Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-02/tgmwc-02-16.08
Last-Modified: 1999/09/17

For some months prior to the issuance of Basic Order No. 24,
regarding collaboration with Japan, this conspirator had been
preparing "Fall Barbarossa", the plan for the attack on the
U.S.S.R. Basic Order No. 24 decreed, however, that the Japanese
"must not be given any intimation of the 'Barbarossa' operation."

In his conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, on
29th March, 1941, almost three weeks after the issuance of Basic
Order No. 24, Ribbentrop nevertheless hinted at things to come.
The report of this conference, contained in 1877-PS, has already
been introduced as Exhibit

                                                        [Page 273]

USA 152 and read into the record. I wish to invite the Tribunal's
attention again to the first two paragraphs of the English
translation of 1877-PS, where Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that the
largest part of the German Army was on the Eastern frontiers of
the Reich, fully prepared to open the attack at any time.
Ribbentrop then added that, although he believed that the U.S.S.R.
would try to avoid developments leading to war, nevertheless a
conflict with the Soviet Union, even if not probable, would have
to be considered possible.

What conclusion the Japanese Ambassador drew from these remarks in
April, 1941, can only be conjectured. Once the Nazis had unleashed
their aggression against the U.S.S.R., in June, 1941, the tenor of
Ribbentrop's remarks left no room for doubt. On 10th July, 1941,
he dispatched a coded telegram to Ott, the German Ambassador in
Tokyo. The telegram is our Document 2896-PS, which I now introduce
as Exhibit USA 155. I quote from Paragraph 4 of that telegram,
which is the first paragraph of the English translation:-

   "Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese Ambassador
   in Moscow for conveying the cable report. It would be
   convenient if we could keep on receiving news from Russia,
   this way. In summing up, I would like to say: I have now, as
   in the past, full confidence in the Japanese policy, and in
   the Japanese Foreign Minister; principally because the present
   Japanese Government would really act inexcusably toward the
   future of its nation if it did not take this unique
   opportunity to solve the Russian problem, as well as to secure
   for all time its expansion to the South and settle the Chinese
   matter. Since Russia, as reported by the Japanese Ambassador
   in Moscow, is, in effect, close to collapse, a report which
   coincides with our own observations as far as we are able to
   judge at the present war situation, it is simply impossible
   that Japan should not solve the matter of Vladivostok and the
   Siberian area as soon as her military preparations are
   completed."

Skipping now to the middle of the second paragraph on Page 1 of
the English translation, the sentence beginning "However".

   "However, I ask you to employ all available means in further
   insisting upon Japan's entry into the war against Russia at
   the soonest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my
   note to Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the
   better. The natural objective still remains that we and Japan
   join hands on the Trans-Siberian railroad, before winter
   starts. After the collapse of Russia, however, the position of
   the Three-Power-Pact States in the world will be so gigantic
   that the question of England's collapse or the total
   destruction of the English islands, respectively, will only be
   a matter of time. An America totally isolated from the rest of
   the world would then be faced with our taking possession of
   the remaining positions of the British Empire which are
   important for the Three-Power-Pact countries. I have the
   unshakeable conviction that a carrying through of the new
   order as desired by us will be a matter of course, and that
   there will be no insurmountable difficulties if the countries
   of the Three-Power Pact stand close together and counter every
   action of the Americans with the same weapons. I ask you to
   report in the near future, as often as possible and in detail,
   on the political situation there."

                                                        [Page 274]

We have Ott's reply to this telegram, dated 13th July, 1941. This
is our Document 2897-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA
156. After reading the heading, I shall skip to the last paragraph
on Page 3 of the German text, which is the paragraph appearing in
the English translation.

   "Telegram; Secret Cipher System. Sent 14th July from Tokyo;
   arrived 14th July, 1941. Immediate.
   
