Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-21/tgmwc-21-201.05
Last-Modified: 2000/11/19

Q. Were these warnings observed?

A. Unfortunately, not. Finally even the French police, whom
we had armed the better to combat the movement, went over to
the rebels.

Q. Did the Germans nevertheless fight against them with
forbearance?

A. Yes, as far as we possibly could. For example, never were
entire towns destroyed from the air, but single planes were
always sent against particular places of resistance. Mass
use of artillery or tanks did not take place. The fact that
excesses, such as those at Oradour, took place, we all
greatly regretted. At that time, I immediately demanded a
report, since I could not order a judicial investigation,
and I also reported this unfortunate occurrence to the OKW.

Q. Why could you not order a judicial investigation?

A. All the troop units of the SS were subordinate only to
Himmler. I had neither disciplinary power nor judicial power
over them. I could not give them leave, or bestow awards. I
was limited only to the tactical employment of these
divisions, much as if I had an Italian or Hungarian or
Slovakian division under my command.

Q. Was the legality of the resistance movement recognized?

A. General Eisenhower and De Gaulle declared via radio that
it was legal. We inquired of the High Command of the
Wehrmacht what should be done in the matter, and the
decision received was negative. Later, after the Allied
troops had landed on the Mediterranean coast, the legality
of the new French Army is said to have been recognized and
observed without argument.

Q. What is your attitude toward illegal warfare?

A. My point of view is the following, based on quite
understandable patriotic feeling: Disorderly, irregular
warfare behind the front of the Army must bring very great
misery to the population of the country affected. No army in
the world can tolerate such conditions for any length of
time, but in the interests of the security and protection of
its own troops it must take sharp, energetic measures. But
this should, of course, be done in a correct and soldierly
manner. Excesses such as those in Oradour were strongly
condemned by myself and by all army leaders. We very much
disliked seeing the attempt made on the German side to set
up this Werwolf movement at the last moment. If it had been
put into practice, it would have brought untold misery to
our Fatherland, and justly so. I would consider it fortunate
for humanity if, through international agreements, such
illegal wars could in future be made impossible. That is my
point of view.

Q. What measures did you introduce to relieve the position
of the French population during the occupation?

A. I would not like to give all the details here. I can only
say that I did everything to help Marshal Petain with whom I
was on terms of great confidence. I asked Hitler to define
at last what position France was to have in the future
Europe. I trained the French Guards and tried to create a
new French Army for Marshal Petain, though it did not grow
into more than a regiment. I succeeded

                                                   [Page 93]

in obtaining more rations for the fine French railwaymen who
managed all our transports, and I tried to have their
relatives who were prisoners of war returned to them, in the
same way in which Hitler had approved after the Dieppe raid
that the relatives of those in Dieppe could return.

We did what we could to supply the great city of Paris with
coal and food, though the transport situation for the German
Army was almost unbearably poor. These are the main points.

Q. One intermediate question: On one of the last few days, a
witness said that from 1944 on, the concentration camps were
guarded by soldiers of all branches of the Wehrmacht. How do
you explain that?

A. I know nothing about that. Since Himmler was Commander-in-
Chief of the Reserve Army after the attempted assassination
of the Fuehrer, he could probably issue such an order. If he
did issue it, my feeling is that he wanted to charge the
Army also with all these occurrences in connection with the
concentration camps.

Q. Now a few questions about the Ardennes offensive. Was an
order to shoot prisoners ever issued before or during this
offensive?

A. Such an order was not issued by Hitler. On the contrary,
he considered it most important to take as many prisoners as
possible in the offensive. I consider it impossible that a
subordinate military command issued such an order; it
contradicts our training and our ideas.

Q. Did you not oppose this offensive?

A. I opposed the offensive for the following reasons: The
operational idea as such can almost be called a stroke of
genius, but all, absolutely all conditions for a possible
success of such an offensive were lacking. Therefore, Field-
Marshal Model and I suggested that we should be satisfied
with less, and attack the Allied troops east of Aachen from
several sides. These suggestions remained unheeded. The
offensive had to start with completely inadequate forces on
the ground and in the air, and as predicted, it failed.

Q. Did you oppose Hitler on other occasions also?

A. Not personally, because I had no opportunity of doing so;
but to his staff I frequently objected to measures ordered
from above; especially in the case of the Normandy invasion,
the Ardennes offensive, after it had failed, and the conduct
of operations in Holland. But it was all in vain.

