Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-12/tgmwc-12-112.09
Last-Modified: 2000/01/23

DR. SEIDL: The document on Page 16 is the report by the S.S.
Brigadefuehrer Stroop, which has already been submitted as
Exhibit USA-275. The report by S.S. Fuehrer Katzmann, which
the Russian prosecutor apparently means, concerning the
solution of the Jewish question in Galicia, is on Page 17 of
the document book, that is, on the next page. Apparently the
insertion of Page 16 in the document book, which was
prepared for the Russian prosecution, was overlooked.

After that report by Brigadefuehrer Stroop - Exhibit USA-275
should be inserted as Page 16A, the affidavit by S.S.
Brigadefuehrer Stroop which was submitted during the cross-
examination of the defendant Dr. Kaltenbrunner, under
Exhibit USA-804. That affidavit bears the number 3481-PS. I
could

                                                  [Page 177]

not include that affidavit in the document book because that
affidavit was submitted by the prosecution only after I had
sent the document book to be translated.

As Page 16B another document should be put in, which was
also submitted during the cross-examination of Dr.
Kaltenbrunner. That is the affidavit by Karl Kaleske. That
affidavit is Exhibit USA-803, Document 3840-PS. That would
be Page 16B of the document book.

Now I come to the report which the Soviet prosecutor had in
mind and which deals with the solution of the Jewish
question in Galicia. It is on Page 17 of the document book.
That measure has the Exhibit number USA-277 and the Document
number 18-L. I quote Pages 4 and 5, word for word:

  "After it had been found in more and more cases that Jews
  had succeeded in making themselves indispensable to their
  employers by providing them with goods in scarce supply,
  etc., it was considered necessary to introduce really
  Draconic measures."

I pass to paragraph 2 and quote:

   "Since the administration was not in a position and
   showed itself too weak to master this chaos, the S.S.
   and Police Leader simply took over the whole question of
   the employment of Jewish labour. The Jewish labour
   agencies, which were staffed by hundreds of Jews, were
   dissolved. All certificates of labour given by firms or
   administrative offices were declared invalid, and the
   cards given to the Jews by the labour agencies were
   revalidated by being stamped by the police offices."

I pass to Page 19 of the document book. That deals with the
letter of the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich
Chancellery to the Reich Fuehrer S.S. and Chief of the
German Police Himmler, of 17 April, 1943. That document has
the number 2220-PS and the Exhibit No. USA-175. I quote:

  "In our conference of 27 March of this year we had agreed
  to prepare written memoranda about conditions in the
  Government General, on which to base our intended report
  to the Fuehrer.
  
  The material compiled for this purpose by S.S.
  Obergruppenfuehrer Kruger has already been submitted to
  you directly. On the basis of this material, I have had a
  report prepared which sums up the most important points
  of this material, sub-divides them clearly, and
  culminates in an exposition of the measures to be taken.
  
  The report has been checked with S.S. Obergruppenfuehrer
  Kruger and has his complete concurrence. I am submitting
  a part of it to you herewith."

It is signed "Dr. Lammers."

I pass on to Page 20 of the document book and I quote:

  "Secret, concerning conditions in the Government General
  ...
  
  The German administration in the Government General has
  to fulfil the following tasks:
  
  To increase agricultural production and seize as much of
  it as possible for the purpose of securing food for the
  German people, to allot sufficient rations to the native
  population occupied with work essential to the war
  effort, and to carry off the rest for the armed forces
  and the homeland."

I leave out the following points and pass to the letter "B,"
where Kruger or his assistant criticised the measures of the
Governor General.

  "German administration in the Government General has
  failed extensively with respect to the tasks listed under
  'A.' Even if a relatively high percentage, namely over 90
  per cent., of the delivery quota of agricultural products
  for the armed forces and the homeland was successfully
  met in the year 1942, and if the labour procurement
  requirements of the homeland were generally satisfied,
  nevertheless, on the other hand two things must be made
  clear: First, these accomplishments were achieved for

                                                  [Page 178]
  
  the first time in the year 1942. Before that, for
  example, only 40,000 tons of bread grain had been
  delivered for the armed forces. Secondly, and above all,
  one had failed to create for the attainment of such
  performances those prerequisites of an organisational,
  economic, and political character which are indispensable
  if such performances are not to lead to a breakdown in
  the situation as a whole, from which chaotic conditions
  in every respect could eventually come about. This
  failure of the German administration can be explained for
  one thing by the system of the German administrative and
  governmental activity in the Government General as
  embodied in the Governor General, and secondly by the
  misguided principles of policy in all those questions
  which are decisive for conditions in the Government
  General.
  
