Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-18/tgmwc-18-172.09
Last-Modified: 2000/09/15

DR. HORN, Continued:

Herr von Ribbentrop has been blamed for having practically
defeated the purpose of the last decisive discussion with
the British Ambassador Henderson, by having read the German
proposals to Poland so fast, contrary to all diplomatic
custom and international courtesy, that Sir Nevile Henderson
could not understand them, and, hence, could not pass them
on. The interpreter, Ambassador Schmidt, was present at this
decisive discussion. He has testified here, under oath, that
this statement is not true. One may consider Hitler's order,
to acquaint Sir Nevile Henderson only with the substance of
the memorandum, as unwise. The fact is that not only did
Herr von Ribbentrop read the entire contents at a normal
speed to the British Ambassador, but he also, by having the
interpreter present, made it possible for Sir Nevile
Henderson to become familiar with the entire contents and,
moreover, to have explanations given on it. Besides, upon
the initiative of Reichsmarschall Goering it was transmitted
to the British Embassy during the same night by dictation to
Counsellor of the Embassy Forbes. Thus the British
Government should have been able to render the good services
offered for opening negotiations based on positive
proposals.

By reason of these facts here deposed, one must rightly
doubt the truth of the allegation that the defendant did
everything to prevent peace with Poland.

At the beginning of my defence speech, I stressed that legal
considerations concerning aggressive war are not possible
without knowledge of the circumstances leading to an armed
conflict. Before I proceed to the legal aspects of the
conflict with Poland, may I make some additional statements
concerning the causes that led to the war.

                                                  [Page 150]

The period between the two world wars is characterised by
the mutual reactions of those Powers which were satisfied
and those which were dissatisfied. It seems to be an
inevitable law that after great war shocks, the victorious
States tend as far as possible towards the re-establishment
of the pre-war status and pre-war mentality, whereas the
vanquished are forced to find a way out of the consequences
of their defeat by new means and methods. Thus the Holy
Alliance came about after the Napoleonic wars, which under
Metternich's leadership, using legitimacy as an
authorisation, tried to ignore the effects of the French
Revolution.

What the Holy Alliance did not achieve, the League of
Nations did not achieve either.

Created in an atmosphere of fervent belief in human
progress, it was quickly transformed into a tool of the
satisfied States. Every effort to "strengthen" the League of
Nations meant a new bulwark to the maintenance of the status
quo. Under the elegant diction of juridical formalities,
power-politics continued. Besides, the obsession by the idea
of securite soon deprived the newly created body of any
breath of freshness and life.

In this fashion, naturally, a solution of the problems
created by the end of the First World War could never be
found. In international relations, a coalition of interests
of the conservative Powers on the one hand content with the
status quo, and on the other hand of the revolutionary
Powers trying to do away with it, became increasingly
apparent. It could only be a question of time when under
those circumstances the political initiative would pass to
the dissatisfied Powers. The formation of this front
depended exclusively on the force of the revolutionary
spirit which was crystallising in opposition to the
political self-complacency of the conservative elements
clinging to the past and status quo. In this fertile soil
grew the doctrines of National Socialism, Fascism and
Bolshevism, obscure, elastic and incoherent in many parts of
the programmes put forward. Their power of propaganda was
based not so much on their programmes, but on the fact that
they admittedly offered something new and that they did not
exhort their followers to worship a political ideal that had
failed in the past.

The economic crisis of the post-war period, the
controversies about reparations and the occupation of the
Ruhr, the inability of democratic governments to attain
anything for their distressed peoples from the other
democracies, unavoidably led to a test of the doctrines
which had not yet been tried out. The practical results of
this revolution, as we experienced them in Germany after
1933, could, apart from the social programme, only consist
in abolishing the peace settlement of 1919, which
constitutes a classical example of the failure to understand
the revolutionary character of a world crisis. For this
revolution these tasks were not based on legal questions,
but on doctrines, exactly as it had long become a doctrine
of the satisfied States to maintain the status quo at all
costs, even at the price of a new world war.

Only he who does not shut his eyes before these facts can
judge the political crisis of the past decade.

Every revolution has but two possibilities; either it meets
so little resistance that eventually conservative tendencies
develop and an amalgamation with the old order is formed, or
the antagonistic forces are so strong that finally the
revolution breaks into pieces through overstraining its own
means and methods.

National Socialism went the second way, which began without
bloodshed, and to some extent with a remarkable tendency
towards tradition. But it too could not escape the inherent
laws of history. The aims were too high for one generation,
the revolutionary essence too strong. The initial successes
were startling, but they also resulted in lack of criticism
as to the methods and aims. The process of uniting all
larger German groups in the Central European space would
most probably have succeeded if, at the end - I am referring
to the setting up of the Protectorate of Bohemia and
Moravia, and the pursuit of the Danzig Corridor question -
the revolutionary tempo and methods had not been excessive
as a result

                                                  [Page 151]
                                                            
of previous successes. No person capable of sober judgement
will dispute the need for a solution of the Danzig Corridor
question, delicate as it was.

