Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-19/tgmwc-19-appendix.03
Last-Modified: 2000/10/23

101. Speer's conference minutes of Central Planning Board,
1942-44, concerning labour supply (R-124, USA 179, p. 32,
Part 2, pp. 303, 300, 312).

102. Memorandum of 15th November, 1941, from Canaris to
Keitel concerning an OKW Order regulating the treatment of
Soviet prisoners of war (EC-338, USSR 356, Part 7, p. 11).

103. Part 9, p. 166.

104. Examples of violations of International Law and
proposed counter propaganda, issued by OKW, 1st October,
1938 (RF-7, F-382, Part 4, p. 387).

105. OKW circular entitled Direction of War as Problem of
Organization, 19th April, 1938 (L-211, GB 161, Part 4, p.
110).

106. Part 9, p. 53.

107. Report by Raeder to Hitler, 15th October, 1939 (C-157;
GB 224, Part 4, p. 273).

108. Extract from Befehlshaber der U-boote; Secret Standing
Order No. 154, signed by Donitz.(D-642, GB 196, Part 4, p.
238). Operation Order "Atlantic" No. 56 for U-boats in
Atlantic, 7th October, 1943 (D-663, GB 200, Part 4, p. 240).

109. Part 9, p. 198.

110. Part 9, pp. 81 et seq.

111. Part 9, pp. 185 et seq.

112. Extracts from testimony of Goering: "It was understood
by all of us that as soon as we had once come into power we
must keep that power under all circumstances ... we did not
want to leave this any longer to chance, elections and
parliamentary majorities ... " (Part 9, p. 72). "The State
Parliaments ... I considered entirely superfluous ... I saw
no reason why so many different authorities should exist
which, with their unnecessary frictions and discussions,
merely hindered constructive work ... A further point in the
consolidation of power was to eliminate to a certain extent
the Reichstag as a parliament ... In some cases we suggested
to the former parties they dissolve themselves, because they
no longer had any purpose, and those which would not
dissolve themselves were dissolved by us" (Part 9, p. 74). "
... For the further consolidation of power, those laws were
created which ... did away with the so-called freedoms ..
." (Part 9, p. 74). See also Part 9, pp. 185 et seq. Frick
accurately predicted the Nazi method of dealing with
political opponents when he declared to an opposing member
of the Reichstag in 1932: "Do not worry, when we are in
power, we shall put all of you guys into concentration
camps" (Affidavit of Gebhart H. Seger, L-83, USA 234).

113. Part 9, p. 196.

114. Part 9, p. 188.

115. Part 9, p. 88.

116. Stenographic report of the meeting on the Jewish
Question under the Chairmanship of Field-Marshal Goering,
12th November, 1938 (1816-PS, USA 261, Part 2, p. 382).

117. Memorandum 19th November, 1938 concerning meeting of
Reich Defence Council (EC-405, USA 781, Part 9, p. 241). For
similar reasons Goring preferred the destruction of Jews
rather than of their property (1816-PS).

118. Vide Dr. Siemers on prosecution's conception of
conspiracy, 17th July, 1946, Part 19.

119. Other factors were not overlooked. One of the reasons
for von Neurath's selection as Foreign Minister at the
beginning of the Nazi regime was his excellent connections
abroad (Part 9, p. 171).

120. Hitler's speech to Commanders-in-Chief, 22nd August,
1939 (1014-PS, USA 30, Part 1, pp. 173-174).

                                                  [Page 480]

121. Affidavit of Alfred Helmut Naujocks 20th November, 1943
(2751-PS, USA 482, Part 3, p 191). Likewise Jodl noted in
his diary a few weeks before the planned invasion of Norway
that the Fuehrer was still looking for an excuse for the
operation (1809-PS, GB 88, Part 4, p. 113).

122. Case Green with wider implications, report of
Intelligence Division, Luftwaffe General Staff, 25th August,
1938 (376-PS, SA 84, Part 2, p. 112).

123. Minutes of conference, 23rd May, 1939. "Indoctrination
on the political situation and future aims (L-79, USA 27,
Part 1, pp. 166, 186; Part 2, p. 107).

124. Goering had accepted responsibility for the Nuremberg
Laws, which he signed (Part 9, p. 90), for the Austrian
Anschluss (Part 9, P: 104), and for the use of prisoners of
war in armament industries (Part 9, p. 272). Von Schirach
had admitted responsibility for the training of the Hitler
Youth: "It is my guilt that I educated the youth of a
Germany for a man who murdered millions. That I believed in
this man is my own, my own personal guilt. I was responsible
for the youth of the country, I was placed in authority over
the young people, and the guilt is mine alone" (Part 14, Pp.
369-370). Frank has admitted, "I am possessed by a deep
sense of guilt" (Part 12, p. 105).

