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                                                  [Page 315]

             HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVENTH DAY
               SATURDAY, 11th MAY, 1946

DR.  KRANZBUHLER: Mr. President, I continue to submit documents 
concerning naval warfare. My next document is printed on
Page 149 of the Document Book No. 3. It is a declaration of
26th September, 1939, by the British First Lord of the
Admiralty concerning the arming of the British merchant
fleet. In this declaration he announces that within a short
time the entire British merchant fleet will be armed. Then
he speaks about the training of the crews, and in conclusion
he thanks his predecessors for the care with which they
prepared that work before the beginning of the war.

I submit Document Donitz 60. Donitz 60 is a large collection
of documents concerning laws of naval warfare. It contains
altogether 550 documents. In accordance with the request of
the President, I have given special numbers to the later
documents.

I come now to some documents which deal with the treatment
of ships which acted suspiciously and were for that reason
attacked by U-boats.

The first document of this series is Donitz 61, Page 150. It
is a warning to neutral shipping against suspicious tactics.
That warning was sent in a note to all neutral missions. At
the end it points out that the ships should avoid being
mistaken for enemy warships or auxiliary cruisers,
especially during the night. There is a warning against all
suspicious tactics, for instance, changing course, use of
wireless on sighting German naval forces, zigzagging,
dimming of lights, not stopping upon demand and the
acceptance of enemy escort.

That warning is repeated in Document Donitz 62, which is on
Page 153, a renewed note of 19th October, 1939, to the
neutral regions - to the neutral governments. Document 63 is
an example of how a neutral government, namely the Danish
Government, in accordance with the German notes warned their
merchant shipping against suspicious conduct. It is found on
Page 154.

I should like to remind you again that the first warning was
given on 28th September.

My next document - 64, shows that on 2nd October the order
was issued to the submarines to attack darkened vessels in
certain operational areas close to the British coast. That
order is particularly significant in view of the cross-
examination of yesterday where the question was put as to
whether an order of that kind had been issued at all or
whether that subject was transmitted to the commanders
orally with instructions to falsify their logs. I read the
order Of 2nd October, 1939, on Page 155.

  "Order by the SKL (Naval War Command) to the Fleet:
  
  "Inasmuch as on the English and French coasts when
  encountering darkened vessels it must be assumed that
  they are battleships or auxiliary battleships, fully
  armed action is authorized against darkened vessels in
  the following territories."

An area around the British coast follows.

The excerpt under it is taken from the War Diary of
Commander-in-Chief Submarines of the same date and shows the
transmission of this order to the submarines.

The readiness of British merchant shipping to commit
aggression against German submarines is motivated or
furthered by the next document which I am going to

                                                  [Page 316]

show. It is numbered Donitz 101 and is on Page 155. The old
number was Donitz 60, Mr. President. It is an announcement
by the British Admiralty, which I will read:

  "The British Admiralty circulated the following warning
  to the British merchant marine on 1st October:
  
  Within the last few days some German U-boats have been
  attacked by British merchant marine vessels. In this
  connection the German radio announces that the German U-
  boats have so far observed the rules of international law
  in warning the merchant marine vessels before attacking
  them.
  
  Now, however, Germany intends to retaliate by considering
  every British merchant marine vessel as a battleship.
  While the first mentioned fact is absolutely untrue, it
  may indicate an immediate change in the policy of German
  submarine warfare.
  
  Be prepared to meet it.
  
  Admiralty."

On Page 157 there is a second report of the same date. "The
British Admiralty announces that German submarines are
pursuing a new strategy. English boats are called upon to
ram every German submarine."

The next document, Donitz 65, contains orders issued as a
result of the armament of and armed resistance by merchant
vessels. I read the order of 4th October, 1939, which was
issued by the SKL (Naval War Command) to the Fleet.

  "Immediate attack in any manner available is permitted by
  submarines against enemy merchant vessels which are
  obviously armed or have been proclaimed as such on the
  basis of conclusive evidence received by the Naval War
  Staff. As far as circumstances permit, measures are to be
  taken to save the crew after every possibility of danger
  for the submarine has been eliminated. Passenger ships
  not used to transport troops are still not to be
  attacked, even if armed."

The excerpt below shows the transmission of the order to the
submarines. The experiences made in the war up to that
period are summarised in a document on Page 159, which is an
excerpt from the prosecution's Exhibit GB 96, "Standing War
Order 171," of Commander-in-Chief Submarines:

I should only like to read from paragraph 4, the first
sentence:

  "Tactics of Enemy Merchant Marine Vessels, following
  instructions have been issued for British shipping...."

