Archive/File: imt/nca/nca-02/nca-02-16-responsibility-19-03
Last-Modified: 1997/06/08

   Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume Two, Chapter XIV
          
     
                                                  [Page 963]
                                                            
     National delegate to the 'Langoth' in Linz was working
     with Rheintaller. Dr. Neubacher and myself contacted
     this circle and met there some other men whose names I
     have forgotten, but who later did not play a particular
     role. After some time, the lawyer applicant from Linz,
     Dr. Kaltenbrunner, joined this circle. He was said to
     be an SS man. The main activities consisted in
     organizing an institution to succor the needy families
     of those arrested and condemned Nazis. *** As matters
     calmed down, the Austrian National Socialists collected
     themselves again into an illegal party, the
     organization was built up for better or worse according
     to the old schedule, those who returned from the Reich
     were considered to be more 'in the know' and
     authoritative. The institution of succor, 'Langoth,'
     remained outside the party organization. But here were
     also men in the Nazi circles who considered an absolute
     dependence on the Reich as politically wrong and
     endeavored for an independent Austrian National
     Socialist Party. In effect, Dr. Rainer from Karnten
     belonged to those, and by his influence the future
     Gauleiter Klausner who is now dead; also Globotschnigg
     was in it, though I doubt he was sincerely convinced,
     and also others. Dr. Neubacher took a keener interest
     in political affairs and entered into relation-ship
     with the proper Party circles." (3254-PS)

The defendant submitted his plans to Hitler, Hess, and
Goering for their approval, and contacted other German
Nazis.

     "After my appointment as State Councillor, Wilhelm
     Keppler, the German Secretary of State for Austrian
     affairs, arranged a visit for me with Hess and Goering.
     I explained my intentions and plans to them, namely,
     the attainment of the legal activity for the Austrian
     National Socialist, independent of the Reich Party.
     Hess expressed his interest and said to me among other
     things: he regretted that I was not one of the original
     'old fighters.' I believe that at that time Goering had
     already established direct connections with the
     Austrian State Secretary, Guido Schmid. After my
     appointment as Minister of Interior and Security of
     Austria, I went to Berlin to visit Hitler. I arrived in
     Berlin on 17-2-1938 where I was met by Keppler who took
     me to Himmler. This visit was not anticipated in my
     program. Himmler wanted to talk over police matters, I
     informed him, however, that I was not conversant to
     speak about them. I did not follow the suggestions
     which he made. I greeted Hitler with raised hand --
     permissible after the agreement of 2-12  -- advised
     him, how-
     
                                                  [Page 964]
                                                            
     ever, immediately that as Austrian Minister, my
     responsibility lay with Austria. I explained to Hitler
     my plans, namely: I was to be the living guaranty for
     Dr. Schuschnigg of the evolutionary way. The Austria
     National Socialists must only conduct their activities
     according to the Austrian Constitution and on those
     lines find their way to the Reich; they must not make
     any totalitarian claim nor conduct a cultural struggle.
     The leadership of the Austrian National Socialists must
     be independent of the Reich and remain responsible to
     Austria. I would have, as Minister of Security to
     oppose any kind of illegal activity. Against this the
     Austrian National Socialist would be permitted full
     freedom of activity to work for the closest cooperation
     of Austria and Germany. Hitler agreed to my plans but
     expressed certain doubts whether Dr. Schuschnigg would
     be willing to go so far. During my conference with
     Hitler, Keppler and Ribbentrop waited in the ante-room
     of Hitler's office." (3425-PS)

Seyss-Inquart's fellow Nazi conspirators regarded his
position as Councillor of State in the Austrian Government
as most important to them, because he had a mandate from the
German Nazis in power, which he was attempting to carry out.
Because his negotiations with Chancellor Schuschnigg seemed
to be running aground, Seyss-Inquart sent a report of that
fact to Keppler by courier, stating that he felt compelled
to return his mandate, and expressing a desire to discuss
the matter before acting accordingly. Keppler immediately
sought advice from Goering in a letter dated 6 January 1938.
On that same day Goering's secretary was instructed to
telephone instructions to Keppler to do anything to avoid
the resignations of Councillor of State Dr. Seyss-Inquart
and State Minister Glaise von Horstenau. Keppler received
this telephone message on 7 January 1938, and on 8 January
1938 wrote a letter to Seyss-Inquart informing him of
Goering's instructions and relaying Goering's request not to
give up the mandate under any circumstances without
discussing the matter with Goering. (5473-PS; 3397-PS)

Despite assertions, in statements since his arrest and
indictment, to the effect that he desired a union of Austria
and Germany in an evolutionary manner and by legal means,
Seyss-Inquart has on other occasions made statements to the
contrary. His letter of 14 July 1939 to Goering is
particularly illuminating on this point:

     "I told myself in July 1934 that we must fight this
     clerical regime on its own ground in order to give the
     Fuehrer a chance to use whatever method he desires. I
     told myself that
     
                                                  [Page 965]
                                                            
     this Austria was worth a mass. I have stuck to this
     attitude with an iron determination because I and my
     friends have had to fight against the whole political
     church, and Free Masonry, the Jewry, in short, against
     everything in Austria. The slightest weakness which we
     might have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our
     political annihilation; it would have deprived the
     Fuehrer of the means and tools to carry out his
     ingenious political solution for Austria as became
     evident in the days of March 1938. I have been fully
     conscious of the fact that I am following a path which
     is not comprehensible to the masses and also not to my
     party comrades. I have followed it calmly and would
     without hesitation follow it again because I am
     satisfied that at one point I could serve the Fuehrer
     as a tool in his work, even though my former attitude,
     even now, gives occasion to very worthy and honorable
     Party comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. I have
     never paid attention to such things because I am
     satisfied with the opinion which the Fuehrer and the
     men close to him have of me." (2219-PS)

Another statement of the defendant, which throws some light
on this point, is found in his letter to Himmler dated 19
August 1939:

     "On 8 November 1938, the Fuehrer invited several
     political leaders for supper. The Fuehrer asked me to
     be next to him. We discussed the situation in Ostmark.
     I told him that in accordance with his order, we
     started to dissolve the competence of the Austrian
     government by giving the powers partly to the Gauen and
     partly to the central leaders. But there still would
     remain certain affairs which would be common for all
     Gauen." (5271-PS)

Furthermore, Seyss-Inquart has made the following statement:

     "I was happy that the Anschluss of Austria with the
     German Reich had come at last after so many vain
     endeavors since 1918 because I was in favor of the
     Anschluss of Austria with the Reich under many
     conditions. I was aware at least to a certain extent of
     the harshness of the National Socialist regime, but I
     was of the opinion that these two German countries
     belonged together and that the German people should
     solve their own internal affairs and difficulties. I
     was convinced that the harshness of the National
     Socialist regime chiefly because of its achievement of
     the National aim -- cancellation of discriminatory
     peace treaties and achievement of the right of self-
     determinationwould in time be surmounted." (425-PS)

                                                  [Page 966]
                                                            
The subversive machinations of the Austrian Nazis to bring
about the absorption of Austria by the Greater German Reich
was described in detail by Dr. Friedrich Rainer, a leading
Austrian Nazi and a collaborator of Seyss-Inquart who became
one of Hitler's Gauleiters, in a report prepared by him and
forwarded to Buerckel. A copy of this report accompanied by
a letter of transmittal was later sent to Seyss-Inquart by
Dr. Rainer. In substance, the report related how the Nazi
party lost a parliamentary battle in 1933, continued its
efforts to force admission of its representatives into the
Austrian government, and finally flowered into the
unsuccessful "Putsch" of July 1934, which, in effect,
destroyed the Nazi organization. Following the unsuccessful
"Putsch", Hitler liquidated the first stage of the battle,
and instructed Franz von Papen to restore normal
relationships between the two countries. Accordingly, a new
method of political penetration was adopted. The result was
that Hinterleitner, an Austrian Nazi got in touch with the
lawyer Seyss-Inquart, who had connections with Dr. Wachter
originating from Seyss-Inquart's support of the July
uprising. Seyss-Inquart also had a good position in the
legal field and especially well established relations with
Christian Social politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from
the ranks of the "Styrian Heimatschutz" and had become a
Nazi party member when the entire "Styrian Heimatschutz" was
incorporated in the NSDAP. The reason for utilizing Seyss-
Inquart appears in the following excerpt from the covering
letter which accompanied Dr. Rainer's report to Reich
Commissar Gauleiter Josef Buerckel, dated 16 July 1939:

     "I think the main reason for the fact that the person
     of Dr. Seyss-Inquart seemed to Hitler and to public
     opinion to have stepped in the limelight in those March
     days, was that no position existed in the party which
     one might have presented oneself to the public, and
     that there was no man who had the guts to let himself
     be presented. The actual reason was that the party
     leadership had to remain secret during the whole
     illegal fight, secret even from the Reich German
     public." 812-PS)

Thus it is clear why Seyss-Inquart was surreptitiously a
member of the Austrian Nazi Party after it was declared
illegal in 1934.

