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   Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume Two, Chapter XIV
                                                  [Page 835]


Finally, Moehle describes the orders to omit from U-boat
logs the notation of any actions in violation of
International Law:

     "There was an order -- I do not remember whether it was
     in the form of a written or verbal instruction -- that
     no events during a war patrol which contravened
     established international agreements should be entered
     in the war log. I believe that the reason for this
     order was that eight copies were made of war logs and
     were available to many authorities; there was always
     the danger therefore that events of this nature would
     become known and it was undoubtedly undesirable for
     reasons of propaganda that this should be so.
     
     "Events of this nature were only to be reported if
     asked for when commanding officers made their personal
     reports; these were invariably made after every patrol
     to Commander in Chief U-boats or later in certain
     instances to Captain U-boats." (382-PS)

Two cases may be noted in which the order of 17 September
1942 (D-60) was apparently put into effect. The first case
is the sinking of a steam trawler, the "Noreen Mary," which
was sunk by U-247 on 5 July 1944. The log of the U-Boat
shows that

                                                  [Page 836]
                                                            
at 1943 hours two torpedoes were fired, which missed (D-
645). At 2055 hours the log reads:


     "Fishing Vessels: [Bearings of 3 ships given].
     
     "Engaged the nearest. She stops after three minutes."
     (D-645)

There follows an account of a shot fired as the trawler lay
stopped, and then, the final entry:

     "Sunk by flak, with shots into her side. Sank by the
     stern." (D-645)

The U-Boat Command made this comment on the action:

     "Recognized success: Fishing vessel 'Noreen Mary' sunk
     by flak."

An affidavit by James MacAlister, who was a deck-hand on
board the "Noreen Mary" at the time of the sinking,
describes the torpedo tracks which missed the trawler, and
continues as follows:

     "At 2110 hours, while we were still trawling, the
     submarine surfaced on our starboard beam, about 50
     yards to the northeast of us, and without any warning
     immediately opened fire on the ship with a machine gun.
     We were 18 miles west from Cape Wrath, on a north-
     westerly course, making 3 knots. The weather was fine
     and clear, sunny, with good visibility. The sea was
     smooth, with light airs."
     
                           *******
     
     "When the submarine surfaced I saw men climbing out of
     the conning tower. The skipper [of the trawler] thought
     at first the submarine was British, but when she opened
     fire he immediately slackened the brake to take the
     weight off gear, and increased to full speed, which was
     about 10 knots. The submarine chased us, firing her
     machine gun, and with the first rounds killed two or
     three men, including the skipper, who were on deck and
     had not had time to take cover. The submarine then
     started using a heavier gun from her conning tower, the
     first shot from which burst the boiler, enveloping
     everything in steam and stopping the
     
     "By now the crew had taken cover, but in spite of this
     all but four were killed. The submarine then commenced
     to circle round ahead of the vessel, and passed down
     her port side with both guns firing continuously. We
     were listing slowly to port all the time but did not
     catch fire.
     
     "The Mate and I attempted to release the lifeboat,
     which was aft, but the Mate was killed whilst doing so,
     so I abandoned
     
                                                  [Page 837]
                                                            
     the attempt. I then went below into the pantry, which
     was below the water line, for shelter. The ship was
     listing more and more to port, until finally at 2210
     she rolled right over and sank, and the only four men
     left alive on board were thrown into the sea. I do not
     know where the other three men had taken cover during
     this time, as I did not hear or see them until they
     were in the water.
     
     "I swam around until I came across the broken bow of
     our lifeboat, which was upside down, and managed to
     scramble on top of it. Even now the submarine did not
     submerge, but deliberately steamed in my direction and
     when only 60 to 70 yards away fired directly at me with
     a short burst from the machine gun. As their intention
     was quite obvious, I fell into the water and remained
     there until the submarine ceased firing and submerged,
     after which I climbed back on to the bottom of the
     boat. The submarine had been firing her guns for a full
     hour." (D-645)

The affidavit goes on to describe the attempts of the Second
Engineer and others to rescue themselves and to help each
other; they were later picked up by another trawler. The
affidavit continues:

     "Whilst on board the 'Lady Madeleine' the Second
     Engineer and I had our wounds dressed. I learned later
     that the Second Engineer had 48 shrapnel wounds, also a
     piece of steel wire 21/2 inches long embedded in his
     body. *** I had 14 shrapnel wounds."
     
