Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-02/tgmwc-02-13.08
Last-Modified: 1999/09/12


                                                  [Page 130]

The military political starting point used as a basis for
concentration plans Red and Green can be aggravated if
either England, Poland or Lithuania join on the side of our
opponents. Thereupon our military position would be worsened
to an unbearable, even hopeless extent. The political
leaders will therefore do everything to keep these countries
neutral, above all England and Poland."

Thereafter it sets out the conditions which are to be the
basis for the discussion. Before I leave that document, the
date will be noted, June, 1937, and it shows clearly that at
that date, anyway, the Nazi Government appreciated the
likelihood, if not the probability of fighting England and
Poland and France, and were prepared to do so if they had
to. On the 5th November, 1937, the Tribunal will remember
that Hitler held his conference in the Reich Chancellery,
the minutes of which have been referred to as the Hoszbach
notes. I will refer to one or two lines of that document for
the attention of the Tribunal to what Hitler said in respect
of England, Poland, and France. On page 1 of that exhibit,
the middle of the page

   "The Fuehrer then stated: 'The aim of German policy is
   the security and preservation of the nation and its
   propagation. This is consequently a problem of space'."

He then went on, you will remember, to discuss what he
described as "participation in world economy", and at the
bottom of Page 2 he said:

   "The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary,
   is the securing of greater living space, an endeavour
   which at all times has been the cause of the formation
   of States and movements of nations."

And at the end of that first paragraph, on Page 3:

   "The history of all times, Roman Empire, British Empire,
   has proved that every space expansion can only be
   effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even
   setbacks are unavoidable. Neither formerly nor today has
   space been found without an owner. The attacker always
   comes up against the proprietor."

My Lord, it is clear that that reference was not only -

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) It has been read already.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GRIFFITH-JONES: But my object was only to
try to collect, so far as England and Poland were concerned,
everything that has been given. If the Tribunal thought that
it was unnecessary, I would welcome the opportunity -

THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal would wish you not to
read anything that has been read already.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GRIFFITH-JONES: I would pass then to the
next document in that part of the document book. I put that
document in. It was referred to by the Attorney General in
his address yesterday, and it shows that on the same day as
the Hoszbach meeting was taking place, a communique was
being issued as a result of the Polish Ambassador's audience
with Hitler, in which it was said in the course of the
conversation, "It was confirmed that Polish-German relations
should not meet with difficulty because of the Danzig
question." That document is TC-73. I put it in as GB 27. On
the 2nd of January -

THE PRESIDENT: That has not been read before, has it?

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GRIFFITH-JONES: It was read by the
Attorney General in his opening.

                                                  [Page 131]

THE PRESIDENT: In his opening? Very well.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GRIFFITH-JONES: On the 2nd January, 1938,
some unknown person wrote a memorandum for the Fuehrer. This
document was one of the seven foreign office documents of
which a microfilm was captured by Allied troops when they
came into Germany. It is headed, "Very Confidential -
Personal Only", and is called "Deduction on the report,
German Embassy, London, regarding the future form of Anglo-
German relations":

   "With the realisation that Germany will not tie herself
   to a status quo in Central Europe, and that sooner or
   later a military conflict in Europe is possible, the
   hope of an agreement will slowly disappear among
   Germanophile British politicians, in so far as they are
   not merely playing a part that has been given to them.
   Thus the fateful question arises: Will Germany and
   England eventually be forced to drift into separate
   camps and will they march against each other one day? To
   answer this question, one must realise the following -
   
   Change of the status quo in the East in the German sense
   can only be carried out by force. So long as France
   knows that England, which so to speak has taken on a
   guarantee to aid France against Germany, is on her side,
   France's fighting for her Eastern allies is probable in
   any case, always possible, and thus with it war between
   Germany and England. This applies then even if England
   does not want war. England, believing she must defend
   her borders on the Rhine, would be dragged in
   automatically by France. In other words, peace or war
   between England and Germany rests solely in the hands of
   France, who could bring about such a war between Germany
   and England by way of a conflict between Germany and
   France. It follows therefore that war between Germany
   and England on account of France can be prevented only
   if France knows from the start that England's forces
   would not be sufficient to guarantee their common
   victory. Such a situation might force England, and
   thereby France, to accept a lot of things that a strong
   Anglo-French coalition would never tolerate.
   