125. Goering blamed persecution of the Churches on Himmler
and Bormann (Part 9, p. 86). Schirach blamed extermination
of the Jews on Hitler and Himmler: "The murder was ordered
by Adolf Hitler ... he and Himmler jointly committed that
crime which, for all time, will be a stain on the pages of
our history. It is a crime which fills every German with
shame "(Part 14, p. 369).

126. Final argument of Dr. Stahmer, counsel for Goering.
Afternoon session, 4th July, 1946, Part 18; pp. 104 et seq.

127. "The Nazi Plan," excerpt of script of a motion picture
composed of captured German film (3054-PS, USA 167, Part 2,
pp. 286-287).

128. Goering testified: "No, I did not want a war... " (Part
9, p. 207). Ribbentrop testified: "We both - the Fuehrer and
then myself at his order - so I believe I am the chief
witness - always tried to solve these problems through
diplomatic and peaceful channels "(Part 10, p. 206).

129. Goering testified: "to get rid of Versailles, the State
had to be strong, for a weak State never makes itself heard;
that we knew from experience " (Part 9, p. 199).

130.Goering has testified that he urged the Fuehrer, in
spite of the menace threatening from Russia, to rather let
this menace continue to exist and, if it was at all
possible, to try to direct the interests of Russia against
England (Part 9, p. 136).

131. Part 9, p. 185.

132. Part 9, pp. 106, 178.

133. Part 9, P. 157.

134. Other defendants admitted that the wars were
aggressive. Schacht testified: " Q. Well we found something
we agree on, Doctor. You knew of the invasion of Poland? A.
Yes. Q. You regarded it as an unqualified act of aggression
on Hitler's part? A. Absolutely. Q. And of Holland? A.
Absolutely. Q. And of Denmark? A. Absolutely. Q. And of
Norway? A. Absolutely. Q. And of Yugoslavia? A. Absolutely.
Q. And of Russia? A. Absolutely, sir; and you have left out
Norway and Belgium" (Part 13, pp. 61-62).

135. Goering testified: "I urged him not to start a war
against Russia at that moment or an even short time
thereafter" (Part 9, p. 135). Keitel testified that he wrote
a memorandum to Hitler opposing the attack on Russia. He
said: "But I did in that memorandum most certainly refer to
the fact that the Non-aggression Pact existed" (Part 11, p.
13).

136. Morning session, 4th July, 1946, Part 18, p. 86.

137. OWK Directive for Unified Preparation for War, 1937-
1938, with covering letter from von Blomberg, 24th June,
1937 (C-175, USA 69, Part 1, p. 244). Yet it was in this
period that Goering was trying out the strength of his
Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War (Part 9, p. 93). Goering
has admitted the non-defensive nature of the Luftwaffe (Part
9, p. 43).

138. Final argument of Dr. Stahmer, counsel for Goering, to
the effect that a conspiracy with a dictator at its head is
a contradiction in itself. A dictator does not enter into a
conspiracy with his followers he does not make any agreement
with them, he dictates (Part 18, afternoon session of 4th
July, 1946, p. 111).

139. Part 17, P. 77.

140. Part 17, p. 91.

141. Part 9, P. 174.

142. Extracts from Organization Book of the NSDAP, 1943
edition (1893-PS, USA 323, Part 3, p. 15).

143. Criminal Code, 1871, Sec. 128 (never repealed).

                                                  [Page 481]

144. Goering testified that Schacht was a very strong
personality, and whilst not wanting to over-emphasize my
importance and disregarding whether we were friends or not
on the basis of the two positions, were bound to get into
each other's way, and cane or the other had to give in (Part
9, pp. 204-205).

145. "Q. Mr. Dahlerus will you tell me whether I understood
your last answer to Dr. Stahmer correctly? Did you say that
'I then realized that it was on the 26th of September, that
his, Goering's aim, had been to split Poland and Great
Britain and to occupy Poland with the consent of Great
Britain'? Is that right? A. Yes, it is correct, but I should
like to say it was the German Government, including Goering"
(Part 9, p. 222). The Fuehrer informed Goering some time
before the attack on Poland was launched that the task was
to "eliminate British intervention" (TC-90, GB 64).

146. Hitler's speech to the Commanders-in-Chief, 22nd
August, 1939 (1014-PS, USA 30, Part 1, p. 173).

147. Frank Diary. 1st January, 1944, to 28th February, 1944.
Entries of 14th January, 15th January, 8th February, 1944
(2233-PS, USA 295, Part 2, p. 417).

148. Note, 11th April, 1943, and report of speech of Koch in
Kiev on 5th March, 1943, concerning treatment of civilian
population in Ukraine (1130-PS, USA 169, Part 2, p. 290).

