Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-10/tgmwc-10-95.02
Last-Modified: 1999/12/20

Q. What caused Germany to violate the integrity of
Luxembourg?

A. Luxembourg was in pretty much the same situation as
Belgium and Holland. It is a very small country, and
obviously in a war on the scale of this one the armies
cannot suddenly refrain from over-running one particular
country. But I would like to point out just one thing in
connection with Luxembourg. The summer before - that is
during the summer of 1939 - we had started negotiations with
France and Luxembourg with a view to making perfectly
definite pacts of neutrality to be established by treaties.
At first, the negotiations seemed to be going very well; but
they were suddenly broken off by both, France and
Luxembourg. At the time, we did not understand the reason
for this, but I know that when I reported it to the Fuehrer,
it made him a little distrustful of their motives. We never
knew the exact reason.

Q. How far was the German Foreign Office able to exert its
influence in France after the partial occupation of the
country?

A. After the occupation, or partial occupation, of France,
although we were not yet at peace with France and there was
therefore really no reason to resume diplomatic relations,
as only an armistice had been declared, the Fuehrer, at my
request, appointed an ambassador to the Vichy Government. I
was especially anxious for this to be done because it had
always been my aim to establish closer relations with
France. I would like to emphasise the fact that I resumed my
efforts in this direction immediately after the victory and
the armistice. The Fuehrer readily agreed to this and also
initiated the so-called Montoire policy at my request, by
meeting Marshal Petain at Montoire after a meeting with
General Franco. I was present at this meeting.

I believe I may say in the interests of historical accuracy
that Hitler's treatment of the ruler of the defeated French
nation is probably unexampled and must be described as
chivalrous. There cannot be many parallel cases in history.

Adolf Hitler immediately made proposals to Petain for a
closer collaboration between Germany and France, but Marshal
Petain, even at the very first meeting, adopted an attitude
of marked reserve towards the victor, so that, to my great
regret, this first meeting came to an end more quickly than
I really wanted it to. In spite of this, we continued to try
to carry out a systematic policy of conciliation and even of
close collaboration with France. Our lack of success was
probably due to the natural attitude of France and the
opposition of influential circles. Germany did not fail to
make every effort.

Q. What influence did you yourself, and also the German
Foreign Office, have on conditions in Belgium after the
occupation?

A. We had no influence whatsoever on conditions in Belgium
or in Holland. The Fuehrer set up military and civil
administrations, and the Foreign Office had no further
connection with them, beyond being represented by a liaison
officer who, in practice, had nothing, or practically
nothing, to do. I would like to add that it was rather
different in France, inasmuch as we were naturally in a
position to exercise a certain amount of influence on the
Vichy Government through our Ambassador. I did so, for
instance, in matters of finance.

We have heard a good deal about the activities of a certain
Herr Henimen. I should just like to say that, no matter how
his powers may have been defined, I appointed him for the
express purpose of preventing inflation and the collapse of
the French currency. That was the special mission entrusted
to Hemmen. Even if France was no longer willing to co-
operate politically with Germany, she was undoubtedly of
economic importance to us; and I wanted to keep her on a
sound basis and to preserve her economic system. That was
the real reason for Hemmen's appointment.

                                                  [Page 194]

Q. What plans did Hitler have with regard to his foreign
policy after the conclusion of the campaign in the West?

A. After the conclusion of the campaign in the West, I
discussed future developments with the Fuehrer at his
headquarters. I asked him what his intentions were with
regard to England, and whether we had better not make
another attempt with England. The Fuehrer seemed to have had
the same idea and was delighted with my proposal for making
a fresh peace offer or attempting to make peace with
England. I asked him whether I should draft such a treaty.
He at once replied: "No, that will not be necessary, I will
do that myself."

He said, word for word: "If England is ready for peace,
there are only four points to be settled. Above all, after
Dunkirk, I do not want England in any circumstances to
suffer a loss of prestige, so that I do not want a peace
which would involve that in any circumstances."

With regard to the contents of such a treaty, he enumerated
four points:

1. Germany was ready to recognise in all respects the
existence of the British Empire.

2. England must, therefore, acknowledge Germany to be the
greatest Continental power, if only because of the size of
her population.

3. He said, "I want England to return the German colonies -
I would be satisfied with one or two of them - because of
the raw materials."

4. He said that he wanted a permanent alliance with England.

Q. Is it correct that at the end of 1939 you heard from
Hitler that conferences had taken place between the Greek
and French General Staffs and that French officers had been
sent to Greece?

A. Yes, that is correct. It came within the scope of the
Fuehrer's policy, as entrusted to me, for preventing the war
from spreading, that I should keep a sharp watch on these
things and, of course, especially on the Balkans; Hitler
wished in all circumstances to keep the Balkans out of the
war.