Dr. Rainer goes on to report that full recognition of the
party leadership was given by Seyss-Inquart and also that
the defendant was in permanent contact with Captain Leopold,
who became a member of the staff of Hess. After
Hinterleitner was arrested, Dr. Rainer became his successor
as leader of the Austrian Nazi Party, and, on 16 July 1936,
Dr. Rainer and Globocnik visited

                                                  [Page 967]
                                                            
Hitler at Obersalzburg, where they received a clear
explanation of the situation and the wishes of the Fuehrer.
Subsequently, on 17 July 1936, all illegal Gauleiters met in
Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report
from Dr. Rainer on the statement of the Fuehrer and his
political instructions for carrying out the fight. After the
agreement between Germany and Austria on 11 July 1936,
Hitler appointed Wilhelm Keppler as Chief of a mixed
commission to supervise the execution of the agreement. At
the same time Keppler was given full authority for the Nazi
Party in Austria. (812-PS)

(6) The activities of Seyss-Inquart and his fellow Nazi
coconspirators and collaborators forced the then Austrian
government into a critical situation and a struggle for
survival. As the result of the plans, maneuvers, and
disturbances created by the Nazis in Austria, Schuschnigg,
Chancellor of Austria, accompanied by his State Secretary,
Guido Schmid, conferred with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on 12
February 1938. Dr. Muehlmann was also present but not as a
member of the Schuschnigg delegation. At this meeting the
possibilities for military action by Germany against Austria
were demonstrated to the Chancellor. The ultimate result was
that Chancellor Schuschnigg had no choice but to accept the
demands of Hitler that the Austrian Nazi Party be legalized;
that amnesty be granted to Austrian Nazis already convicted
for illegal activities; and that Seyss-Inquart be appointed
Minister of the Interior and Security in the Austrian
cabinet, (2995-PS; 3254-PS; 3425-PS; 2469-PS; 2464-PS)

A few days after the Berchtesgaden meeting of Hitler and
Schuschnigg, and immediately after his appointment as
Minister of the Interior and Security of Austria, Seyss-
Inquart went to Berlin for a conference with Hitler. Upon
arrival in Berlin he was met by Keppler, Hitler's special
delegate on Austrian affairs, who took him to Himmler. After
a short conference with Himmler, the defendant was conducted
to Hitler, to whom he gave the Nazi salute and with whom he
had a conference lasting two hours and ten minutes. Foreign
Minister von Ribbentrop and Keppler waited in the ante-
chamber during the conference. Seyss-Inquart first offered
Hitler an explanation for greeting him with the Hitler
salute, by saying: "I consider him as the Fuehrer of the
German people who led us out of the discriminations of the
peace treaties." During the conference, he rendered a report
to Hitler concerning the Austrian situation since June of
1934 and presented his own program for Hitler's approval.
Hitler expressed his approval of the plan but told Seyss-
Inquart that he doubted

                                                  [Page 968]
                                                            
whether Chancellor Schuschnigg would be willing to go so
far. It seems clear that Hitler's doubt concerning
Schuschnigg's approval of the Seyss-Inquart plan referred
solely to Seyss-Inquart's proposal to allow Austrian Nazis
to "conduct their activities according to the Austrian
Constitution and on those lines find their way to the
Reich," because all other portions of his plan had
previously been adopted as a result of the Berchtesgaden
Agreement. (3254-PS; 3425-PS; 2484-PS)

Seyss-Inquart has asserted that, upon his return to Vienna
after his conference with Hitler, he reported to Chancellor
Schuschnigg the content of his discussion and urged the
Chancellor to make a decision about the Austrian National
Socialist question. He then attended rallies of the Austrian
National Socialists held in various places in Austria to
inform them of the content of his conference with Hitler.
Two of the principal meetings were held at Graz and Linz
(3425-PS; 3254-PS). Considerable doubt is cast upon the
truth of Seyss-Inquart's assertions that he reported the
contents of his conference with Hitler to Chancellor
Schuschnigg and in public meetings of the Austrian Nazis, by
a statement contained in a letter written by Seyss-Inquart
to Himmler on 19 August 1939. The statement is as follows:

     "I had a conversation of over two hours with the
     Fuehrer on 17 February 1938, in which I explained to
     him my point of view. I would only be able to make
     statements about the content of this conversation if
     the Fuehrer would grant me permission. I left this
     discussion as a very sincere man and with a feeling of
     great happiness to be of help to the Fuehrer." (3271-
     PS)

(7) Finally Chancellor Schuschnigg determined to go before
the people for a decision on the question of Austrian
independence. Chancellor Schuschnigg planned to hold a
plebiscite on that precise question and fixed 13 March 1938
as a date upon which the plebiscite would be held. The
Chancellor took Seyss-Inquart into his confidence and
discussed the matter of the plebiscite with him. The
Chancellor requested Seyss-Inquart to keep the matter a
secret until noon of the next day, and the defendant
promised to do so. Thereafter, Seyss-Inquart prepared a
letter to Schuschnigg objecting to the plebiscite on
constitutional grounds and alleging that the manner in which
the plebiscite was to be held would not allow the Austrians
to express their own desires. Seyss-Inquart admits that a
copy of his letter was delivered to Hitler in Berlin by
Globotschnigg. (254-PS; 425-PS)

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