THE PRESIDENT: What's the date of this document?

DR. KRANZBUHLER: The document was issued before May, 1940. I
shall have to call on a witness to give the correct date,
Mr. President, I assume it was in October, 1939:

   "The British Navy has received the following
   instructions:
   
   (a) To fight every German submarine with all the means
   at hand, to ram it or attack it with depth-charges, if
   equipped to do so."

Further details follow.

Experiences drawn from the entire operations of the British
Merchant Service are summarised in the next document in an
order. It has been numbered Donitz 66, and is on Page 161. I
shall read the order which is dated 17th October, 1939.

  "At 1500 hours the following order was issued to
  Commander-in-Chief Submarines:
  
  Submarines are permitted immediate and full use of armed
  force against all merchant vessels recognizable with
  certainty as being of enemy nationality, as in every case
  attempts to ram or other forms of active resistance may
  be expected. Exceptions to be made, as hitherto, in the
  case of enemy passenger boats."

                                                  [Page 317]

On Page 162 I have reproduced another part of document
Donitz 62, which has been submitted already. It is a note to
the neutral countries dated 22nd October, 1939, defining
conduct on the part of ships, which is according to German
opinion incompatible with the peaceful character of a
merchant ship. I read from the long paragraph, the second
sentence:

  "According to previous experiences such tactics may be
  expected with certainty from English and French boats,
  particularly when sailing in convoys; inadmissible use of
  wireless, sailing without lights and in addition armed
  resistance and aggressive action."

In the next, the German government warns neutral nations
against the use of enemy ships for this reason.

The German orders were issued in consequence of the
experiences made by our U-boats.

I have already submitted the next document, Donitz 67, on
Page 163 et seq., and I only wish to explain on the basis of
a report made by the British Admiralty, which is on Page
163, that the orders for merchant shipping were published in
the handbook for the defence of merchant ships of January,
1938 - they were issued before the war.

Now I come to several documents dealing with the treatment
of passenger ships. They have an important bearing on the
Athenia case, since the Athenia was a passenger ship.

Document Donitz 68 presents some evidence on the treatment
of passenger ships. First comes an order issued on 4th
September, 1939, which I should like to read:

  "On the Fuehrer's orders no hostile action is to be taken
  against passenger ships for the time being, even when in
  convoy."

The next excerpt from the same page contains reports on the
use of passenger ships as troop transports.

I will now read an excerpt from the directives for the
conduct of the war against merchant shipping, from October
to the middle of November, 1939, Page 3. "As the fullest
possible use was made of enemy passenger boats for the
transport of troops, it was no longer possible to justify
their being spared, at least when they were sailing in
convoy." The following order was issued on 29th October. I
will read the order, which is dated 29th October. It is at
the bottom of the page.

  "Passenger liners in enemy convoys may be subjected to
  immediate unrestricted armed attack by U-boats."

The next document, Donitz 69, on Page 70, is to show that in
November and December the German Press issued a warning
against the use of armed passenger ships by publishing lists
of these ships.

The next document is Donitz 70, on Page 171. It is an order
issued on 7th November, 1939 by the SKL to C.-in-C. U-boats.
I read the order:

  "U-boats are permitted to attack immediately with all
  weapons at their command all passenger ships which can be
  identified with certainty as, enemy ships and whose
  armament is detected or is already known."

That was about six weeks after permission to attack other
armed ships had been given.

Donitz V shows that the U-boats were not permitted also to
attack darkened passenger ships until as late as 23rd
February, 1940, five months - no, four months - after they
were given permission to attack other ships.

Now I come to the prosecution's Exhibit GB 224, which I
reproduce on Pages 199-203 in volume 4 of my document book.
I should like to emphasize again that the object of this
document was to incriminate Admiral Raeder in particular;
and that it was described by the prosecution as a cynical
denial of international law. I should like to point out, to
begin with, that according to the title it concerns
deliberations by the SKL on the possibilities of
intensifying economic

                                                  [Page 318]

warfare against England. I shall read a few paragraphs, or
give a short account of them, to show that a very thorough
investigation of International Law was made.

The first paragraph: War Aims.

