Archive/File: imt/nca/nca-02/nca-02-16-responsibility-01-02
Last-Modified: 1996/10/23

A. CRIMES AGAINST PEACE.

(1) Acquisition and Consolidation of Power in Germany.

                                                  [Page 418]
                                                            
(a) Before 1933. Soon after joining the Party, Goering in
1923 was placed in command of the entire SA (2168-PS). In
November 1923, he took part in the ill-fated attempt at
Munich to gain control of the German State by force. In the
encounter with the police, Goering was wounded and fled from
Germany. (2532-PS)

After his return, Goering became more than a commander of
street fighters. He was designated Hitler's first political
assistant.

     "The movement was conducted by the Fuehrer from Munich.
     But one man has to act for him in Berlin, while
     Gauleiter Goebbels stirs up the masses and makes them
     ripe for National Socialism, a man on whom he could
     rely unconditionally to the same extent as if he acted
     himself. And thus, Hermann Goering became the political
     deputy of Adolf Hitler."

Goering's official biographer, the Ministerial Dirgent
Gritzbach, tells of his dealings with the Bruening
government, his attempts to "break down the barrier" around
the Reich President, von Hindenburg, and of his "coup" as
Reichstag President in September 1932 in procuring a vote of
nonconfidence against the Papen government just before the
Reichstag could be dissolved (3252-PS). Goering says in his
own book, Aufbau einer Nation:

     "The moment was unforgettable for me who have gone back
     and forth as representative so often between the
     Kaiserhof and the Wilhelmstrasse during the past year,
     when I hurried out to my car and could report to the
     questioning masses as the first one: 'Hitler has become
     Reich Chancellor.' " (3251-PS)

Goebbels also gave him full measure of credit:

     " 'This is surely Goering's happiest hour,' wrote Dr.
     Goebbels in his book Von Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei,
     and, quoting from it, said: that 'Goering prepared
     diplomatically and politically in a long lasting all
     hard struggle the-basis for Hitler's rise." (3252-PS.)

In a letter written in 1935, Hitler summarized Goering's
contributions as follows:

     "My dear Goering: When in November 1923 the Party tried
     -for the first time to conquer the power of the State,
     you as Commander of the SA created within an
     extraordinarily short time that instrument with which I
     could bear that struggle. Highest necessity had forced
     us to act, but a wise providence at that time denied
     that success. After receiving a grave wound you again
     entered the ranks as soon as circumstances permitted as
     my most loyal comrade in the battle for
     
                                                  [Page 419]
                                                            
     power. You contributed essentially to creating the
     basis for the 30th of January. Therefore, at the end of
     a year of the National Socialist Revolution, I desire
     to thank you wholeheartedly my dear Party Comrade
     Goering, for the great values which you have for the
     National Socialist Revolution and consequently, for the
     German people. In cordial friendship and grateful
     appreciation.

                                                      Yours,
                                              Adolf Hitler."
                                                   (3259-PS)

Goering himself has boasted:

     "Numerous titles and honors have been bestowed on me
     during the past months, and still no title and no
     decoration could make me so proud, as the designation,
     given to me by the German people: 'The most faithful
     paladin of our Fuehrer.' In that, my relationship to
     the Fuehrer finds expression. I followed him for over a
     decade with unreserved faith, and I will follow him
     with the same unconditional faith until my end." (3251-
     PS)

(b) Prussia, 1936. Immediately after 30 January 1933,
Goering was awarded the key post of acting Prussian Minter
of the Interior, and shortly thereafter, that of Minister
President of Prussia. In these capacities, he proceeded
promptly to establish a regime of terror in Prussia designed
to suppress all opposition to the Nazi program.