The prosecution may assert that, in reality, Danzig was but
a pretext, but seen from the state of affairs in 1939, this
can hardly be proved. But it is certain that the opposite
side was concerned about other things than the maintenance
of the status quo in the East. National Socialism, and with
it in its newly gained strength, the German Reich, had
become such a danger in the eyes of other States that, after
Prague, it was determined to make any further German advance
a "test case", wherever it should happen.

I have already said that the revolutionary process in
Central Europe was chiefly due to economic causes brought
about by "Versailles" where a peace treaty was imposed on
Germany, the economic provisions of which, as was well
known, could not be carried out by the vanquished.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal thinks that sentence,
at any rate, is objectionable on the ground that I have
already stated.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, I did not mean to emphasize how the
Versailles Treaty came about; I only wanted to stress
certain necessary consequences which are generally known
facts. But I have completed this part and have nothing
further to say with reference to it.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Horn.

DR. HORN: Much has been said here about the slogan
"Lebensraum". I am convinced that this word would never have
become a political programme if, after the First World War,
Germany had been given the possibility of linking up with
the world markets, instead of being strangled economically.
By systematically cutting her off from all raw material
sources of the world-all this for reasons of securite - the
tendency towards autarchy, the inevitable way out from the
barring from the world markets, was fostered; and, at the
same time, with the progressively deteriorating economic
situation, the cry for Lebensraum fell on receptive ears.

Thus, Stalin is right when he says:

  "It would be erroneous to believe that the Second World
  War came about accidentally or as result of mistakes of
  one or the other of the statesmen, even though such
  mistakes were made without doubt. Actually, the war came
  about as an inevitable result of the development of
  international economic and political forces based on
  modern monopolistic capitalism."

Professor Jahrreiss has already fully explained in his basic
arguments concerning the legal and the actual significance
of the Kellogg Pact that the meaning given to this project
for the prevention of war by the prosecution cannot be
recognized by the defence.

Even though war had been previously declared an
international crime, especially at the eighth League of
Nations assembly of 1927, it became quite clear in
preliminary conversations-as has been proved by documents
already submitted to the Tribunal - that this declaration
was not meant to make war a crime in the legal sense, but
that it was an expression of the wish to prevent future
international catastrophes on a World War I scale. Moreover,
neither the U.S.A. nor the U.S.S.R. participated in the
League of Nations resolution of 1927.

All further plans for outlawing war, during the period
between World Wars I and II, remained mere drafts - as the
British Prosecutor had to acknowledge in his significant
argumentation - because practical politics could not follow
these moral postulates.

All these experiments - and they are by no means few -
clearly show that the problem of finding a definition lies
in the difficulty of condensing a political process,
dependent upon a host of components, into a legal concept
which will cover all the varying cases occurring in
practice. The failure to formulate a definition which could
be used in International Law has led to the fact that,
instead of working

                                                  [Page 152]

out general standards and measures, applicable in each case,
the designation of the aggressor was left to the decision of
an organ standing above all the contending parties. In such
a way, the question of defining the aggressor became the
question quis judicavit, i.e., "who designates the
aggressor?" From this decision follows a new difficulty:
"What is to be done against the aggressor?"

Previous to the attempt of settling in a general way the
concept of aggression and the sanctions against the
aggressor, political alliances determined the obligations of
the parties to wage war. In order to improve this
unsatisfactory, anarchic situation, the United States Under
Secretary of State, Bryan -

THE PRESIDENT (interposing): Is this not really arguing the
same questions that Dr. Jahrreiss has already argued?

DR. HORN: Mr. President, I have tried to omit the matters
set forth by Professor Jahrreiss. Professor Jahrreiss
confined his arguments chiefly to the Kellogg Pact. I am
only dealing with the questions pertaining to the legal
aspect of wars of aggression.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but the Tribunal only granted the right
to have an additional counsel deal with the general
questions of law on the understanding that the other counsel
were not going to deal with the same questions of law. Of
course, you are not using the words of Dr. Jahrreiss, I
should not expect you to do that, but you are arguing the
very same topics.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, it had been agreed originally, as
the Professor as an expert had stated, that every counsel is
entitled to take a different attitude toward the problem
argued by him.

Professor Jahrreiss concentrated chiefly on the Kellogg Pact
and its consequences. I personally am turning my attention
to aggressive war, and, as the President emphasized -

THE PRESIDENT (interposing): Just a moment. What is
involved, then, is that the Tribunal is going to hear twenty
arguments upon the general questions of law; and surely it
can scarcely have been thought by defendants' counsel that
the Tribunal proposed to hear twenty arguments on the
general questions of law and also hear Dr. Jahrreiss on it.
The only purpose of hearing one counsel was to have the
general questions of law dealt with by one counsel alone,
and that the others should not speak upon it.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, may I emphasize once more -

THE PRESIDENT (interposing): Just a moment. The Tribunal
will adjourn.

