The Nizkor Project: Remembering the Holocaust (Shoah)

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Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-16/tgmwc-16-149.05
Last-Modified: 2000/05/10
                                                            
THE WITNESS: May I ask the Tribunal for permission to make a
correction in my objection to this document?

THE PRESIDENT: Which document are you speaking of?

THE WITNESS: USSR 470.

THE PRESIDENT: What do you want to say about it?

                                                   [Page 17]



THE WITNESS: I previously described that document as
nonsensical because, at the first moment, I regarded it as a
German order. In the meantime I have ascertained that it is
obviously a Croatian order, because it is addressed to three
Ustaschi* battalions. [NB. *Ustaschi i.e. Croatian
anti-Jewish, anti-Communist movement.] In this Croatian
order the Croatian commander of this mountain regiment tells
his troops something which he had apparently received in the
way of orders from the 4th German Mountain Division,
regarding the treatment of prisoners. He, in turn, traces it
back to an order from Keitel, which, however, is
misrepresented, and which, if it were correct, ought to be
handed to the defence counsel for Field Marshal Keitel,
because it is the best example of the attitude toward the
guerrillas in Yugoslavia in keeping with international law;
that is, if it is correct.

Therefore it is not a German order; it is apparently a draft
or a translation of a Croatian order of the 4th Mountain
Regiment. But what the 4th Croatian Regiment has to do with
the General or the defendant Jodl is a puzzle to me. I do
not understand it.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Colonel Pokrovsky.

BY COLONEL POKROVSKY:

Q. I ask you, witness Jodl, whether you knew of such a
directive by Keitel to the effect that divisional commanders
or commanders of higher rank were entitled to issue orders
that no prisoners should be taken? Do you know of such a
directive?

A. No, it is not known to me, and it is not certain that the
order was issued in that way. However, in certain cases it
is permissible under international law.

Q. I have no further questions to ask in connection with
these documents. The defence counsel will obviously ask some
questions when the original document is submitted to the
Tribunal.

I shall now proceed to another group of questions. If I am
not mistaken, you confirmed the authenticity of your
so-called notes for "Plan Grun" where it dealt with the
organization for the creation of an incident on the borders
of Czechoslovakia. It is stated quite clearly there that the
organization of this incident was to be entrusted to the
Abwehr (Counter Intelligence). Have I interpreted the idea
of your notes correctly?

A. No. The translation as it came over to me is completely
distorted. But there has been a full discussion about that
too.

Q. To facilitate the task of the interpreters, I shall
simplify the question. You, I believe, confirmed the
authenticity of this document dealing with the incident and
the organization of the incident. This is defence Document
Jodl 14.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it has come through properly.

THE WITNESS: No. It did not make any sense to me at all.

BY COLONEL POKROVSKY:

Q. All right. I shall repeat it. Do I clearly understand
that you do not contest the authenticity of Document Jodl
14?

A. If that is the letter from me to Major Schmundt, then
that is an absolutely genuine document which I wrote myself.

Q. To elucidate this I should like to ask you one question:
Do you confirm that the provocation which you call the
"organization of an incident" had two objects in view;
first, to give a pretext for an attack against
Czechoslovakia; and secondly - to use your own terminology,
which we heard here on 4th June - the aim would be worded as
follows: "I shall shift the blame for the war on to somebody
else's shoulders"? Had you these two objects in view when
you proposed to organize an incident? Do you understand my
question?

A. I understood roughly what you said.

Q. Can you give an answer?

A. I can repeat the answer I gave yesterday.

Q. You confirm this?

                                                   [Page 18]


A. My testimony of yesterday? Yes, of course. I still
maintain today something which I said yesterday.

Q. Very well. I would like you to tell the Tribunal
everything you know about the supplying of weapons to the
Sudeten Germans forming the Henlein Corps; which you
mentioned to the Tribunal in passing. You stated that this
Corps contained a certain number of officers. Do you
remember?

A. Yes, I remember.

Q. In order to help you, I will show you a document - it is
the testimony of Karl Hermann Frank. He declares in this
testimony that the Henlein Corps received a certain quantity
of weapons. Do you know anything about this?

A. I only know of weapons supplied to the Henlein Free Corps
at the time when it was being formed on German territory.
Whether arms had been previously smuggled into
Czechoslovakia for that Sudeten German group, or how they
were brought in, is something which I know nothing about.
The Armed Forces were never in any way concerned with that,
just as later on they were never concerned with the Henlein
Free Corps.