His chief tool was the Prussian police, which remained under
jurisdiction until 1936. As early as February 1933, he
ordered the entire police forces to render unqualified
assistance to the para-military organizations supporting the
new government, such as the SA and the SS, and to crush all
political opponents with firearms, if necessary, regardless
of the consequences. (Directive of 1 February 1933,
Ministerialblatt fuer die Preussische innere Verwaltung
1933, p. 148; Directive of 17 February 1933, id, p 169).
Goering has frequently and proudly acknowledged his own
personal responsibility for the crimes committed pursuant to
orders of this character:

     "I declared at that time before thousands of fellow
     Germans, each bullet which leaves the barrel of a
     police pistol now is my bullet. If one calls this
     murder, then I have murdered; I ordered all this, I
     back it up. I assume the responsibility, and I am not
     afraid to do so." (2324-PS; 3252-PS.)

Soon after he became Prussian Minister President, Goering
began to develop the Gestapo, or Secret State Police. To
quote from his own book:

                                                  [Page 420]

     "The most important thing for me was first, to get the
     instrument of power of the protective police and
     political police firmly in my hand. Here I undertook
     the first sweeping changes of personnel. Of the 32
     available colonels of the protective police, I
     dismissed 22. Hundreds of officers and thousands of
     sergeants followed them in the course of the next
     months. New forces were procured, and everywhere, these
     forces were taken out of the large reserve pool of the
     SA and the SS.
     
     "For weeks, I personally worked on this transformation,
     and finally I created alone and from my own conviction
     and own thought the 'Secret State Police Office'. That
     instrument, feared so much by the enemies of the state,
     which above all has contributed so much, that today a
     Communist or Marxist danger in Germany or Prussia is
     hardly worth talking about anymore." (3251-PS)

In a public address delivered on 11 December 1934, Goering
boasted:

     "We were firmly determined after assumption of power to
     hit the Communists so that in Germany they would never
     recover from our blow. For that we do not require a
     Reichstag fire. That has been one of the most important
     points on our program. In the former Weimar
     Constitution the destruction of Communism was
     unthinkable. For the execution of these measures we
     needed the instrument of a through and through
     reliable, and of the highest degree powerful, police
     force. I have created this instrument through the
     reorganization of the field police (Landespolizei) and
     the formation of a Secret State Police. These
     organizations will constitute a means for implanting
     fear in all enemies of the State, which a State needs
     if it wishes to defend itself for always". (3440-PS)

On 26 April 1933 Goering signed the first law officially
establishing the Secret State Police in Prussia (2104-PS).
On 30 November 1933, Goering signed a law naming himself, as
Prime Minister, Chief of the Prussian Secret State Police
(2105-PS). He continued in this position until sometime in
1936, when Himmler secured control of all police in the
Reich.

Men and women taken into custody by the Gestapo were thrown,
without judicial or other form of trial, into concentration
camps, which had been established in Prussia as early as the
spring of 1933. (3252-PS; L-83.)

As explained by Goering in his own book:

                                                  [Page 421]
                                                            
     "Against the enemies of the State, we must proceed
     ruthlessly. It cannot be forgotten, that at the moment
     of our rise to power, according to the official
     election figures of March 1933, six million people
     still confess their sympathy for Marxism. *** Therefore
     the concentration camps have been created, where we
     have first confined thousands of Communists and Social
     Democrat functionaries. ***" (2344-PS)

On 10 February 1936 , Goering, as Prussian Minister
President, signed a further basic law on the Prussian Secret
State Police. Article 7 of this law provided:

     "Orders in matters of the Secret State Police are not
     subject to the review of the administrative courts".
     (2107-PS)

Thus it was made quite clear by Goering's own law that those
imprisoned in concentration camps without trial of any kind
were to have no recourse to any court. On the same day
Goering signed a decree for the execution of the foregoing
law, which further acknowledged his responsibility for
Prussian concentration camps. Its provisions included the
following:

     "Art. 2 *** (4) The Secret State Police Bureau
     administers the state concentration camps." (2108-PS)

The range of police terrorism under Goering's leadership was
almost limitless. A glance at a few of his police directives
in these early days will indicate the extent and
thoroughness with which every dissident voice was silenced:

     Directive of 22 June 1933 (Ministerial-Blatt fuer die
     Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 731): Ordered
     all officials to watch the statements of employees of
     the Prussian civil service and to denounce to Goering
     those who made critical remarks ("Miesrnacher");
     failure to do so regarded as proof of hostile attitude.
     