   This position would arise for instance if England,
   through insufficient armament or as a result of threats
   to her Empire by a superior coalition of powers, e.g.
   Germany, Italy, Japan, thereby tying down her military
   forces in other places, were not able to assure France
   of sufficient support in Europe."

The next page goes on to discuss the possibility of a strong
partnership between Italy and Japan, and I would pass from
my quotation to the next page where the writer is
summarising his ideas.

   Paragraph 5: Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us.
   
   1. Outwardly, further understanding with England in
   regard to the protection of the interests of our
   friends.
   
   2. Formation under great secrecy, but with whole-hearted
   tenacity of a coalition against England, that is to say,
   a tightening of our friendship with Italy and Japan;
   also the winning over of all nations whose interests
   conform with ours directly or indirectly.
   
   3. Close and confidential co-operation of the diplomats
   of the three great powers towards this purpose. Only in
   this way can we confront England, be it in a settlement
   or in war. England is going to be a hard, astute
   opponent in this game of diplomacy.

                                                  [Page 132]

   4. The particular question whether in the event of a war
   by Germany in Central Europe - " - I am afraid the
   translation of this is not very good - "The particular
   question whether, in the event of a war in Central
   Europe France and thereby England would interfere,
   depends on the circumstances and the time at which such
   a war commences and ceases, and on military
   considerations which cannot be gone into here."

And whoever it was who wrote that document, he appears to be
on a fairly high level, because he concludes by saying, "I
should like to give the Fuehrer some of these viewpoints
verbally." That document is GB 28. I am afraid the next two
documents have got into your books in the wrong order. If
you will refer to 2357-PS - you will remember that the
document to the Fuehrer, which I have just read, was dated
the 2nd January.

On 20th January, 1938, Hitler spoke in the Reichstag.

THE PRESIDENT: February, you said?

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon,
February 1938. That is 2357-PS, and will be Exhibit GB 30.
In that speech he said:

   "In the fifth year following the first great foreign
   political agreement with the Reich, it fills us with
   sincere gratification to be able to affirm that in our
   relations with the State, with which we had had perhaps
   the greatest difference, not only has there been a
   'detente,' but in the course of the years there has been
   a constant improvement. This good work, which was
   regarded with suspicion by so many at the time, has
   stood the test, and I may say that since the League of
   Nations finally gave up its continual attempts to
   unsettle Danzig, and appointed a man of great personal
   attainments as the new Commissioner, this most dangerous
   spot from the point of view of European peace has
   entirely lost its menacing character. The Polish State
   respects the national conditions in this State, and both
   the city of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights.
   And so the way to an understanding has been successfully
   paved, an understanding which beginning with Danzig has
   today, in spite of the attempts of certain mischief-
   makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of
   the relations between Germany and Poland, and
   transforming them into a sincere, friendly co-operation.
   
   To rely on her friendships, Germany will not leave a
   stone unturned to save that ideal which provides the
   foundation for the task which is ahead of us - peace."

I turn back to the next - to the document which was in our
document books, the one before that, L-43, which will be
Exhibit GB 29. This is a document to which the Attorney
General referred yesterday. It is dated the 2nd May, 1938,
and is entitled, "Organisational Study, 1950." It comes from
the office of the Chief of the Organisational Staff of the
General Staff of the Air Force, and its purpose is said to
be:

   "The task is to search, within a framework of very
   broadly conceived conditions, for the most suitable type
   of organisation of the Air Force. The result gained is
   termed, 'Distant Objective.' From this shall be deduced
   the goal to be reached in the second phase of the
   setting-up process in 1942; this will be called, 'Final
   Objective, 1942.' This in turn yields what is considered
   the most suitable proposal for the reorganisation of the
   staffs of the Air Force Group Commands, Air Gaus, Air
   Divisions, etc."