Greece: The situation was as follows: Greece had accepted a
British guarantee, Also, there were close links between
Yugoslavia and England and - especially - France. Through
our intelligence and through military channels we repeatedly
heard about staff conferences between Athens, Belgrade,
London and Paris, which were supposed to be taking place.
About that time I summoned the Greek Ambassador on several
occasions and drew his attention to these things. I asked
him to be very careful, and told him that Germany had no
intention of taking any steps against the Greek people, who
had always been very much liked in Germany.

However, further intelligence reports came in, to the effect
that Britain had been given permission to establish naval
bases in Greece. All this led up to the intervention of
Italy, which was highly undesirable from our point of view.
I believe Reichsmarshal Goering has already discussed this
topic. It was impossible to prevent this intervention, for
when we arrived in Florence - I was with Hitler at the time
- for his conference with Mussolini it was too late, and
Mussolini said: "We are on the march."

The Fuehrer was very much upset and depressed when he heard
this news. We then had to do everything in our power so that
the war between Greece and Italy might at least be prevented
from spreading. Yugoslav policy was naturally the decisive
factor here. I tried in every possible way to establish
closer links with Yugoslavia and to win her over to the
Tripartite Alliance which had already been concluded. It was
difficult at first, but with the help of the Regent, Prince
Paul and the Zwetkowitsch Government, we finally succeeded
in inducing Yugoslavia to join the Tripartite Alliance. We
knew very well, however, that there was strong opposition in
Belgrade to the adhesion of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite
pact and to any kind of closer connection with Germany. In
Vienna at the time the Fuehrer said that the signing of the
Tripartite Alliance seemed like a funeral to him.

All the same, we were very much surprised when - I think it
was two or three

                                                  [Page 195]

days after the conclusion of this pact - the government was
overthrown by General Simovic's putsch and a new government
was set up which certainly could not be described as
friendly to Germany.

Reports came from Belgrade concerning close collaboration
with the British General Staff. I believe American observers
in this field are informed on the point, and during the last
few months I have heard from English sources that British
elements had played a part in this putsch. That was quite
natural, for we were at war.

All these events caused the Fuehrer to intervene in the
Balkans, first of all, to help Italy, whom the courageous
resistance of the Greeks had forced into a very difficult
position in Albania; and, secondly, to prevent a possible
attack from the North on the part of Yugoslavia, which might
have made the Italian situation still more serious or even
brought about a crushing defeat for our Italian partner.

Those were the military and strategic factors which induced
the Fuehrer to intervene and to conduct the campaign against
Greece and Yugoslavia.

Q. If I understood you correctly, Greece put bases on her
territory at the disposal of the British navy before the
Italian attack in October, 1940, in spite of the fact that
she had declared her neutrality. Is that correct?

A. That was the substance of the military reports which I
received.

Q. In September 1939, General Gamelin, then French Commander-
in-Chief, approved the project for an allied landing at
Salonika. When did Germany receive knowledge of this
intention?
A. We first learned the exact details from the files of the
French General Staff on the outbreak of war. But I know that
from the very beginning all the reports which the Fuehrer
received from the various intelligence branches of the Reich
caused him to fear the possibility that a new front might be
built up at any moment in Salonika, as had happened in the
first World War, and that would mean a considerable
dispersal of the German forces.

Q. In September of 1938 you made a second trip to Moscow.
What was the reason for this visit and what was discussed
there?

A. My second visit to Moscow was made necessary by the
ending of the Polish campaign. I flew to Moscow toward the
end of September, and this time I received an especially
cordial reception. We had to reach a definite agreement
about Poland. Soviet troops had occupied the Eastern regions
of the country, and we had occupied the Western parts up to
the line of demarcation previously agreed upon. Now we had
to fix a definite line of demarcation. We were also anxious
to strengthen our ties with the Soviet Union and to
establish cordial relations with them.

An agreement was reached in Moscow finally fixing the line
of demarcation in Poland, and an economic treaty, putting
economic relations on an entirely new basis, was envisaged.

A comprehensive treaty regulating the exchange of raw
materials was envisaged and later concluded. At the same
time this pact was amplified into a treaty of friendship, as
is well known.

The question of Lithuania remained. For the sake of
establishing particularly confidential relations between
Moscow and Berlin, the Fuehrer refrained from claiming
influence over Lithuania, and gave Russia predominance in
that country by the second treaty, so that there was now a
clear understanding between Germany and Soviet Russia with
respect to territorial claims as well.

Q. Is it correct that on 15th June, 1940, after the delivery
of an ultimatum, the Russians occupied the whole of
Lithuania, including the part which was still German,
without any intimation being received by Germany?