     Directive of 23 June 1933 (Ministerial-Blatt fuer die
     Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 749):
     Suppressed all activities of the Social Democratic
     Party, including meetings and press, and ordered
     confiscation of its property.
     
     Directive of 30 June 1933, (Ministerial-Blatt fuer die
     Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 793): Ordered
     the Gestapo authorities to report to the Labor Trustees
     on political attitudes of workers, particularly in
     cases of criticism of the regime.
     
     Directive of 15 January 1934 (Ministerial-Blatt fuer
     die Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933 p. 137):
     Ordered the Gestapo and frontier police to keep track
     of and to watch emigres particularly political emigres
     and Jews, residing in
     
                                                  [Page 422]
                                                            
     neighboring countries, and ordered them arrested and
     put into concentration camps if they returned to
     Germany.

After the elimination of the forces of the opposition, the
Nazis felt it necessary to dispose of nonconformists within
their own ranks. During the Roehm purge of 30 June 1934,
many people were murdered who had nothing to do with the
internal SA revolt but were just "not liked very well" (2950-
PS). Goering's role in this bloody affair was related less
than two weeks later by Hitler in a speech to the Reichstag:

     "Meanwhile Minister President Goering had previously
     received my instructions that in case of a purge, he
     was to take analogous measures at once in Berlin and in
     Prussia. With an iron fist he beat down the attack on
     the National Socialist State before it could develop."
     (3442-PS)

(c) The Reich, 1933-39. Meanwhile, in the central Reich
government, Goering occupied a series of the highest and
most influential positions. The broad powers which devolved
upon him made him, under Hitler, the Chief Executive of the
Nazi State.

With the accession to power, Goering retained the somewhat
empty title of Reichstag President but was also appointed
Minister Without Portfolio and became a cabinet member. When
in an early meeting (15 March 19333) the cabinet discussed
the pending Enabling Act (which gave the Cabinet plenary
powers of legislation) he offered the suggestion that the
required two-thirds majority might be obtained simply by
refusing admittance to the Social Democratic delegates (2962-
PS). He became Reich Air Minister in May 1933 (2089-PS). In
his capacity as Air Minister and Supreme Commander of the
Luftwaffe, he sat as a member of and the Fuehrer's deputy on
the Reich Defense Council, which was established by the
secret law of 21 May 1933 and continued by the secret law of
4 September 1938 (2261-PS; 2194-PS). This Council was a war
planning group whose purpose was "to plan preparations and
decrees in case of war which later on were published by the
Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich." (2986-PS)

In 1936, Goering was made Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year
Plan and acquired plenary legislative and administrative
powers over all-German economic life. (1862-PS)

Goering was a member of the Secret Cabinet Council
established in 1938 to act as "an advisory board in the
direction of foreign policy" (2031-PS).

The Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich,
created in 1939, took over, in effect, all the legislative
powers of the Cabinet

                                                  [Page 423]
                                                            
which had not been reserved to Hitler's personal control or
to Goering as the Delegate for the Four-Year Plan. Goering
became the Chairman of this Council. (2018-PS)

Finally as the invading Nazi armies marched into Poland,
Hitler announced the designation of Goering as successor
designate, the heir apparent of the "New Order."

d) Economic Preparation for War, 1933-1939.