Q. Do you know what kind of weapons were sent? Were they of
German origin or not?

A. The fact that arms were taken into Czechoslovakia is
something I know absolutely nothing about. I was not a
"gun-runner"; I was a General Staff officer.

Q. That is why I am asking you, since you have said that you
received reports on the arming of the Henlein Free Corps
when it arrived on German territory That is why I asked you,
as an officer of the General Staff. Were these weapons of
German origin or not? You must know that.

A. Henlein's Free Corps, which was formed near Hof and in
the district to the North on 17th September, received in my
opinion former Austrian, or even German arms; I think they
were Austrian weapons, but I do not know that for certain.

Q. Then we can ignore that. We only need definite
information and definite facts. You will now be handed a
photostatic copy of file "Gruen" and you will look at the
passage which has been marked. The marked passage says:

  "For the success of the operation, the penetration into
  Sudeten Germany with parachute troops will be of great
  value."

The defendant Keitel, on 6th April, 1946, when questioned
regarding this part of the document, said that it is
precisely you who could give the requisite explanations with
regard to this document.

A. With reference to this paragraph I have to say that in
the preparation for a possible war there was a code word for
the Army to the effect that fortifications would have to be
penetrated quickly, or would have to be opened up from the
rear, and that for success of this joint action the
co-operation of air-borne troops together with the border
population and the Sudeten Germans who deserted to us might
be of value. For, of course, it was a fact, that among the
Germans who had been drafted into the ranks of the
Czechoslovakian Army, and who numbered about 100,000, not
one would have turned his weapon upon us, but would have
deserted on the spot. They wrote that to me personally while
wearing Czech uniform. These Germans would have deserted on
the spot. That, of course, we expected and took it into
account in our military calculations.

Q. I am afraid you have not understood me quite correctly,
or did not wish to understand the question which I put to
you. I, defendant Jodl, am interested in something else: do
you confirm the fact that prior to the attack on
Czechoslovakia you had planned diversionary work on the
territory of Czechoslovakia proper? That is what I am
interested in. Yes or no?

A. Firstly, there was no attack upon Czechoslovakia at all;
that is a historical untruth. Secondly, this was General
Staff work, which was prepared for the possibility of a war,
and there is nothing else to be said about that.

                                                   [Page 19]

THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to the question. The
question was whether you planned before the war, or the
possible war, diversionary activity in Czechoslovakia. Did
you plan that? Can you answer that?

THE WITNESS: No, I did not. You will have to ask Admiral
Canaris about that. Such matters were not in my
jurisdiction.

BY COLONEL POKROVSKY:

Q. Keitel advised us to ask you, and you advise us to
question Canaris. Very well, I have another question to ask
you. Was the unification of all pro-fascist forces and armed
fascist bands in Yugoslavia, which fought against the Allied
Bloc, carried out with your knowledge? Or do you know
nothing about that?

A. You mean the military organization under Marshal Tito?
That is known to me, yes.

Q. No, I am referring to the organization under the
direction of the German High Command, of a united front of
all pro-fascist bands: of Neditch, Michailovitch and others,
financed by Germany, helped by Germany and under the
leadership of the German High Command. Do you know anything
about that, or do you not?

A. I do not know whether you have in mind the Chetniks. They
were under Italian command. Because of this there was always
a row between us and the Italians. Then there was the
Ustaschi, they were Croatians. But the other pro-fascist
organizations are not known to me.

Q. Very well. You will look at Exhibit USSR 288. It has
already been submitted to the Tribunal. It is the testimony
of Neditch. Two or three sentences from this document have a
direct bearing on the question that I have asked. Neditch
testified under oath and named those who had helped him to
form and to finance his bands. He named the representatives
of the German High Command and of the Gestapo who helped him
to create his armed forces.

Have you found that?

A. That is right. Neditch formed a Serbian unit. I forgot
that before. Neditch had a - what shall I say - a Serbian -

Q. Do you remember it?

A. Yes, Neditch had a small unit. That is right, there were
perhaps five to six thousand men. They were Serbs.

Q. Did you finance this undertaking?

A. No. I had no money.

Q. No, I am not speaking of your personal means, but the
means of the German Reich.

A. I cannot tell you that. I did not concern myself about
money in this war.

Q. Was the German High Command the controlling head of the
organization of these bands? Or was it not?

A. No. I did not organize it. The Commander-in-Chief South
East probably discussed that with Neditch.  But it was
Neditch's own private affair if he wished to call on the
Serbs to fight.