Q. When did you consider the war lost?

A. In my opinion the war could not have been won after the
fall of Stalingrad. I considered the war lost when the
Allies had succeeded in establishing a strong bridgehead on
French soil. That meant the end.

Q. Did you or other Commanders-in-Chief attempt to stop the
continuation of the war when you regarded it as lost?

A. Both Field-Marshal Rommel and I attempted twice to
persuade Hitler to change the conduct of the war and
especially to withdraw the front to the German frontiers.
But, as was to be expected, these suggestions were not
heeded.

Q. Since Hitler refused to listen to such advice, did you
not consider his overthrow?

A. I would never have thought of such a thing, that would
have been base, bare-faced treachery, and could not have
changed the situation. The Army and the people still
believed in Hitler at that time, and such an overthrow would
have been quite unsuccessful. Even if I, perhaps with the
aid of the Allies, had brought about an overthrow, the fate
of the German people, according to the famous statement of
the Big Three, would have been exactly what it is now, and I
would have emerged and been considered for all time as the
greatest traitor to my Fatherland.

Q. You lost your position three times during the war. What
were the reasons?

A. In 1941, a quite impossible order of a technical nature
was issued from above, and would have led to the destruction
of the entire Kleist Panzer Army near Rostov. I objected to
it I demanded that the order be withdrawn, and said that
otherwise

                                                   [Page 94]

I would be compelled to consider it a lack of confidence in
my leadership, and I would ask that another Commander-in-
Chief be selected. Thereupon, I was removed from my post on
the same night, on 1st of December, at my own request, as it
was put. That was the first case.

The second case was on the 2nd of April, 1944, when, in a
very cordial letter,

I was replaced by another Commander-in-Chief because of the
impaired state of; my health.

The third case was on the 9th of March, 1945. Then I could
no longer be expected, as an old. gentleman, to continue
performing the exacting duties of the Commander-in-Chief
West.

Those were the three cases.

Q. And in none of these cases did you resign against the
will of Hitler?

A. In the first case one could say so. But he did not hold
it against me in any way, for as early as the following
March I was made Commander-in-Chief in France.

Q. Now I come to the last question. You know, Field-Marshal,
that the prosecution has asked that the body of military
leaders be declared criminal. As the senior officer of the
German Army, you know the attitude of these leaders toward
military and International Law. Would you please tell the
Tribunal about it briefly?

A. The rules of warfare and of International Law as set down
in the Geneva Convention and the Hague Rules on Land Warfare
were always binding for us older leaders. Their strict
observance by the troops was demanded, and very severe
measures were taken in case of excesses which in war can
probably take place in all armies. The court-martial records
of the various divisions can give information on this point.
Property of the inhabitants was ordered to be respected.
Severe punishment for plundering had to be meted out, if
only in the interests of maintaining discipline amongst our
own troops. Raping of women and other inhuman acts were also
subject to severe punishment. What we could do to support
the inhabitants of enemy countries affected by the war was
done, as far as was possible. The wounded or conquered enemy
was no longer considered as such, but had a claim to decent
treatment. We ordered that the battle itself was to be
fought chivalrously. We old officers who lived through the
time of cavalry battles and of infantry bayonet attacks
witnessed the increasing mechanisation of warfare with
regret. Today the bravest men and the best troops are
helpless against the force of mechanisation. All the more
did we leaders believe that where there was fighting on land
the old soldierly, decent forms of battle should be
maintained, and that they should be impressed on the troops
again and again.

As senior soldier of the German Army, I will say this: We
accused leaders were trained in the old soldierly traditions
of decency and chivalry. We lived and acted according to
them, and we endeavoured to hand them down to the younger
officers.

DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. CALVACORESSI:

Q. Field-Marshal, in time of war the military commander must
keep in close touch, must he not, and know the opinions of
his immediate subordinates, is that right?

A. That is not actually necessary. My subordinates only had
to know my operational and tactical views. For the rest,
they were free as army leaders within their sphere.

Q. I want to quote to you one sentence from the evidence
which has been given by your former Commander-in-Chief. The
translators already have it. It is on Page 2 of Affidavit
No. 4:

                                                   [Page 95]

  "During operations, the OKH maintained a constant
  exchange of ideas with army groups by means of telephone,
  radio and courier. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army
  used every opportunity to maintain a personal exchange of
  ideas with the commanders of army groups, armies and
  lower echelons by means of personal visits to them."