                           *******
     
     "This is my fourth wartime experience, having served in
     the whalers 'Sylvester' (mined) and 'New Seville'
     (torpedoed), and the Trawler 'Ocean Tide', which ran
     ashore.
     
     "As a result of this attack by U-boat, the casualties
     were six killed, two missing, two injured." (D-645).

The next case is that of the ship "Antonico", which was
torpedoed, set afire, and sunk on 28 September 1942, off the
coast of French Guiana. The date of the incident is some
eleven days after the issue of the order (D-630). A
statement given by the Second Officer describes the attack
on the ship, which by then was on fire (D-647):

     "*** That the witness saw the dead on the deck of the
     'Antonico' as he and his crew tried to swing out their
     lifeboat; that the attack was fulminant, lasting almost
     20 minutes; and that the witness already in the
     lifeboat tried to get away from the side of the
     'Antonico' in order to avoid being dragged down by the
     same 'Antonico' and also because
     
                                                  [Page 838]
                                                            
     she was the aggressor's target; that the night was
     dark, and it was thus difficult to see the submarine,
     but that the fire aboard the 'Antonico' lit up the
     locality in which she was submerging, facilitating the
     enemy to see the two lifeboats trying to get away; that
     the enemy ruthlessly machined-gunned the defenseless
     sailors in No. 2 lifeboat, in which the witness found
     himself, and killed the Second Pilot Arnaldo de Andrade
     de Lima, and wounded three of the crew; that the
     witness gave orders to his company to throw themselves
     overboard to save themselves from the bullets; in so
     doing, they were protected and out of sight behind the
     lifeboat, which was already filled with water; even so
     the lifeboat continued to be attacked. At that time the
     witness and his companions were about 20 meters in
     distance from the submarine." (D-647)

The U-boat's log in that case is not available, but it may
be surmised, in view of the order that nothing compromising
should be included in entries in logs, that it would be no
more helpful than in the case of the previous incident.

A broadcast by a German Naval War Reporter on the long wave
propaganda service from Friesland, (D-646-A) in English, on
11 March 1943, stated:

     "Santa Lucia, in the West Indies, was an ideal setting
     for romance, but nowadays it was dangerous to sail in
     these waters -- dangerous for the British and Americans
     and for all the colored people who were at their beck
     and-call. Recently a U-boat operating in these waters
     sighted an enemy windjammer. Streams of tracer bullets
     were poured into the sails and most of the Negro crew
     leaped overboard. Knowing that this might be a decoy
     ship, the submarine steamed cautiously to within 20
     yards, when hand grenades were hurled into the rigging.
     The remainder of the Negroes then leaped into the sea.
     The windjammer sank. There remained only wreckage.
     Lifeboats packed with men, and sailors swimming. The
     sharks in the distance licked their teeth in
     expectation. Such was the fate of those who sailed from
     Britain and America." (D-646-A)

This statement shows that it was the policy of the enemy to
seek to terrorize crews. It is a part with the order with
regard to rescue ships and with the order on the destruction
of steamers.

After Doenitz succeeded Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the
Navy he presumably also succeeded to the equivalent rank of
a Minister of the Reich, which Raeder had held (2098-PS).

An official report certified by an official of the British
Admiralty

                                                  [Page 839]
                                                            
sets out the number of meetings, the dates of the meetings,
and those present, on the occasion of meetings between
Doenitz or his representative with Hitler from the time that
he succeeded Raeder until the end (D-648). The certificate
states:

     "*** I have compiled from them [captured documents the
     attached list of occasions on which Admiral Doenitz
     attended conferences at Hitler's headquarters. The list
     of other senior officials who- attended the same
     conferences is added when this information was
     contained in the captured documents concerned. I
     certify that the list is a true extract from the
     collective documents which I have examined, and which
     are in the possession of the British Admiralty,
     London."

Either Admiral Doenitz or his deputy, Konteradmiral Voss,
was present at each of the numerous meetings listed. Among
hose who were also constantly present were Speer, Keitel,
Jodl, Ribbentrop, Goering, and Himmler or his lieutenants,
Fegelein or Kaltenbrunner. The inference is clear that from
the time that he succeeded Raeder, Doenitz was one of the
rulers of the Reich and as undoubtedly aware of all major
decisions of policy.


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