A. We had no special agreement concerning this, but it is
well known that these areas were actually occupied.

Q. What further Russian measures caused Hitler anxiety as to
Russia's attitude and intentions?

                                                  [Page 196]

A. Various things made the Fuehrer a little sceptical about
the Russian attitude. One was the occupation of the Baltic
States, which I have just mentioned. Another was the
occupation of Bessarabia and North Bukovina after the French
campaign, of which we were simply informed without any
notification beforehand. The King of Roumania asked us for
advice at that time. The Fuehrer, out of loyalty to the
Soviet pact, told him to accept the Russian demands and to
evacuate Bessarabia. In addition, the war with Finland in
1940 caused a certain uneasiness among the German people,
who had strong sympathies for the Finns. The Fuehrer felt
himself bound to take this into account to some extent.
There were two other points to consider. One was that the
Fuehrer received a report on communist propaganda in German
factories which alleged that the Russian trade delegation
was the centre of this propaganda. We also heard of military
preparations being made by Russia. I know that, after the
French campaign, he spoke to me about this matter on several
occasions, and said that approximately twenty Russian
divisions had been concentrated near the East Prussian
border; and that very large forces - I happen to remember
the number, about thirty army corps - were to be
concentrated in Bessarabia. The Fuehrer was perturbed by
these reports, and asked me to watch the situation closely.
He even said that in all probability the 1939 pact had been
concluded for the sole purpose of being able to dictate
economic and political measures to us. In any case, he now
proposed to take counter-measures. I pointed out the danger
of preventive wars, but the Fuehrer said that German-Italian
interests must come first in all circumstances, if
necessary. I said I hoped that matters would not go so far
and that at all events we should make every effort through
diplomatic channels to avoid it.

Q. In November - from 12th to 14th November, 1940, to be
exact - the Russian foreign commissar Molotov visited
Berlin. On whose initiative did this visit take place and
what was the subject under discussion?

A. The conferences with Molotov at Berlin concerned the
following subjects I might interpolate that when we were
trying to effect a settlement with Russia through diplomatic
channels, I wrote to Marshal Stalin, with the Fuehrer's
permission, in the late autumn of 1940 and invited M.
Molotov to visit Berlin. This invitation was accepted, and
Russo-German relations were discussed in their entirety
during a conversation between the Fuehrer and M. Molotov. I
was present at this discussion.

M. Molotov first discussed with the Fuehrer Russo-German
relations in general, and then went on to mention Finland
and the Balkans. He said that Russia had vital interests in
Finland. He said that when the delimitation of zones of
influence had been settled, it had been agreed that Finland
should be included in the Russian sphere of influence. The
Fuehrer replied that Germany also had extensive interests in
Finland, especially with regard to nickel, and, furthermore,
it should not be forgotten that the entire German people
sympathised with the Finns. He would therefore ask M.
Molotov to compromise on this question. This topic was
brought up on several occasions.

With regard to the Balkans, M. Molotov said that he wanted a
non-aggression pact with Bulgaria, and closer ties generally
with Bulgaria. He also thought of establishing bases there.
The Fuehrer replied - or, rather asked - whether Bulgaria
had approached Molotov in the matter, but that apparently
was not the case. The Fuehrer then said that he could not
express any opinion on this question until he had discussed
it with Mussolini, who was his ally and who was naturally
interested in the Balkans, too.

Various other points were also discussed, but no final
settlement was reached at this discussion. The discussion
proceeded on lines which seemed to me not those best
calculated to lead to a solution likely to satisfy both
sides. As soon as the meeting was over, I requested the
Fuehrer to authorise me to start fresh discussions with
Molotov and asked him if he would consent to my discussing
with him the possibility of Russia joining the Tripartite
Alliance. That was one

                                                  [Page 197]

of our aims at the time. The Fuehrer agreed to this, and I
had another long discussion with the Russian Foreign
Minister on the same questions. M. Molotov alluded to vital
importance of Finland to Russia; he also referred to
Russia's interest in Bulgaria, her kinship with the
Bulgarian people and her interest in other Balkan countries.
It was finally agreed that on his return to Moscow he should
speak to Stalin and try to arrive at some solution of the
question. I suggested that they might join the Tripartite
pact, and further proposed that I should discuss with the
Fuehrer the various points which had been raised. Perhaps we
could still find a way out. The general result of this
conversation was that Molotov went back to Moscow with the
intention of clearing up, through diplomatic channels, the
differences still existing between us.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, surely, as these negotiations did
not eventuate in any agreement, they are very remote from
anything we are considering. You are not suggesting that any
agreements were come to, are you?

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