April 1936, Goering was appointed Coordinator for Raw
Materials and Foreign Exchange and empowered to supervise
all State and Party activities in these fields (2827-PS). In
this capacity he convened the War Minister, the Minister of
Economics, the Reich Finance Minister, the President of the
Reichsbank, and the Prussian Finance Minister to discuss
inter-agency problems connected with war mobilization. At a
meeting of this group on 12 May 1936, when the question of
the prohibitive cost of synthetic raw material substitutes
arose, Goering said:

     "If we have war tomorrow, we must help ourselves by
     substitutes. Then money will not play any role at all.
     If that is the case, then we must be ready to create
     the prerequisites for that in peace." (1301-PS)

At a subsequent meeting of the same men on 27 May 1936,
Goering suggested a program of plant construction for the
production of synthetic substitutes but warned against the
financial strain involved in excessive overexpansion. He
opposed any limitations dictated by orthodox financial
policy and stated:

     "All measures are to be considered from the standpoint
     of assured waging of war.
     
     "Ready reserves must ordinarily be accumulated already
     in peace in
     certain amounts." (1301-PS).

On the Nurnberg Party Day in the fall of 1936, Hitler
proclaimed the establishment of the Four-Year Plan, a
comprehensive program of national self-sufficiency, and
announced the appointment of Goering as "Plenipotentiary" in
charge. In October, a decree was promulgated which
implemented this announcement and provided for the execution
of the plan. (1862-PS)

It is clear from Goering's own statements in an
interrogation on 25 June 1945 that the purpose of the Plan
was to place Germany on a war footing economically:

     "Goering: 'My job was to organize the German economy
     and my energy was put to work to get things started and
     carried through ***. My main task was to secure the
     food supply for Germany for many years ahead and to
     make Germany self-sufficient. The most important items
     were iron,
     
                                                  [Page 424]
                                                            
     petroleum and rubber. *** The industry only wanted to
     have very high grade Swedish iron for business reasons.
     There was danger that during the war Germany would not
     be able to get iron from Sweden and there would be no
     iron.'
     
     Interrogator: 'What war are you talking about? This is
     1936 you're speaking of.'
     
     Goering: 'Any possibility of war. Perhaps with Russia,
     or in case there was war with anyone at any time and
     anywhere.' "

When asked the reasons why the Four-Year Plan lost
importance in 1942, Goering explained that his preoccupation
with the Air Force did not allow him the necessary
concentration on the affairs of the Four-Year Plan, and
stated:

     "The main task of the Four-Year Plan had been
     accomplished. This task was to get Germany ready."

These answers confirm the comment Goering made in 1936, that
his chief task as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan was
"to put the whole economy on a war footing within four
years." (EC-408) As Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan,
Goering was virtually the economic dictator for Germany with
control over all other interested Reich agencies. He was the
"boss of the economy," and all important decisions had to be
referred to him.

Two important conferences show clearly how Goering inspired
and directed the preparation of the German economy for
aggressive war. On 8 June 1938 he addressed a number of
leading German aircraft manufacturers, explained the
political situation, and laid the groundwork for a vast
increase in aircraft production. After stating that war with
Czechoslovakia was imminent and boasting that the German air
force was already superior in quality and quantity to the
English, he continued:

     "If Germany wins the war, she will be the greatest
     power in the world, dominating the world market, and
     Germany will be a rich nation. For this goal, risks
     must be taken. The only thing that matters is increased
     output regarding quantity and quality. Even if the
     manufacturers know that their present policies may mean
     their bankruptcy within three years, they will have to
     do it all the same *** I want you to be perfectly
     resolved, today already, how you will run your business
     when war comes. The earlier the manufacturers make
     their preparations for mobilization today, the less
     danger there will be of work being held up. It must be
     determined for every worker whether he is essential for
     production upon outbreak of war, and measures must be
     taken to
     
                                                  [Page 425]
     
     secure his deferment in case of mobilization. (3441-
     PS). An executive will be put in charge to work on
     nothing but the complete preparation of each plant for
     mobilization day." (R-140)