  (1) The spirit of the German administration in the
  Government General.
  
  From the beginning it has been the endeavour of the
  Governor General to create a State organisation out of
  the Government General which was to lead its own
  existence in complete independence of the Reich."

Then I pass to Page 22 of the report, No. 3 and I quote:-

  "(3) The treatment of the native population can only be
  led in the right direction on the basis of clean and
  orderly administrative and economic leadership. Only such
  a foundation makes it possible to handle the native
  population strictly and, if necessary, even severely on
  the one hand, and on the other hand to act generously
  with them and cause a certain amount of satisfaction in
  the population by certain liberties, especially in the
  cultural field. Without such a foundation, severity
  strengthens the resistance movement, and meeting the
  population halfway only undermines respect for the
  Germans. The above-mentioned facts prove that this
  foundation is lacking. Instead of trying to create this
  foundation, the Governor General inaugurates a policy of
  encouraging the individual cultural life of the Polish
  population, which in itself is already overshooting the
  goal, but which, under the existing conditions and viewed
  in connection with our military situation during the past
  winter, can only be interpreted as weakness, and must
  achieve the opposite of the aim intended.
  
  (4) The relationship between racial Germans and the
  Polish- Ukrainian population in the Government General.
  
  The cases are numerous in which the German administration
  has permitted the requirements of the racial Germans in
  the Government General to be put into the background in
  favour of the interests of the Poles and Ruthenians, in
  its endeavour to win over t1he latter. The opinion was
  advanced that racial Germans resettled from somewhere
  else were not to be installed immediately as settlers,
  but for the duration of the war were only to be employed
  as farm workers. A legal foundation for the expropriation
  of Polish property has not been created so far. Bad
  treatment of racial Germans by their Polish employers was
  not stopped. German citizens and racial German patients
  were allowed to be treated in Polish hospitals by Polish
  physicians, badly and at great expense. In German spas in
  the Government General the sheltering of children of
  German citizenship from territories which were threatened
  with bombing and Stalingrad fighters was hampered, while
  foreigners took convalescent vacations there, and so on.
  
  The big plans for resettlement in the Lublin district for
  the benefit of racial Germans could have been carried out
  with less friction if the Reich Commissioner for the
  Strengthening of German Nationality had found the
  administration willing to co-operate and assist in the
  proper manner."

I pass to Page 24 and quote, under C:-

  "The administrative system, represented by the Governor
  General personally, and the material failure of the
  general German administration

                                                  [Page 179]
  
  in the most various fields of decisive importance, has
  not only shaken the confidence and the will to work of
  the native population, but has also brought about the
  result that the Poles, who have been socially divided and
  constantly disunited throughout their history, have come
  together in a united national body through their
  hostility to the Germans. In a world of pretence, the
  real foundations are lacking on which alone those
  achievements which the Reich requires from the Government
  General, and those aims which it must see realised
  through the latter, can be brought about and fulfilled in
  the long run. The non-fulfilment of the tasks given to
  the general administration, as happened, for example, in
  the field of the Strengthening of German Nationality, led
  to a condition which made it necessary for other
  administrative bodies (Reich Commissioner for the
  Strengthening of German Nationality, and the Police) to
  take over these tasks."

Now I pass to Page 27 of the document book. That is the
repeatedly mentioned report by the Governor General to the
Fuehrer of 19 June, 1943. The document has the number 437-
PS, Exhibit USA-610. Of this document the prosecution has so
far quoted only Pages 10 and 11. These are the very points
in the memorandum by the Governor General which were most
severely condemned.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking now of the report which
begins on Page 20?

DR. SEIDL: I am speaking of the report which begins on Page
27. I have already finished the report which begins on Page
20.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, what number did you give to that on
Page 20?

DR. SEIDL: The report on Page 20 is an integral part of the
letter which begins on Page 19, and which already has the
Exhibit USA- 175.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see, yes.

DR. SEIDL: Now I come to the document on Page 27. That is a
memorandum which has already been mentioned by various
witnesses, and was submitted under Exhibit USA-610 by the
prosecution. Of this report, the prosecution has only read
Pages 10 and 11, on Pages 36 and 37 of the document book,
that is to say, only those passages in the report which
concerned excesses of the police, and against which excesses
the Governor General complained to the Fuehrer.