149. Frank testified: "Q. Did you ever participate in the
annihilation of Jews? A. I say yes, and the reason why I say
yes is because having lived through the five months of this
trial, and particularly after having heard the testimony of
the witness Hoess, my conscience does not allow me to throw
the responsibility solely on these small people. I myself
have never installed an extermination camp for Jews or
supported the existence of such camps ; but if Adolf Hitler
personally has laid that dreadful responsibility on his
people, then it is mine too, for we have fought against
Jewry for years; and we have indulged in the most horrible
utterances, and my own diary bears witness against me.
Therefore it is no more than my duty to answer your question
in this connection with 'Yes'. A thousand years will pass
and this guilt of Germany will still not be erased" (Part
12, p. 109).

150. Funk explained that "the position of Minister in the
usual meaning of the term did not exist" (Part 13, p. 112).

151. Ribbentrop, Part 10, pp. 222, 204 ; Keitel, Part 11,
pp. 43, 44 ; Funk, Part 13, p. 162; Goering. Part 9, p. 287.

152. Part 13, pp. 61-62.

153. Part 13, pp. 12, 14-16, 67-68.

154. "The fact was that Hitler tried to use this defeat for
the self-destruction of the German people, as Speer has now
horribly confirmed, and as I was able to observe during the
last phase of the conflict in Berlin when, through deceit by
raising false hopes, boys of 15, 14, 13, and even 12 years
of age were equipped with small arms to fight against tanks,
and called into battle, boys who otherwise might have been
the hope of the period of reconstruction. Hitler found
escape in death, leaving behind him the order to keep on
fighting. He also left behind him the official report that
he had died in battle. I learned that he had committed
suicide, and my last public statement, on 2nd May, 1945, was
to let everybody know of this suicide, for I wanted to nip a
Hitler legend in the bud" (Part 17, p. z69). Dahlerus has
recorded his impression of Hitler, before the war, as a
completely abnormal person (Part 9, p. 225).

155. Part 17, p. 39.

156. Part 117, pp. 57-58.

157. Milch testified: "My offer that I would try to speak to
Hitler against war once more was rejected by the
Reichsmarschal as absolutely hopeless " (Part 8, p. 255).

158. Part 17, P. 58.

159. Part 10, p. 234.

160. Minutes of second session of Working Committee of the
Reich Defence Council held on 22nd May, 1933 (EC-177, USA
390, Part 3, pp. 79, 95).

161. Raeder testified: Yes, as regarding circumventing the
Versailles Treaty as far as that was necessary to improve
our defenceless position, for reasons which I explained
recently here. To do this was a matter of honour for every
man" (Part 14, p. 183).

162. Goering testified: "In the conversation which I had
with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, who was in London at
that time, I stressed that the ultimatum had not been put by
us, but by Seyss-Inquart. That was absolutely true de jure;
de facto, of course, I put it, but this telephone
conversation was being listened to by the English, and I had
to conduct a diplomatic conversation, and I have never heard
yet that diplomats in such cases say how it was de facto,
rather they always stress how it was de jure, and why should
I make an exception there?" (Part 9, p. 104). But the
transcript of the telephone conversation between Goering and
Seyss-Inquart which led to the capitulation of Austria shows
Goering. saying: "Now, remember the following: You go

                                                  [Page 482]

immediately together with Lt.-General Muff and tell the
Federal President that if the conditions which are known to
you are not accepted immediately, the troops who are already
stationed on and advancing to the frontier will march in
tonight along the whole line, and Austria will cease to
exist." Transcript of telephone calls from Air Ministry,
11th-14th March, 1938 (2949-PS, USA 76, Part 1, pp. 254-
256).

163. German assurance to Czechoslovakia of 12th March, 1938
(TC-27, GB 21, Part 2, p. 123).

164. Speer's conference minutes of Central Planning Board,
1942-44, concerning labour supply (R-124, USA 179, Part 2,
p. 300, 303, 312; Part 4, p. 402).

165. Part 9, p. 97.

166. Part 9, p. 238.

167. Part 9, p. 108.

168. Part 12, p. 317.

169. Part 12, p. 312.

170. Dr. Thoma, Part 18, morning session, 10th July, 1946.

171. Part 10, p. 222.

172. Examples of the application of this philosophy may be
found in Goering's explanation of his art looting: he had
intended to put his pictures in a gallery which he intended
to construct for the German people - some day (Part 9, p.
124); his statement that he had always held that captured
enemy airmen were to be treated as "comrades" (Part 9, p.
147); and his attempt to minimize his words advocating harsh
treatment of the Jews, was the result of conversational
excitement (Part 9, p. 259).

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