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                          Judgment
                           of the
               International Military Tribunal
                           For The
             Trial of German Major War Criminals

                           London
               His Majesty's Stationery Office
                            1951
                                                            
                                                  [Page 116]

                            JODL

Jodl is indicted on all four Counts. From 1935 to 1938 he
was Chief of the National Defense Section in the High
Command. After a year in command of troops, in August, 1939
he returned to become Chief of the Operations Staff of the
High Command of the Armed Forces. Although his immediate
superior was defendant Keitel, he reported directly to
Hitler on operational matters. In the strict military sense,
Jodl was the actual planner of the war and responsible in
large measure for the strategy and conduct of operations.

Jodl defends himself on the ground he was a soldier sworn to
obedience, and not a politician; and that his staff and
planning work left him no time for other matters. He said
that when he signed or initialed orders, memoranda, and
letters, he did so for Hitler and often in the absence of
Keitel. Though he claims that as a soldier he had to obey
Hitler, he says that he often tried to obstruct certain
measures by delay, which occasionally proved successful as
when he resisted Hitler's demand that a directive be issued
to lynch Allied "terror
fliers".

Crimes against Peace

Entries in Jodl's diary of 13th and 14th February, 1938,
show Hitler instructed both him and Keitel to keep up
military pressure against Austria begun at the Schuschnigg
conference by simulating military measures, and that these
achieved their purpose. When Hitler decided "not to
tolerate" Schuschnigg's plebiscite, Jodl brought to the
conference the "old draft", the existing staff plan. His
diary for 10th March shows Hitler then ordered the
preparation of "Case Otto", and the directive was initialed
by Jodl. Jodl issued supplementary instructions on 11th
March, and initialed Hitler's order for the invasion on the
same date.

In planning the attack on Czechoslovakia, Jodl was very
active, according to the Schmundt Notes. He initialed items
14, 17, 24, 36, and 37 in the Notes. Jodl admits he agreed
with OKH that the "incident" to provide German intervention
must occur at the latest by 1400 on X-1 Day, the day before
the attack, and said it must occur at a fixed time in good
flying weather. Jodl conferred with the propaganda experts
on "imminent common tasks" such as German violations of
international law, exploitation of them by the enemy and
refutations by the Germans, which "task" Jodl considered
"particularly important".

                                                  [Page 117]

After Munich, Jodl wrote:

     "Czechoslovakia as a power is out.. The genius of
     the Fuehrer and his determination not to shun even
     a World War have again won the victory without the
     use of force. The hope remains that the
     incredulous, the weak, and the doubtful people
     have been converted and will remain that way,"

Shortly after the Sudeten occupation, Jodl went to a post
command and did not become Chief of the Operations Staff in
OKW until the end of August, 1939.

Jodl discussed the Norway invasion with Hitler, Keitel, and
Raeder on 12th December, 1939; his diary is replete with
late entries on his activities in preparing this attack.
Jodl explains his comment that Hitler was still looking for
an "excuse" to move meant he was waiting for reliable
intelligence on the British plans, and defends the invasion
as a necessary move to forestall them. His testimony shows
that from October, 1939 Hitler planned to attack the West
through Belgium, but was doubtful about invading Holland
until the middle of November. On 8th February, 1940, Jodl,
his deputy Warlimont, and Jeschonnek, the Air Forces
planner, discussed among themselves the "new idea" of
attacking Norway, Denmark, and Holland, but guaranteeing the
neutrality of Belgium. Many of the 17 orders postponing the
attack in the West for various reasons including weather
conditions, until May, 1940, were signed by Jodl.

He was active in the planning against Greece and Yugoslavia.
The Hitler order of 11th January, 1941 to intervene in
Albania was initialed by Jodl. On 20th January, 4 months
before the attack, Hitler told a conference of German and
Italian generals in Jodl's presence that German troop
concentrations in Rumania were to be used against Greece.
Jodl was present on 18th March when Hitler told Raeder all
Greece must be occupied before any settlement could be
reached. On 27th March, when Hitler told the German High
Command that the destruction of Yugoslavia should be
accomplished with "unmerciful harshness", and the decision
was taken to bomb Belgrade without a declaration of war,
Jodl was also there.

Jodl testified that Hitler feared an attack by Russia and so
attacked first. This preparation began almost a year before
the invasion. Jodl told Warlimont as early as 29th July 1940
to prepare the plans since Hitler had decided to attack; and
Hitler later told Warlimont he had planned to attack in
August, 1940 but postponed it for military reasons. He
initialed Hitler's directive of 12th November, 1940 that
preparations verbally ordered should be continued and also
initialed "Case Barbarossa" on 18 December. On 3rd February,
1941 Hitler, Jodl, and Keitel discussed the invasion, and he
was present on 14th June when final reports on "Case
Barbarossa" were made.

War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity

On 18th October, 1942 Hitler issued the Commando Order and a
day later a supplementary explanation to commanding officers
only. The covering memorandum was signed by Jodl. Early
drafts of the order were made by Jodl's staff, with his
knowledge. Jodl testified he was strongly opposed on moral
and legal grounds, but could not refuse to pass it on. He
insists he tried to mitigate its harshness in practice by
not informing Hitler when it was not carried out. He
initialed the OKW memorandum of 25th June, 1944 reaffirming
the Order after the Normandy landings.

A plan to eliminate Soviet commissars was in the directive
for "Case Barbarossa". The decision whether they should be
killed without trial

                                                  [Page 118]

was to be made by an officer. A draft contains Jodl's
handwriting suggesting this should be handled as
retaliation, and he testified this was his attempt to get
around it.

When in 1945 Hitler considered denouncing the Geneva
Convention, Jodl argued the disadvantages outweighed the
advantages. On 21st February he told Hitler adherence to the
Convention would not interfere with the conduct of the war,
giving as an example the sinking of a British hospital ship
as a reprisal and calling it a mistake. He said he did so
because it was the only attitude Hitler would consider, that
moral or legal arguments had no effect and argues he thus
prevented Hitler from denouncing the Convention.

There is little evidence that Jodl was actively connected
with the slave labor program, and he must have concentrated
on his strategic planning function. But in his speech of 7th
November, 1943 to the Gauleiters he said it was necessary to
act "with remorseless vigor and resolution" in Denmark,
France, and the Low Countries to compel work on the Atlantic
Wall.

By teletype of 28th October, 1944 Jodl ordered the
evacuation of all persons in northern Norway and burning of
their houses so they could not help the Russians. Jodl says
he was against this, but Hitler ordered it and it was not
fully carried out. A document of the Norwegian Government
says such an evacuation did take place in northern Norway
and 30,000 houses were damaged. On 7th October, 1941, Jodl
signed an order that Hitler would not accept an offer of
surrender of Leningrad or Moscow, but on the contrary he
insisted that they be completely destroyed. He says this was
done because the Germans were afraid those cities would be
mined by the Russians as was Kiev. No surrender was ever
offered.

His defense, in brief, is the doctrine of "superior orders",
prohibited by Article 8 of the Charter as a defense. There
is nothing in mitigation. Participation in such crimes as
these has never been required of any soldier and he cannot
now shield himself behind a mythical requirement of
soldierly obedience at all costs as his excuse for
commission of these crimes.

Conclusion: The Tribunal finds that Jodl is guilty on all
four counts.

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