  "The Fuehrer's proposal to restore a just and honourable
  peace and establish a new political order in Central
  Europe has been rejected. The enemy powers want war with
  Germany's destruction as the goal. In the struggle in
  which Germany is now forced to defend her existence and
  rights, Germany must employ her weapons ruthlessly while
  fully respecting the rules of soldierly conduct in
  warfare."

Then there follows a paragraph in which it is stated that
the enemy is also ruthless in carrying out his plans.

On the next page, Page 200, there are a few sentences of
basic importance which I should like to read. I read from
the paragraph "Military Requirements" the fourth sentence:

  "It is still desirable to base military measures on the
  existing principle of International Law; but military
  measures recognized as necessary must be taken if they
  seem likely to lead to decisive military successes, even
  if they are not admitted by International Law. For that
  reason, the military weapon which effectively breaks the
  enemy's powers of resistance must on principle be given a
  legal base, even if new rules of naval warfare have to be
  created for the purpose.
  
  After weighing political, military And economic
  considerations with regard to the war as a whole, the
  High Command must decide on the military procedure and
  legal rules of warfare to be applied."

Then there are a number of excerpts to show the way in which
SKL investigated the legal aspect of the situation; that is
to say the present legal aspect of the situation, the
situation which would arise in the case of a siege of
England or a blockade against England.

The end, which is on Page 203, emphasises the political
character of the final decision. I shall read it:

  "The decision as to the form to be taken by the
  intensification of economic warfare and the time fixed
  for changing over to the most intensified and therefore
  final form of naval warfare in this war is of far-
  reaching political importance. It can be made only by the
  Supreme War Command, which will weigh the military,
  political and economic requirements against each other."

I should like to add that this document is dated 15th
October, 1939. At the end of November, 1939, the Naval War
Command took the consequent -

THE PRESIDENT: In our document it is 3rd November. You said
just now it was some date in October.

DR. KRANZBUHLER: 15th October, Mr. President. It is a
memorandum dated 15th October, which was submitted.

WTHE PRESIDENT: Well, I thought you were dealing with
Exhibit GB 224. That is the one you have been reading just
now.

DR. KRANZBUHLER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: That is headed on our Page 199, 3rd of
November, 1939.

DR. KRANZBUHLER: Yes, Mr. President. The 3rd of November is
the date on which the memorandum was distributed to the High
Command of the Armed Forces and to the Foreign Office.

I have just been told that in the English text, above the
word "Memorandum," the date is apparently not printed. In
the original it says, right above the word "Memorandum,"
"Berlin, 15th October, 1939."

                                                  [Page 319]

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. KRANZBUHLER: I have already submitted Document Donitz
73, on Page 206, in which neutrals are warned against entry
into the zone which corresponds to the American combat zone
declared by President Roosevelt on 4th November.

The German point of view, that entry into this zone
constitutes an endangering of all neutrals by their own
action, was also published in the Press. Therefore I submit
the Document Donitz 103, on Page 210. It is an interview
given by Admiral Raeder to a representative of the National
Broadcasting Company, New York, on 4th March, 1940. I should
like to read a few sentences from that document. In the
second paragraph Admiral Raeder points out the dangers
existing for neutral merchant ships if they act in a warlike
manner and are consequently enemy ships. The last sentence
of that paragraph reads:

  "The German standpoint may be concisely expressed by the
  formula: Whoever depends on the use of arms must be
  prepared for attack by arms."

I shall read the two last paragraphs:

  "In discussing the possibility that there might be
  frequent differences of opinion, the Commander-in-Chief
  of the Navy mentioned President Roosevelt's order
  prohibiting American shipping in the dangerous zones
  around England. He said: 'This prohibition is the best
  proof against England's practice of forcing neutrals to
  sail through these zones without being able to guarantee
  their security. Germany can only advise all neutrals to
  copy the policy of your President.'
  
  Question: 'Thus, according to this state of affairs,
  there is no protection for neutral shipping in the war-
  endangered zones?'
  
  Answer: 'Probably not, so long as England adheres to her
  methods ..."

With the collapse of France the entire USA combat zone was
declared a German blockade area. That is shown by the next
document, Donitz 104, Page 212. I read from the middle of
the long paragraph on that page:

  "The entire sea area around England has thus become a
  theatre of operations. Every ship sailing this zone runs
  the risk of being destroyed not only by mines but also by
  other means...."

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuhler, did you call that Exhibit
Donitz 60 or -

DR. KRANZBUHLER: That was originally also one of the
documents from Donitz 60, Mr. President, to which I have now
given a new number. It is now Donitz 104.


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