                                                  [Page 133]

The Table of Contents, the Tribunal will see, is divided
into various sections, and Section I is entitled,
"Assumptions." Under the heading "Assumption 1, frontier of
Germany ", see map, enclosure one.

The Tribunal sees a reproduction of that map on the wall and
it will be seen that on the 2nd May, 1938, the Air Force was
in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Austria and Hungary, all coming within the boundaries of the
Reich. The original map is here attached to this file and if
the Tribunal will look at the original exhibit, it will be
seen that this organisational study has been prepared with
the greatest care and authority, with a mass of charts
attached to the appendices.

I would refer also to the bottom of the second page, in the
Tribunal's copy of the translation.

   "Consideration of the principles of organisation on the
   basis of the assumptions for war and peace made in
   Section 1;
   1. Attack Forces:-
   Principal adversaries: England, France and Russia."

It then goes on to show all the one hundred and forty-four
Geschwader employed against England, very much concentrated
in the Western half of the Reich; that is to say, they must
be deployed in such a way that they, by making full use of
their range, can reach all English territory down to the
last corner.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps it is involved in the map. I think
you should refer to the organisation of the Air Forces, with
group commands at Warsaw and Konigsberg.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GRIFFITH-JONES: I am much obliged. Under
the paragraph "Assumption" double heading 2, "Organisation
of Air Force in peacetime", seven group commands: - 1
Berlin, 2 Brunswick, 3 Munich, 4 Vienna, 5 Budapest, 6
Warsaw, and 7 Konigsberg."

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged.
Lastly, in connection with that document, on Page 4 of the
Tribunal's translation, the last paragraph:
   
   "The more the Reich grows in area and the more the Air
   Force grows in strength, the more imperative it becomes
   to have locally bound commands."

I only emphasise the opening, "The more the Reich grows in
area, the more the Air Force grows in strength" but I would
say one word on that document. The original, I understand,
is signed by an officer who is not of the top rank in the
Air Force and I, therefore, do not want to over-emphasise
the inferences that can be drawn from it, but it is
submitted that it at least shows the lines upon which the
General Staff of the Air Force were thinking at that time.

The Tribunal will remember that in February, 1938, the
defendant Ribbentrop succeeded von Neurath as Foreign
Minister. We have another document from that captured
microfilm, which is dated 26th August, 1938, when Ribbentrop
had become Foreign Minister, and it is addressed to him, as
"The Reich Minister, via the State Secretary." It is a
comparatively short document and I will read the whole of
it.

The most pressing problem of German policy, the Czech
problem,

                                                  [Page 134]


   might easily, but must not lead to a conflict with the
   Entente. (TC-76 - GB 31.) Neither France nor England are
   looking for trouble regarding Czechoslovakia. Both would
   perhaps leave Czechoslovakia to herself, if she should,
   without direct foreign interference and through internal
   signs of disintegration, due to her own faults, suffer
   the fate she deserves. This process, however, would have
   to take place step by step and would have to lead to a
   loss of power in the remaining territory by means of a
   plebiscite and an annexation of territory.

   The Czech problem is not yet politically acute enough
   for any immediate action, which the Entente would watch
   inactively, and not even if this action should come
   quickly and surprisingly. Germany cannot fix any
   definite time, and this fruit could be plucked without
   too great a risk. She can only prepare the desired
   developments."

I pass to the last paragraph on that page. I think I can
leave out the intervening lines, Paragraph 5.

THE PRESIDENT: Should you not read the next paragraph "for
this purpose."

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GRIFFITH-JONES:

   "For this purpose the slogan emanating from England at
   present of the 'right for autonomy of the Sudeten
   Germans,' which we have intentionally not used up to
   now, is to be taken up gradually. The international
   conviction that the choice of nationality was being
   withheld from these Germans will do useful spadework,
   notwithstanding the fact that the chemical process of
   dissolution of the Czech form of States may or may not
   be finally speeded up by mechanical means as well. The
   fate of the actual body of Czechoslovakia, however,
   would not as yet be clearly decided by this: but would
   nevertheless be definitely sealed.
   