Q. I do not know whether it was his private business or not.
But it is most important to me that you should confirm that
these bands actually were created. How Neditch created them
does not interest me.

A. I can confirm that. There were about 5,000 to 6,000 men
of the Serbian Service.

Q. Very well. You will be shown another report from this
group of questions. It is an official report of the Polish
Government sent to the Military Tribunal. You will find that
it contains some very valuable information about the
activities of the Fifth Column. Please turn to the sentence
which is marked "B". It is said there:

  " In addition to the agents, selected from among the
  young people and appointed to co-operate with the German
  population, there also existed a group of leaders and
  instructors, consisting of officers who had come to
  Poland, supplied with passports, weeks before the
  outbreak of hostilities."

                                                   [Page 20]


Do you, as the direct leader of the "Abwehr" (Counter
Intelligence ) - this section was subordinate to you-know
anything about this Fifth Column organization in Poland?

A. There are two small errors you have made, Colonel
Pokrovsky. First of all, Counter Intelligence was not
responsible to me, but to the Chief of the OKW; and
secondly, I stated at length yesterday that I know nothing
about any of the: preparations for the Polish campaign
either from the point of view of operations or otherwise,
because I was Artillery Commander in Vienna and Brunn. What
Canaris did at that time with respect to Poland is something
I know absolutely nothing about. I am afraid, therefore, I
cannot be of any help.

Q. Let us proceed to the next group of questions. You were
examined on the 8th November by the Soviet Prosecution and
you were asked whether Germany was pursuing a predatory
policy when attacking the Soviet Union. Do you remember
being asked this question?

A. I remember very well. Yes.

Q. You will now be handed a copy of your answer. You
replied: "I admit that the question of the expansion of
Germany's 'Lebensraum' and the utilization of Russian
economy for Germany's needs, did play a certain part, but it
was not the basic reason for the attack on the Soviet
Union." Do you remember answering in this sense?

A. It is possible. I did not sign it. At any rate, I said it
was not the chief cause.

Q. You also said in the same answer: "It was never our
intention constantly to enlarge our 'Lebensraum' and thereby
acquire new enemies." It appears that you do remember that?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Very well. Perhaps you will now recall that the witness
Ohlendorf testified before the Tribunal that prior to the
outbreak of hostilities against the Soviet Union, Himmler,
in his speech, had outlined a programme for the
annihilation, in the East, of 10,000,000 Slavs and Jews?

A. I recollect having heard that testimony in this
courtroom, yes.

Q. In the light of this, in the light of Ohlendorf's
testimony, would you not like to answer more precisely to
the question whether the war against the Soviet Union was
waged with a predatory purpose, with the purpose of seizing
territory, annihilating the population and then of
transforming the land thus freed, to quote Hitler's own
words: "Into a garden of Paradise for the Germans"? Do not
you think that is exactly what did happen?

A. What the Fuehrer might have wanted to create later on I
do not know, but the military and strategic reasons which he
gave us, and which were definitely confirmed by the many
reports received, I explained yesterday in great detail. The
main reason was the feeling of being under a tremendous
threat of an attack by Russia. That was the decisive point.

Q. Very well. You will now be handed Document 57-S. It has
already been submitted to the Tribunal, my Lord. On the
evening of 5th April, 1946, this document was put to the
defendant Keitel as Exhibit USSR 336. I must ask you to turn
to sub-paragraph 4 of this document and to sub-paragraph 7,
for Keitel stated that you could give far more detailed
explanations about these documents. Sub-paragraph 4 referred
to the active participation of Spain in the seizure of
Gibraltar as far back as 1941. Tell us, how was this active
participation to be expressed? Have you found this passage
in the document?

A. Yes, I already know the document. But nobody signed it.
First of all, I have to give an explanation of what this
document is, so that it is not mistaken for an order.

Q. But I do not believe I ever said that it was an order.

A. That is all right, because it is not an order. I cannot
say what the people who drew up this document had in mind.
It was obviously a draft which the General Staff officers,
presumably, from my department, together with the

                                                   [Page 21]

Operations expert of the Navy prepared in my office and
which they submitted to the Naval Staff for their perusal,
according to the principle that German Staff -officers must
think and plan a long time ahead. They had these personal
ideas and put them down on paper without my ever having seen
them.


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