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 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume One, Chapter Thirteen

                                                 [Page 1038]
                      2. CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The conspirators had given much thought to their plans to
Germanize Bohemia and Moravia. Three plans, each
characterized by severity, were discussed, and finally the
Fuehrer decided on plan (c), which involved the assimilation
of about one-half the Czech population by the Germans and
the extermination of the other half. Moreover, this plan
envisaged a large influx into Czechoslovakia of Germans
whose loyalty to the Fuehrer was unquestioned.

These matters appear from a top secret report dated 15
October 1940, written by General Friderici, Deputy General
of the Wehrmacht in Bohemia and Moravia. On the face of the
document, it appears that only four copies were made. The
original document bears the handwritten letters "K" and "J"
on the first Pg. on the left side, and the handwriting is
unquestionably that of Keitel and Jodl. The report states:

     "On 9 October of this year the office of the Reich
     Protector held an official conference in which State
     Secretary SS Lt. General K. H. Frank spoke about the
     following: [SS Gruppenfuehrer K. H. Frank was Secretary
     of State under Von Neurath, who at the date of this
     report was the Protector of Bohemia and Moravia].
     "Since creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and
     Moravia, Party agencies, industrial circles, as well as
     agencies of the central authorities of Berlin have had
     difficulties about the solution of the Czech problem.
     "After ample deliberation, the Reich Protector
     expressed his views about the various plans in a
     memorandum. In this way, three ways of solution were
     "a. German infiltration of Moravia and reduction of the
     Czech nationality to a residual Bohemia. This solution
     is considered unsatisfactory, because the Czech
     problem, even if in a diminished form, will continue to
     "b. Many arguments can be brought up against the most
                                                 [Page 1039]
     radical solution, namely, the deportation of all the
     Czechs. Therefore, the memorandum comes to the
     conclusion that it cannot be carried out within a
     reasonable period of time.
     "c. Assimilation of the Czechs, i.e., absorption of
     about half of the Czech nationality by the Germans,
     insofar as this is of importance by being valuable from
     a racial or other standpoint. This will take place,
     among other things, also by increasing the
     Arbeitseinsatz of the Czechs in the Reich territory
     (with the exception of the Sudeten German border
     district), in other words, by dispersing the closed
     Czech nationality.
     "The other half of the Czech nationality must be
     deprived of its power, eliminated and shipped out of
     the country by all sorts of methods. This applies
     particularly to the racially mongoloid part and to the
     major part of the intellectual class. The latter can
     scarcely be converted ideologically and would represent
     a burden by constantly making claims for the leadership
     over the other Czech classes and thus interfering with
     a rapid assimilation. 

     "Elements which counteract the planned Germanization ought 
     to be handled roughly and should be eliminated. 

     "The above development naturally presupposes an increased 
     influx of Germans from the Reich territory into the Protectorate. 

     "After a discussion, the Fuehrer has chosen solution (c)
     (Assimilation) as a directive for the solution of the
     Czech problem and decided that, while keeping up the
     autonomy of the Protectorate on the surface, the
     Germanization will have to be carried out in a
     centralized way by the office of the Reich Protector
     for years to come.

     "From the above no particular conclusions are drawn by the 
     armed forces. This is the direction which has always been 
     represented from here.  In this connection, I refer to my 
     memorandum which was sent to the Chief of the Supreme Command 
     of the Armed Forces, dated 12 July 1939, file number 6/39, top
     secret, entitled: "The Czech Problem." (Attached as
     "The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich
     Protector in Bohemia and Moravia."
                                         "(Signed) FRIDERICI
                             Infantry Lt. General." (862-PS)

Solution (a), as outlined in the foregoing report, would
have called for German infiltration into Moravia and the
forcible removal of the Czechs from that area to Bohemia.
Moravia lies

                                                 [Page 1040]
between Bohemia and Slovakia. Thus, solution (a) would have
between Bohemia and Slovakia. Thus, solution (a) would have
involved the erection of a German state between Bohemia and
Slovakia, and would have prevented effective inter-
communications between the Czechs and the Slovaks. In this
manner, the historic desire for unity of these two groups of
people and the continued existence of their Czechoslovakian
State would have been frustrated. Solution (a) was rejected
because the surviving Czechs, even though compressed into a
"residual Bohemia," would have remained to plague the

Solution (b), which involved the forcible deportation of all
Czechs, was rejected, not because its terms were deemed too
drastic but rather because a more speedy resolution of the
problem was desired.

Solution (c) was regarded as the most desirable, and was
adopted. This solution first provided for the assimilation
of about one half of the Czechs. This meant two things: (a)
enforced Germanization for those who were deemed racially
qualified, and (b) deportation to slave labor in Germany for
others. "Increasing the Arbeitseinsatz of the Czechs in the
Reich territory", as stated in the report, meant, in
reality, slave labor in Germany.

Solution (c) further provided for the elimination and
deportation "by all sorts of methods" of the other half of
the Czech population, particularly intellectuals and those
who did not meet Nazi racial standards. Czech intellectuals,
as the conspirators well know, had a conspicuous record of
resistance to the Nazi ideology. They were, therefore, to be
exterminated. That section of the report which stated,
"elements which counteract the planned Germanization are to
be handled roughly and should be eliminated," meant that
intellectuals and other dissident elements were either to be
thrown in concentration camps or
immediately exterminated.

In short, the provisions of solution (c) were simply a
practical application of the conspirators' philosophy as
expressed in Himmler's speech referred to above:

"Either we win over any good blood that we can use for
ourselves *** or we destroy this blood." (L-70)

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