A few weeks after the Munich agreement, on 14 October 1938,
another conference was held in Goering's office. He began
with the statement that Hitler had instructed him to
organize a gigantic armament program which would make
insignificant all previous achievements. He indicated that
he had been ordered to build as rapidly as possible an air
force five times as large, to increase the speed of Army and
Navy armament, and to concentrate on offensive weapons,
principally heavy artillery and heavy tanks. He then
proposed a specific program designed to accomplish these
ends. (1301-PS)

(e) Military Mobilization for War. In his dual role as Reich
Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the German Air Force,
it was Goering's function to develop the Luftwaffe to
practical war strength. As early as March 1935 Goering
frankly announced to world that he was in the process of
building a true military air force:

     "After the German government expressed willingness to
     help, it became necessary to make a clear demarcation
     within German aviation, namely in this respect: which
     air force will be able to be made available? This
     situation brought about the decision as to those of the
     German aviation who will in future belong to the Air
     Force and those who will in future remain in civil
     aviation or in sport aviation. It was necessary to mark
     this separation also outwardly, so that the members of
     the German Air Force became soldiers according to the
     law and their leaders became officers." (2292-PS)

Two months later, in a speech to 1,000 Air Force officers,
Goering spoke in a still bolder vein:

     "I repeat: I intend to create a Luftwaffe which, if the
     hour should strike, shall burst upon the foe like a
     chorus of revenge. The enemy must have a feeling of
     being lost already before even having fought ***"

In the same year, he signed his name to the Conscription Law
which provided for compulsory military service and
constituted an act of defiance on the part of Nazi Germany
in violation of the Versailles Treaty. (1654-PS)

Goering's statements during this period left no doubt in the
minds of Allied diplomats that Germany was engaged in full
mobilization of air power for an impending war.

     "Goering and Milch often said to me or in my presence
     that
     
                                                  [Page 426]
                                                            
     the Nazis had decided to concentrate on air power as
     the weapon of terror most likely to give Germany a
     dominant position and the weapon which could be
     developed the most rapidly and in the shortest time . .
     . High ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain
     official contact, particularly men such as Goering,
     Goebbels, Ley, Frick, Frank, Darre and others,
     repeatedly scoffed at my position as to the binding
     character of treaties and openly stated to me that
     Germany would observe her international undertakings
     only so long as it suited Germany's interests to do
     so." (2385-PS)

(2) The Launching of Aggressive War. Goering was the central
figure in the preparation of Germany for military
aggression. In German economic development and military
growth he held the key positions throughout the prewar
period. Although he held no official position in the field
of foreign affairs, Goering also figured prominently in all
of the major phases of Nazi international aggression between
1937 and 1941. As "No. 2 Nazi" he was a leading participant
in every major plan of territorial aggrandizement or
offensive military strategy.

Goering was the prompter and director of the diplomatic
tragicomedy leading to the Austrian Anschluss. In the middle
of November 197, Mr. Bullitt, the American Ambassador to
France, reported the following conversation with Goering:

     "I asked Goering if he meant that Germany was
     absolutely determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He
     replied that this was an absolute determination of the
     German Government. The German Government at the present
     time was not pressing this matter because of certain
     momentary political considerations, especially in their
     relations with Italy; but Germany would tolerate no
     solution of the Austrian question other than the
     consolidation of Austria in the German Reich. He then
     added a statement which went further than any I have
     heard on this subject: He said, 'There are schemes
     being pushed now for a union of Austria, Hungary, and
     Czechoslovakia, either with or without a Hapsburg at
     the head of the unit. Such a solution is absolutely
     inacceptable to us, and for us the conclusion of such
     an agreement would be an immediate casus belli." (L-
     151)

When the time came, on 11 March 1938, Goering was in
complete command. Throughout the afternoon and evening of
that day he directed by telephone the activities of Seyss-
Inquart, also of Keppler, Ullrich, and the other Nazi
operatives in Vienna. (2949-PS); the pertinent portions of
these telephone conversations

                                                  [Page 427]

have already been referred to in Section 3 of Chapter IX on
Aggression against Austria.)