   I am trying with all means to work toward Japan's entry into
   the war against Russia, as soon as possible, especially using
   arguments of personal message of Foreign Minister and telegram
   cited above, to convince Matsuoka personally, as well as the
   Foreign Office, military elements, nationalists and friendly
   business men. I believe that, according to military
   preparations, Japanese participation will soon take place. The
   greatest obstacle which I have to fight against is the
   disunity among the activist group which, without unified
   command, follows various aims and only slowly adjusts itself
   to the changed situation."

On subsequent occasions Ribbentrop repeated his exhortations to
induce the Japanese to aggression against the U.S.S.R. I shall
present three documents covering July, 1942, and March and April,
1943. The first is our Document 2911-PS, which contains notes of a
discussion between Ribbentrop and Oshima, Japanese Ambassador to
Berlin, on 9th July, 1942.

As a matter of background, I note that at this time German armies
were sweeping forward in the U.S.S.R., and the fall of Sebastopol
had just been announced.

I now offer our Document 2911-PS as Exhibit USA 157, and I quote
the relevant extracts appearing in the English translation
thereof:-

   "He, the German Minister, had asked to see the Ambassador at
   this time when the situation was as described, because now a
   question of fateful importance had arisen concerning the joint
   conduct of the war. If Japan felt itself sufficiently strong
   militarily, the moment for Japan to attack Russia was probably
   now. He thought it possible that if Japan attacked Russia at
   this time, it would lead to her - Russia's - final moral
   collapse; at least, it would hasten the collapse of her
   present system. In any case, never again would Japan have such
   an opportunity as then existed to eliminate once and for all
   the Russian colossus in Eastern Asia.
   
   He had discussed this question with the Fuehrer, who was of
   the same opinion; but he wanted to emphasise one point right
   away: Japan should attack Russia only if she felt sufficiently
   strong for such an undertaking. Under no circumstances should
   Japanese operations against Russia be allowed to bog down at
   the half-way mark. We do not want to urge Japan into an action
   that is not mutually profitable."

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now, for ten minutes.

(A recess was taken.)

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I now offer in evidence
our Document 2954-PS, as Exhibit USA 158. This is a record of a
conference between Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima on 6th March,
1943.

I note again for background, that the strategic military situation
in the broad expanses of the U.S.S.R. had changed somewhat.

                                                        [Page 275]

In the previous month, February, 1943, the Soviet armies had
completely defeated the German forces at Stalingrad and inflicted
very severe losses. Further North and West their winter offensive
had removed large areas from the hands of the invader. Combined
United States and British forces had already landed in North
Africa.

You will remark as I read that the tone of Ribbentrop's argument
at this time reflects the changed military situation. The familiar
Japanese refrain of "So sorry, please", likewise appears to have
crept in.

I note in this record that the month of February, 1943, had also
seen the end of organised Japanese resistance on the Island of
Guadalcanal.

I now quote the relevant extracts from the minutes of the
discussion between Ribbentrop and Oshima on 6th March, 1943, which
appear in the English translation in the document book.

   "Ambassador Oshima declared that he had received a telegram
   from Tokyo, and he was to report by order of his Government to
   the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs the following: The
   suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was the
   subject of a common conference between the Japanese Government
   and the Imperial headquarters, during which the question was
   discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The result was
   the following: The Japanese Government absolutely recognised
   the danger which threatened from Russia, and completely
   understood the desire of its German ally, that Japan on her
   part should also enter the war against Russia. However, it was
   not possible for the Japanese Government, considering the
   present war situation, to do so. It was rather of the
   conviction that it would be in the common interest, not to
   start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the
   Japanese Government would never disregard the Russian
   question.
   
   The Japanese Government had the intention of becoming
   aggressive again in the future on other fronts.
   
   The R.A.M. brought up the question, after the explanation by
   the Ambassador, how the continued waging of the war was
   envisaged in Tokyo. At present, Germany was waging the war
   against the common enemies, England and America, mostly alone,
   while Japan was mostly behaving more defensively. However, it
   would be more correct that all powers allied in the Three-
   Power Pact should combine their forces to defeat not only
   England and America, but also Russia. It was not good when one
   part had to fight alone. One could not overstrain the German
   national strength. He was inwardly concerned about certain
   forces at work in Tokyo, who were of the opinion and
   propagated it that, doubtless, Germany would emerge from the
   battle victoriously, but that Japan should proceed to
   consolidate her forces, before she further exerted herself to
   the fullest extent."