I do not intend to read the whole memorandum, but I will
pass on to Page 27 of the report, which is Page 53 of the
document book, and I quote under No. 2:

  "The almost complete discontinuation of the possibilities
  for participation in the cultural field has led, even
  among the lowest classes of the Polish people, to
  considerable discontent. The Polish middle and upper
  classes have a great need for self-expression. Experience
  shows that the possibility of cultural activity would at
  the same time mean a diversion from the political
  questions of the day. German propaganda frequently meets
  with the objection on the part of the Poles, that the
  restriction of cultural activity enforced by the German
  authorities not only prevents the contrast being made
  with the Bolshevist lack of culture, but also shows that
  Polish cultural activity falls below the degree of
  culture allowed to Soviet citizens.
  
  (3) The closing of colleges, high schools and secondary
  schools is on the same level. Its considered purpose is
  without doubt the lowering of the Polish educational
  standard. The realisation of this goal appears, from the
  point of view of the necessities of war, not always
  beneficial to German interests. As the war goes on the
  German interest in the mobilisation of able foreign
  replacements in the various fields of knowledge
  increases. But more important than that is the fact that
  the crippling of the school system, and the severe
  hampering of cultural activities, foster the growth

                                                  [Page 180]
  
  of a Polish national body led by the intelligentsia to
  conspire against Germany. What was not possible during
  the course of Polish national history, what even the
  first years of German dominion could not bring about,
  namely the achievement of national unity in a common
  purpose, to hold together through thick and thin, now
  threatens to become a reality, slowly but surely, because
  of the German measures. The German leadership cannot pass
  unheeded this process of unifying the individual classes
  of the Polish population into a growing power of
  resistance of the Poles. The German leadership should
  promote class distinction by certain cultural concessions
  and should be able to play one class off against the
  other.
  
  (4) The recruiting of labour and the methods employed,
  even though often exercised under the inescapable
  pressure of circumstances, have, with the aid of clever
  Bolshevist agitation, evoked a strong feeling of hatred
  among all classes. The workers thus obtained often come
  to work with a firm resolve to engage in positive
  resistance, even active sabotage. Improvement of
  recruiting methods, together with the continued effort to
  arrest the abuses still practised in the treatment of
  Polish workers in the Reich, and lastly, some provision,
  however meagre it may be for the families left behind,
  would cause a rise in morale, and the result would be an
  increased desire to work, and increased production in the
  German interest.
  
  (5) When the German administration was set up at the
  beginning of the war the Polish element was removed from
  all important positions. The available German staff had
  always been quantitatively and qualitatively
  insufficient. Besides, during the past year a
  considerable number of German personnel has had to be
  transferred to meet the replacement needs of the armed
  forces. Already an increased amount of non-German
  manpower has had to be obtained compulsorily. An
  essential change in the treatment of the Poles would
  enable the administration, while exercising all necessary
  precaution, to induce a greater number of Poles to
  collaborate. Failing this the administration, having in
  view the present amount of personnel, not to speak of
  future transfers, cannot be kept working. The increased
  participation of Poles would further help to raise the
  morale itself.
  
  Besides the positive changes set down in these proposals,
  a number of methods employed up till now in the treatment
  of Poles require to be changed or even completely
  abandoned, at least for the duration of the fighting in
  Europe.
  
  (1) I have already shown in special reports that
  confiscation and evacuation of agricultural land have
  caused great and irreparable damage to agricultural
  production. Not less great is the damage to morale caused
  by such actions. The seizure alone of a great part of the
  large Polish estates naturally has embittered those
  affected by it, a class which represents that strata of
  the population which is always anti-Bolshevik. But their
  opposition does not count nearly as much, because of
  their numerically small strength and their complete
  isolation from the mass of the people, as the attitude of
  the mass of the population consisting mainly of small
  farmers. The evacuation of Polish peasants from the
  defence zone, no doubt necessary for military-political
  reasons, has already had an unfavourable effect on the
  mentality and attitude of many farmers. At any rate, this
  evacuation was kept within certain territorial limits. It
  was carried out with careful preparation on the part of
  the governmental offices with a view to avoiding
  unnecessary hardship. The evacuation of Polish farmers
  from the Lublin district, held to be necessary by the
  Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German
  Nationality, for the purpose of settling racial Germans
  there, was much more serious. Moreover - as I already
  reported separately - the pace at which it was carried
  out, and
  