In the late afternoon Goering gave the following order to
Seyss-Inquart:

     "Now, remember the following: You go immediately
     together with Lt. General Muff and tell the Federal
     President that if the conditions which are known to you
     are not accepted immediately, the troops who are
     already stationed in and advancing to the frontier will
     march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria will
     cease to exist." (2949-PS)

Early the same evening he dictated to Seyss-Inquart the
telegram which the latter was to send to Berlin requesting
the Nazi Government to send German troops to "prevent
bloodshed". Two days later he was able to call Ribbentrop in
London and say:

     "Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely
     over-shadowed. The Fuehrer was deeply moved, when he
     talked to me last night. You must remember it was the
     first time that he saw his homeland again. Now, I
     merely want to talk about political things. Well, this
     story we have given an ultimatum, that is just foolish
     gossip." (2949-PS)

Goering played a similarly important role in the attack on
.Czechoslovakia. In March of 1938, at the time of the
Anschluss with Austria, he had given a solemn assurance to
the Czechoslovakian Minister in Berlin that the developments
in Austria would in no way have a detrimental influence on
the relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and had
emphasized the continued earnest endeavor on the part of
Germany to improve these mutual relations. In this
connection, Goering used the expression: "Ich gebe Ihnen
mein Ehrenwort. (I give you my word of honor) " (TC-27). On
the other hand, in his address to German airplane
manufacturers on 8 July 1938, he made his private views on
this subject clear:

     "Beyond this they fear that once we have pocketed
     Czechoslovakia, we will attack Hungary, the Romanian
     oil wells, etc. Moreover, since there are democratic
     countries on the one hand, and authoritarian ones on
     the other, there is enough inflammable matter in the
     world anyway. When, how and where this inflammable
     matter will explode, no one among us can say. It may
     happen within some months, but it may also take some
     years. At present, the situation is this that
     Czechoslovakia has promised the Sudeten Germans to meet
     them half way. I am convinced that they will satisfy no
     more than some of their unimportant demands. Such
     action on their part would probably suit our policy
     best, since in
     
                                                   [Page 428
                                                            
     this case we could put the entire responsibility on
     England because she has engaged herself so deeply in
     this business." (R-140)

On 14 October 1938, shortly after the Munich agreement,
Goering gave his views on the Czechoslovakian question at a
conference in the Air Ministry:

     "The Sudetenland has to be exploited with all the
     means. General Field Marshal Goering counts upon a
     complete industrial assimilation of the Slovakia. Czech
     and Slovakia would become German dominions. Everything
     possible must be taken out. The Oder-Danube Canal has
     to be speeded up. Searches for oil and ore have to be
     conducted in Slovakia, notably by State Secretary
     Keppler." (1301-PS)

Meanwhile, he was deceiving the representatives of the
puppet Slovakian government to the same end:

     "The Field Marshal considers that the Slovak
     negotiations toward independence are to be supported in
     a suitable manner. Czechoslovakia without Slovakia is
     still more at our mercy." (2801-PS)

In the following year, with the rape of Czechoslovakia
complete Goering frankly stated what Germany's purpose had
been throughout the whole affair:

     "In a rather long statement the field marshal explained
     that the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the
     German economy had taken place, among other reasons to
     increase the German War potential by exploitation of
     the industry there." (R-133)

Goering was also a moving force in the later crimes against
the peace. As the successor designate to Hitler, as Chief of
the Air Forces and as economic czar of Greater Germany, he
was a party to all the planning for military operations of
the Nazi forces in the East and the West. In the Polish
affair, for example, it was Goering who in 1935 gave
assurances to the Polish government that "there should be
not the slightest fear in Poland that on the German side it
(the German-Polish alliance) would not be continued in the
future." Yet, four years later, Goering helped formulate
plans for the invasion of Polish territory.

With regard to the attack upon the Soviet Union, plans for
the ruthless exploitation of Russian territory were made
months in advance of the opening of hostilities. Goering was
placed in charge of this army of spoliation, whose mission
was that of "seizing raw materials and taking over all
important concerns." (1317-PS; 1157-PS.)