I now omit several pages in the German text and resume the
quotation:

   "Then the R.A.M. again brought up the question of the attack
   on Russia by Japan, and he declared that after all, the fight
   on the Burma front as well as in the South was actually more
   of a maritime problem; and on all fronts except those in China
   very few ground forces were stationed. Therefore, the attack
   on Russia was primarily an Army affair, and he asked himself
   if the necessary forces for that would be available."

                                                        [Page 276]

Ribbentrop kept on trying. He held another conference with Oshima,
about three weeks later, on 18th April, 1943. The top secret notes
of this conference are contained in our Document 2929-PS, which I
now offer as Exhibit USA 159. I shall quote only one sentence:

   "The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again
   that, without any doubt, this year presented the most
   favourable opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough
   and had sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal, to
   attack Russia, who certainly would never again be as weak as
   she was at the moment."

I now wish to come to that aspect of this conspiracy which is in a
large measure responsible for the appearance of millions of
Americans in uniform all over the world.

The Nazi preparations and collaboration with the Japanese against
the United States, as noted by the United States Chief of Counsel
in his opening statement, present a two-fold aspect; one of
preparations by the Nazis themselves for an attack from across the
Atlantic, and the other of fomenting war in the Pacific.

In the course of my presentation of the Nazi exhortations to the
Japanese to war against the British Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R.,
I have referred to some documents and quoted some sentences
relating to the United States. I shall take those documents up
again in their relevant passages to show their particular
application. I have also, in the treatment of Ribbentrop's urging
the Japanese to war against the U.S.S.R., gone beyond the dates of
7th December and 11th December, 1941, when the Japanese and German
Governments respectively initiated and declared aggressive war
against the United States.

Apart from the advantage and convenience of presentation, these
documents have indicated the Nazi awareness and acceptance of the
direction in which their actions were leading, as well as the
universal aspects of their conspiracy and of their alliance with
the Japanese. Their intentions against the United States must be
viewed in the focus of both their overall plan and their immediate
commitments elsewhere. That their overall plan involved ultimate
aggressive war against the United States was intimated by the
defendant Goering in a speech on 8th July, 1938, when these
conspirators had already forcibly annexed Austria and were
perfecting their plans against Czechoslovakia.

This speech was delivered to representatives of the aircraft
industry, and the copy that we have was transmitted as the
enclosure to a secret memorandum from Goering's adjutant to
General Udet, who was then in charge of experimental research for
the Luftwaffe. It is contained in our Document R-140, which I now
offer as Exhibit USA 160.

I invite the Tribunal's attention to the statement in the covering
memorandum, that the enclosure is a copy of the shorthand minutes
of the conference. I shall not go through the long speech in which
Goering called for increased aircraft production and pointed to
the necessity for full mobilisation of German industrial capacity.
I wish to quote just two sentences, which appear on Page 33 of the
German text and Page 11 of the English translation. Quoting from
the second full paragraph on Page 11 of the English translation,
starting with the third sentence from the end of the paragraph:-

                                                        [Page 277]

   "I still lack these rocket-motors, which could make such
   flights possible, perfect bombers, capable of round trip
   flights to New York with a 10-ton bomb load. I would be
   extremely happy to possess such a bomber, which would at last
   stuff the mouth of arrogance across the sea."

Goering's fervent hope, of course, was not capable of realisation
at that time, either technically or in the face of the Nazi
conspirators' schedule of aggression that has been outlined here
in the past several days.

During the period of their preparation for and the waging of
aggressive war in Europe, up to the launching of the campaign
against the U.S.S.R., it is only reasonable to believe that these
conspirators were not disposed to involve the United States in war
at that time. Nevertheless, even in the fall of 1940, the
prosecution of war against the United States of America at a later
date was on the military agenda. This is clearly shown in a
document which we have found in the files of the O.K.L., the
German Air Force files. It is Document 376-PS, which I now offer
as Exhibit USA 161. This document is a memorandum marked
"Chefsache", the German designation for top secret, from a Major
von Falkenstein to an unspecified general, presumably a Luftwaffe
General.