                                                  [Page 181]
  
  the methods adopted, caused immeasurable bitterness among
  the populace. At short notice families were torn apart,
  those able to work were sent to the Reich while old
  people and children were directed to empty Jewish
  ghettos. This happened in the middle of the winter of
  1942-43 and resulted in considerable loss of life,
  especially among members of the last-mentioned group. The
  dispossession meant the complete expropriation of movable
  and immovable property of the farmers. The entire
  population succumbed to the belief that these
  deportations meant the beginning of a mass deportation of
  the Poles from the region of the Government General. The
  general impression was that the Poles would meet a fate
  similar to that of the Jews. The evacuation from the
  Lublin district was a welcome opportunity for Communist
  agitation, which skilfully poisoned the minds of the
  people against the Government General, even in the
  annexed Eastern Territories, for a long time. Thus it
  came about that considerable portions of the population
  in the territories to be evacuated, and also in
  territories not affected, fled into the woods and greatly
  increased the strength of the guerrillas. The consequence
  was a tremendous deterioration of the security situation.
  These people, driven to despair, are incited by skilful
  agents to upset agricultural and industrial production
  according to a definite plan.
  
  (2) One has only to mention the crime of Katyn for it to
  become obvious that the safeguarding of personal security
  is an absolute condition for the winning over the Polish
  population in the fight against Bolshevism. The lack of
  protection against seemingly arbitrary arrests and
  executions makes good copy for Communist propaganda and
  slogans. The shooting of women, children and old men in
  public, which took place again and again without the
  knowledge and against the will of the leadership, must be
  prevented in all circumstances. Naturally this does not
  apply to the public executions of bandits and partisans.
  In cases of collective punishments, which nearly always
  hit innocent persons, and are applied against people who
  are fundamentally politically indifferent, the
  unfavourable psychological effect cannot possibly be
  overestimated. Serious punitive measures and executions
  should only be carried out after a trial based at least
  upon the elementary conceptions of justice and
  accompanied by publication of the sentence. Even if the
  court procedure is carried on in a simple, imperfect and
  improvised manner, it serves to avoid or to lessen the
  unfavourable effect of a punitive measure which the
  population considers purely arbitrary, and disarms
  Bolshevist agitation which claims that these German
  measures are only the prelude to future events. Moreover,
  collective punishment, which by its nature is directed
  primarily against the innocent, in the worst cases
  against forced or desperate persons, is not exactly
  looked upon as a sign of strength of the ruling power,
  which the population expects will strike at the
  terrorists themselves and thereby liberate the population
  from the insecurity which burdens them."

I pass now to Page 37 of the report and quote under No. 3:-

  "Besides the most important prerequisites mentioned in
  (1) and (2) to restore calm in the Government General,
  security of property among the non-agricultural people
  must also be guaranteed, in so far as it is not run
  counter to the urgent needs of war. Expropriation or
  confiscation without compensation in the industrial
  sector, in commerce and trade and of other private
  property, should not take place in any case, if the owner
  or the custodian has not committed an offence against the
  German authorities. If the taking over of industrial
  enterprises, commercial concerns, or real estate is
  necessary for reasons connected with the war, one should
  proceed in every case in such a way as to avoid hardship
  and under guarantee of appropriate compensation. Such a
  procedure would, on the one hand,

                                                  [Page 182]

  further the initiative of Polish business men and, on the
  other hand, avoid damage to the interests of German war
  economy.
  
  (4) In any attempt to influence the attitude of the
  Poles, importance must be attached to the influence of
  the Catholic Church which cannot be over-estimated. I do
  not deny that the Catholic Church has always been on the
  side of the leading fighters for an independent national
  Poland. Numerous clergymen also made their influence felt
  in this direction even after the German occupation.
  Hundreds of arrests were also carried out among them. A
  number of priests were taken to concentration camps and
  also shot. However, in order to win over the Polish
  population the Church must be given at least a legal
  status even though it might not be possible to co-
  operate. It can without doubt be won over to reinforce
  the struggle of the Polish people against Bolshevism,
  especially today under the effect of the crime of Katyn,
  for the Church would always oppose a Bolshevist regime in
  the Vistula area if only from the instinct of self
  preservation. To achieve that end, however, it is
  necessary to refrain in the future from all measures
  against its activity and its property, in so far as they
  do not run directly counter to war requirements.
  
  Much harm has been done even quite recently by the
  closing of monasteries, charitable institutions and
  church establishments" -

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