proposed military action
   against Greece, for, if one considers that for 350 to
   4oo kilometres the important line of communication
   through Bulgaria runs within 20 kilometres of the
   Yugoslav border, one can judge that with a dubious
   attitude of Yugoslavia an undertaking against Greece
   would have been militarily an extremely foolhardy
   venture."

Again it is a matter of history that on the night of 26th
March, when the two Yugoslav ministers returned to Belgrade,
General Simovic and his colleagues effected their removal by
a coup d'etat, and Yugoslavia emerged on the morning of 27th
March, ready to defend, if need be, its independence. The
Yugoslav people had found itself.

The Nazis reacted to this altered situation with lightning
rapidity, and the immediate liquidation of Yugoslavia was
decided on.

I ask the Tribunal to turn back to PS-1746, which I put in
as GB 120, to the second part on Page 3 of the document,
consisting of a record of a conference of Hitler and the
German High Command on the situation in Yugoslavia, dated
27th March, 1941.

                                                  [Page 221]

It shows that those present included the Fuehrer; the Reich
Marshal, that is of course, the defendant Goering; Chief of
the O.K.W., that is the defendant Keitel; Chief of the
Wehrmacht Fuehrungstab, that is the defendant Jodl. Then -
over the page - "later on the following persons were added."
I call the Tribunal's attention to the fact that those who
came in later included the defendant Ribbentrop.

If I might read the part of Hitler's statement set out on
Page 4

   "The Fuehrer describes Yugoslavia's situation after the
   coup d'etat. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain
   factor in regard to the coming Marita action and even
   more in regard to the Barbarossa undertaking later on.
   Serbs and Slovenes were never pro-Germans."

I think I can pass on to the second paragraph:

   "The present moment, is for political and military
   reasons favourable for us to ascertain the actual
   situation in the country and the country's attitude
   towards us. For, if the overthrow of the Government
   would have happened during the Barbarossa action, the
   consequences for us probably would have been
   considerably more serious."

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