   This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia is to be
   recommended because of our relationship with Poland. It
   is unavoidable that the German departure from the
   problems of boundaries in the South-east and their
   transfer to the East and Northeast must make the Poles
   sit up. The fact is" - I put in an "is" because I think
   it is obviously left out of the copy I have in front of
   me. - "The fact is that after the liquidation of the
   Czech question, it will be generally assumed that Poland
   will be the next in turn.
   
   But the later this assumption sinks into international
   politics as a firm factor, the better. In this sense,
   however, it is important for the time being to carry on
   the German policy, under the well known and proved
   slogans of 'The right to autonomy' and 'Racial unity'.
   Anything else might be interpreted as pure imperialism
   on our part, and create the resistance to our plan by
   the Entente at an earlier date and more energetically,
   than our forces could stand up to."

That was on 26th August, 1938, just as the Czech crisis was
leading up to a Munich settlement. While at Munich, or
rather a day or two before the Munich agreement was signed,
Herr Hitler made a speech. On the 26th September, he said: -
I think I will read just two lines -

   "I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that
   when this problem is solved there will be no more
   territorial problems for Germany in Europe."

And again, the last document in your book, which is another
extract from that same speech, I will not read unless the
Tribunal desire because the


                                                  [Page 135]

Attorney General quoted it in his address yesterday. These
two documents precede TC-28, which is already in as GB 2,
and TC-29, which is the second extraction of that same
speech, and is Exhibit GB 32.

I would refer the Tribunal to one more document under this
part which has already been put in by my American
colleagues. It is C-23, now Exhibit USA 49, and it appears
before TC-28 in your document book. The particular passage
of the exhibit, to which I would refer, is a letter from
Admiral Carl, which appears at the bottom of the second
page. It is dated some time in September, with no precise
date, and is entitled "Opinion on the 'Draft Study of Naval
Warfare against England'".
     "
There is full agreement with the main theme of the Study".
Again, the Attorney General quoted the remainder of that
letter yesterday, which the Tribunal will remember.

   "If, according to the Fuehrer's decision, Germany is to
   acquire a position as a world power, she needs not only
   sufficient colonial possessions but also naval
   communications and secure access to the ocean."

That, then, was the position at the time of the Munich
agreement in September, 1938.

The gains of Munich were not, of course, so great as the
Nazi Government had hoped and had intended and, as a result,
they were not prepared straight away to start any further
aggressive action against Poland or elsewhere: but, as we
have heard this morning, when Mr. Alderman dealt, in his
closing remarks, with the advantages that were gained by the
seizure of Czechoslovakia, Jodl and Hitler said on
subsequent occasions, that Czechoslovakia was only setting
the stage for this attack on Poland. It is, of course,
obvious now that they intended and indeed had taken the
decision to proceed against Poland as soon as Czechoslovakia
had been entirely occupied.

We know that now from what Hitler said in talking to his
military commanders at a later date. The Tribunal will
remember the speech-where he said that from the first he
never intended to abide by the Munich agreement, but that he
had to have the whole of Czechoslovakia. As a result,
although not ready to proceed in full force against Poland,
after September, 1938, they did at once begin to approach
the Poles on the question of Danzig. Until, as the Tribunal
will see, the whole of Czechoslovakia had been taken in
March, no pressure was put on, but immediately after the
Sudetenland had been occupied preliminary steps were taken
to stir up trouble with Poland, which would and was
eventually to lead to the excuse or so-called justification
for their attack on that country.

If the Tribunal would turn to part 3.

THE PRESIDENT: I think it is time to adjourn now until 10
o'clock tomorrow morning.

(The Tribunal adjourned until 6th December, 1945, at 1000
hours.)

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