(A recess was taken.)

DR. DIX: My Lord, may I ask the Tribunal to accept a short
explanation regarding the matter which has just taken up the
attention of the Tribunal and which for most of counsel is
of general and fundamental importance. I should like to
remind you of the fact that the suggestion and initiative to
take up certain legal topics and have them dealt with by
Professor Jahrreiss came from the defence and that this
suggestion was made for the sole reason of complying with
the Tribunal's wish to expedite the proceedings. I must
adjure the Tribunal to protect us from letting this
suggestion, made to and granted by the Tribunal at the time,
become our own pitfall in that a resolution which has been
made may be interpreted too strictly. I do not have the
resolution before me and I do not intend to deal with it and
discuss it, but I should like to say just one thing.
Professor Jahrreiss did speak and was to speak on but two
topics which, it is true, were of a general nature, that is,
(a) the punishment of individuals for a war of aggression,
in other words: nulla poena sine lege, and (b) the legal
nature of the Fuehrer decrees. Only these two problems were
to be dealt with by Dr. Jahrreiss, and these were the two
topics that he actually did deal with. But besides that,
these proceedings entail a series of legal problems which
are of a general nature and more or less affect each of the
defendants. I only recall to you the interpretation

                                                  [Page 153]

of the conspiracy charges; the various questions dealing
with International Law; the questions of hostages and forced
labour, and the legal question concerning distress at sea
through naval warfare and other questions. There are a host
of general questions, and above all, the matter on which my
colleague, Dr. Horn, was stopped, concerning the question:
"What is an aggressive war?" There exist the fundamental
differences between a military war of aggression, a
political war of aggression, and a juridical war of
aggression, etc., about which Dr. Jahrreiss did not say a
single word, nor was he supposed to do so. And please - I
trust you do not mind my saying so, but that is the way - I
understood Dr. Horn; that is really the basis of his
argument.

I do not propose to argue and to refer to a resolution, but
I ask the Tribunal not to put us in a situation which we can
hardly account for; namely, that we, in order to expedite
the proceedings by having Professor Jahrreiss deal with a
number of legal questions, be put in a position for which we
cannot take the responsibility, that is to say, that we
cannot deal with certain questions which, in our opinion,
are of decisive legal importance to the defendants and about
which Jahrreiss himself did not speak at all.

Only a word or two yet. I believe the Tribunal will agree
with me that one can have an entirely different opinion on
the subject with which Professor Jahrreiss has dealt. I do
not have it; I also shall not contradict Dr. Jahrreiss. But
from a purely theoretical point of view - should it be, just
because in such an important matter a speaker had dealt with
this question, but in a sense which possibly one of the
counsel considers entirely improper and harmful to his case,
that he is to be forced to keep silent on such a matter?
That cannot have been the intention of the Tribunal. Well,
all I wanted to say was this: This speech of Jahrreiss
served the purpose of expediting the trial. Well and good.
But we ask - I think I may say "we", I believe that no one
of the Tribunal is of a different opinion - we ask that it
should not be interpreted too formally and, if one of us for
some good reason says: "I have to discuss this, it is
important for this or that reason," to give us that
possibility wherever Jahrreiss dealt with the subject in a
sense of which we do not approve, and not to prevent the
discussion of some general legal question if it should be
raised by any of the counsel.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has been considering this matter
and they are fully aware, of course, of the difficulties
which may possibly arise if there were differences of
opinion among the defendants' counsel upon questions which
had been dealt with by Dr. Jahrreiss. They did anticipate
when they made the order which specifies that Dr. Jahrreiss
should speak on legal issues arising out of the Indictment
and Charter which are common to all the defendants - those
are the words of the order - that he would deal with all the
issues which were common to all the defendants and in the
absence of some difference of opinion, that the other
defendants would be prepared to adopt his argument, but the
Tribunal thinks that the questions of law may be to some
extent very various and difficult and that the only rule
which is possible for them to lay down at this stage is that
there must be no real repetition by defendants' counsel. The
Tribunal apprehends that defendants' counsel will see the
necessity for such a rule as that. It cannot be in the
interests of an expeditious trial that argument should be
repeated over and over again, and this Tribunal desires to
point out to the defendants' counsel that such repetition
upon general matters only tends to distract the attention of
the Tribunal from the real defences of the clients whom they
represent, and therefore the Tribunal hopes that the
defendants' counsel will try to co-operate in this matter
and confine such legal arguments as they think it right to
present to the Tribunal to arguments which had not been
addressed to the Tribunal by counsel who preceded them -
either Dr. Jahrreiss or any other counsel. That is all that
I need to say, I think, at this stage; and as it is now five
o'clock, the Tribunal will adjourn.

(The Tribunal adjourned until 8th July, 1946, at 1000 hours.)

Home ·  Site Map ·  What's New? ·  Search Nizkor