Is that, generally speaking, correct?

A. That is absolutely correct as far as the conduct of the
war, operations and tactical actions are concerned. Such an
exchange did take place from the army groups up to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

Q. I shall read you one more sentence from the evidence that
has been given by Colonel-General Blaskowitz. He has said -
and I want you to tell me whether you agree with this - that
it was common practice for the commanders of army groups and
of armies to be asked from time to time for estimates of a
situation, and for their recommendations, by telephone,
teletype or wireless, as well as by personal records.

A. It is not correct that they had to give such estimates.
They could.

Q. Now I have some questions on the Russian campaign. You
yourself at a conference with Hitler and your Army
colleagues raised a question of a gap which existed between
your army group and that of Field-Marshal von Bock, is that
right?

A. That is correct.

Q. And you knew from your former experience that although on
the map that gap was shown as swamp land, it could be used
by troops; and you therefore advised about the steps that
should be taken to prevent its exploitation by the enemy?

A. I pointed out that according to my experiences in the
last war against Russia, the Russians could operate freely
in this swamp area, and that it would therefore be practical
for German troops also to be moved through this area. This
suggestion was not accepted. As the operations later showed
the Russians had strong forces in the area, and from there
they constantly threatened the left flank of my army.

Q. Yes. I am not concerned with whether the advice was
listened to or not. But you agree that you offered it?

A. It was not advice; it was a question which occurred to me
as I described the plan of the operation to the Fuehrer. It
was not advice.

Q. I am not going to quarrel with you on that. I want to
mention one other conference about which we have already
heard a certain amount, and that was the meeting which took
place - I think it was in the office of Field-Marshal von
Brauchitsch - May, 1938, when there was a question of
seizing the Sudetenland. Is it not a fact that at that
conference von Brauchitsch asked for your opinion and that
of your fellow officers on the proposals which Hitler had
laid before you?

A. At that time, a memorandum was read which the Chief of
the General Staff Beck had drawn up, and which warned
against a war over the question of the Sudetenland. It was
to be submitted to Hitler by von Brauchitsch. We were asked
for our opinion on this memorandum, and we unanimously
agreed that war should not be waged.

Q. You were unanimously agreed with General Beck that the
sort of war that was likely to happen at that time, if
Hitler had his way, should not be waged at that time in that
way?

A. In our opinion, or in the opinion of the memorandum, the
German Army was not in a position to wage this war if
France, England, and America were to join the enemy side.
That was the fundamental idea of the memorandum. We could
probably have dealt with Czechoslovakia alone, but never if
the countries just mentioned had come to her aid. And
against that Hitler was to be warned.

Then it is fair to say, is it not, that in order to support
himself in the objections which he proposed to make to
Hitler, Brauchitsch assembled a circle

                                                   [Page 96]

of leading generals who were of the same opinion as himself?
That strengthened his hand, did it not?

A. Yes; one could say, that.

Q. You all agreed in giving advice similar to that which had
been given by Generaloberst Beck?

THE PRESIDENT: Is this a convenient time to break off?

MR. CALVACORESSI: Yes, my Lord.

(The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours.)

GERT VON RUNDSTEDT - Resumed

CROSS-EXAMINATION - Continued

BY MR. CALVACORESSI:

Q. You have given evidence, Field-Marshal, to the effect
that you had little or no knowledge of such moves as the
occupation of the Rhineland or the seizure of the
Sudetenland, is that correct?

A. I had no previous knowledge of the occupation of the
Rhineland, just as little as I knew anything of the
occupation of the Sudetenland in 1939. I was inactive at the
time, retired.

Q. What was the highest past you held when you were in
service between 1933 and the outbreak of the war in 1939?

A. As I reported earlier, from the 1st of October, 1932,
until 31st October, 1938, I was Supreme Commander of Group
I, Berlin. And then I was retired.

Q. Therefore, during the period up to the outbreak of the
war, during such time as you held the post, and when you
received little or no information about what was going on,
you were not a member of the indicted group, as defined in
this Indictment?

A. No, I was not a member of that group.

Q. And as far as the invasion of Norway is concerned, you
were at that time active in a different theatre of war, is
that right?

A. At the time when the Norway enterprise began I was
Supreme Commander of Army Group A, stationed at Coblenz, in
the West.

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