Falkenstein, who was a major of the General Staff, was at that
time the Luftwaffe liaison officer with the Operations Staff of
the O.K.W., which was the staff headed by the defendant Jodl. His
memorandum, which he characterises as a "brief resume on the
military questions current here", is dated 29th October, 1940. It
covers several questions. I shall quote to you numbered Paragraph
5, which appears at the bottom of the first page of the English
translation and carries over to the reverse side of the one-sheet
document.

   "(5) The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of
   the occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the
   prosecution of a war against America at a later date.
   Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here.
   Essential conditions are at present:
   
   (a)No other operational commitment.
   (b) Portuguese neutrality.
   (c) Support of France and Spain.
   
   A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding
   air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the
   G.A.F." - or the German Air Force.

The Nazi's military interest in the United States is further
indicated by Paragraph 7, which I read:

   "General von Botticher has made repeated reference, especially
   in his telegram 234, dated 26th October, to the fact that in
   his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American
   aircraft industry are being published in the German Press. The
   matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I
   pointed out that the matter was specifically a G.A.F. one, but
   have taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its
   own merits."

Again, in July, 1941, in his first flush of confidence resulting
from early gains in the aggression against the U.S.S.R., the
Fuehrer signed an order for further preliminary preparations for
the attack on the United States.

                                                        [Page 278]

This Top Secret order, found in the files of the German Navy, is
our Document C-74, which I now offer as Exhibit USA 162. I read
from the first paragraph of that text, just preceding Paragraph 1:-

   "By virtue of the intentions announced in Directive No. 32,
   for the further conduct of the war, I lay down the following
   principles to govern the strength of personnel and of material
   supplies:
   
   (1) In General:
   
   The military domination of Europe, after the defeat of Russia,
   will enable the strength of the Army to be considerably
   reduced in the near future. As far as the reduced strength of
   the Army will allow, the armoured units will be greatly
   increased.
   
   Naval armament must be restricted to those measures which have
   a direct connection with the conduct of the war against
   England and, should the case arise, against America.
   
   The main effort in armament will be shifted to the Air Force,
   which must be greatly increased in strength."

From these documents, it appears that the Nazi conspirators were
making at least preliminary plans of their own against the United
States. The Nazis overall plan with regard to the United States
was, however, a complex one, involving, in addition, collaboration
with the Japanese. In the course of their repeated representations
to the Japanese, to undertake an assault against British
possessions in the Pacific Far East, they again considered war
against the United States.

I now refer again to Basic Order No. 24, regarding collaboration
with Japan. This is Document C-75, which I have put in as Exhibit
USA 151. 1 have read it in its entirety into the record. The
Tribunal will recall that in that basic order, which was issued on
5th March, 1941, the Nazi policy was stated in Subparagraph (3)
(a) as "forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping
the United States out of the war."

Nevertheless, the Nazi conspirators clearly contemplated within
the framework of that policy, the possibility of the United
States' entry into the Far Eastern conflict which the Nazis were
then instigating. This could result from an attack by Japan on
possessions of the United States, practically simultaneously with
the assault on the British Empire, as actually happened. Other
possibilities of involvement of the United States were also
discussed. This Basic Order No. 24 stated - and I am referring to
Subparagraph (3) W, on the top of Page 2 of the Document C-75:-

   "(c) The raw material situation of the Pact Powers demands
   that Japan should acquire possession of those territories
   which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if
   the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried
   out, even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they
   are of vital importance to Germany."

The Order continues in an unnumbered paragraph, immediately below
Subparagraph (3)(d):-

   "In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British
   Naval power - extending to those of American naval power only
   if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be
   prevented - will result in weakening the enemy's system of
   power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea
   communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds
   (Australia)."

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