These specific instances cover only a small part of
Goering's

                                                  [Page 429]
                                                            
activities in the field of aggressive war. There follows a
partial list of additional documents which demonstrate
Goering's knowledge of and continued participation in the
Nazi war program. They deal either with conferences on the
highest war-planning levels which he attended, or with
secret orders communicated to him outlining in advance the
official plans for the execution of the successive acts of
aggression.

             Meetings and Conferences Attended:

Conference in Reichskanzlei, 5 November 1937, to outline the
necessity for expanding German foreign policy; plans
discussed for the acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia.
(386-PS)

Entry in Jodl diary, 10 March 1938, referring to meeting
attended by Goering and others at which the preparation of
"Case Otto" and the mobilization of the army and the air
force were ordered. (1780-PS)

Top secret conference with Hitler on 23 May 1939, the
subject of which was indoctrination on the political
situation and foreign aims.

Meeting with Hitler, 22 August 1939, attended by commanders
of the armed forces at which immediate plans for Polish
invasion were discussed. (L-3, 798-PS, 1014-PS)

Hitler's speech to all military commanders on 23 November
1939, regarding the invasion of the low countries. (789-PS)

Meetings of 8 February 1941 and 27 March 1941, at which
Hitler outlined the prospective operations against
Yugoslavia and Greece. (1746-PS)

            Orders and Other Directives Received:

Directive of Blomberg to the armed forces containing plans
for military operations in the event that sanctions were
applied against German withdrawal from League of Nations. (C-
140)

Top secret directive of Blomberg of 2 May 1935, with plans
for operation "Schulung" (the reoccupation of the
Rhineland). (C-139)

Top secret letter from Blomberg dated 24 June 1935,
enclosing copy of secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935
and decision of Reich Cabinet of the same date. (2261-PS)

Order of Blomberg of 2 March 1936 , giving the operational
basis for the Rhineland occupation. (C-159)

Directives from Hitler and Keitel April to August 1939 on
preparation and invasion of Poland. (C-120)

Operational file, "Fall Weiss," the code name for the Polish
operation. (C-126)

Directive from GAF, dated 25 August 1938, regarding the
acquisition of bases in the low countries. (375-PS)

                                                  [Page 430]
                                                            
Directive No. 6 for the conduct of the war, dated 9 October
1939, signed by Hitler, and orders of Keitel, dated 15
November 1939, on the plans for "Fall Gelb", (operation in
the West). (C-62)

Orders of the Supreme Command from 7 November 1939 to 9 May
1940, regarding the opening of the invasion in the West. (C-
72)

Order of Hitler No. 8, 20 November 1939, for the execution
of "Fall Gelb". (440-PS)

Operational plans signed by Keitel on 28 November 1939, on
action near the French-Belgium borders. (C-10)

Entries in Jodl diaries from 1 February 1940 to 26 May 1940
confirming plans for invasion of the West. (1809-PS)

OKW orders, 27 January 1940, signed by Keitel on preparation
for "Fall Weseruebung" (Invasion of Norway and Denmark) (C-
63)

Fuehrer order of 1 March 1940 for the execution of "Fall
Weseruebung." (C-174)

Most secret order from Hitler's headquarters, dated 19
February 1941, on plans for the invasion of Greece. (C-59)

Top secret operational order on "Case Barbarossa" (invasion
of the Soviet Union), dated 13 March 1941, signed by Keitel.
(447-PS)

Time table for "Case Barbarossa," signed by Keitel. (C-39)

Top secret memorandum of 29 October 1940, signed by
Falkenstein, Luftwaffe liaison officer with OKW, discussing
need for the seizure of air bases in the event of future war
with the United States. (376-PS)

Basic order No. 24, dated 5 March 1941, signed by Keitel,
regarding German collaboration with Japan. (C-75)

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