Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-02/tgmwc-02-16.05
Last-Modified: 1999/09/17

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In announcing this act of perfidy to the world, Hitler issued a
proclamation on the day of the attack. The text of this statement
has already been brought to the Tribunal's attention by my British
colleagues, and I should like merely to refer to it in passing
here by quoting therefrom this one sentence.

     "I have therefore today decided to give the fate of Europe again
     into the hands of our soldiers."

This announcement told the world that the die had been cast-the
plans darkly conceived almost a full year before, and secretly and
continuously developed since then, had now been brought to
fruition. These conspirators, having carefully and completely
prepared this war of aggression, now proceeded to initiate and
wage it.

That brings us to the consideration of the motives for the attack.
Before going into the positive reasons, I should like first to
point out that not only was Germany bound by a solemn covenant not
to attack the U.S.S.R., but that throughout the entire period from
August, 1939, to the invasion in 1941, the Soviet Union was
faithful to its agreements with Germany and displayed no
aggressive intentions toward territories of the German Reich.
General Thomas, for example, points out in his draft of "Basic
Facts for a History of the German War and Armaments Economy,"
which is our Document 23S3-PS and which I put in evidence earlier
as Exhibit USA 3S, that in so far as the German-Soviet trade
agreement of 11th August, 1939, was concerned, the Soviets carried
out their deliveries thereunder up to the very end.

Thomas points out that deliveries by the Soviets were usually made
quickly and well, and since the food and raw materials being thus
delivered were considered essential to the German economy, efforts
were made to keep up their side too. However, as preparations for
the campaign proceeded, the Nazis cared less about complying with
their obligations under that agreement. At Page 315 of his book,
Thomas says, and I read from Page 9 of the English translation:

   "Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries diminished, as
   preparations for the campaign in the East were already under
   way." - By that, clearly he speaks of German deliveries to
   Russia, not as to what the Russians delivered.
   
   "The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned, right up
   to the start of the attack; even during the last few days,
   transports of india-rubber from the Far East were completed by
   Express transit trains."

Again at Page 404, this author brings this point out even more
forcefully when he states, and I shall read the first paragraph on
Page 14 of the English translation:

"In addition to the Italian negotiations, until June, 1941, the
negotiations with Russia were accorded a great deal of attention.
The Fuehrer issued the directive that, in order to camouflage-"

THE PRESIDENT: Are you reading now from a document?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Where is that?

MR. ALDERMAN : It is Page 14 of the English translation of these
notes.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

   "The Fuehrer issued the directive that, in order to camouflage
   German troop movements, the orders Russia has placed in Germany
   must be

                                                        [Page 257]

   filled as promptly as possible. Since the Russians only made
   grain deliveries when the Germans delivered orders placed by
   the Russians, and since, in the case of the individual firms,
   these deliveries to Russia made it impossible for them to fill
   orders for the German Armed Forces, it was necessary for the Wi
   Rue office to enter into numerous individual negotiations with
   German firms in order to co-ordinate Russian orders with those
   of the Germans from the standpoint of priority. In accordance
   with the wishes of the Foreign Office, German industry was
   instructed to accept all Russian orders, even if it were
   impossible to fill them within the limits of the time set for
   manufacture and delivery. Since in May especially large
   deliveries had to be made to the Navy, the firms were
   instructed to allow the equipment to go through the Russian
   Acceptance Commission, then, however, to make such a detour
   during its transportation as to make it impossible for it to be
   delivered over the frontier prior to the beginning of the
   German attack."

Not only was the Soviet Union faithful to the treaty obligations
with Germany, but the evidence shows that she had no aggressive
intentions toward any German territory. Our Document C-170, which
is in evidence as Exhibit USA 136, is, as I have previously
stated, a file on Russo-German relations found in the files of the
Naval High Command covering the entire period from the treaty to
the attack. The entries in this file demonstrate conclusively the
point I have just stated. It will, I think, be sufficient to read
to the Tribunal a few entries which include reports from the
German Ambassador in Moscow as late as June, 1941. 1 shall read
the first entry "165" on Page 21 of the English translation. That
is 4th June.

   "Outwardly, no change in the relationship Germany-Russia;
   Russian deliveries continue to full satisfaction. Russian
   government is endeavouring to do everything to prevent a
   conflict with Germany."

In entry 167, on Page 22 of the English translation, it says:

   "6th June. Ambassador in Moscow reports: Russia will only fight
   if attacked by Germany. Situation is considered in Moscow much
   more serious than before. All military preparations have been
   made quietly - as far as can be recognised, only defensive.
   Russian policy still strives as before to maintain the best
   possible relationship to Germany."

The next one is entry 169, also on Page 22, the date, 7th June.

   "From the report of the Ambassador in Moscow: All observations
   show that Stalin and Molotov, who alone are responsible for
   Russian foreign policy, are doing everything to avoid a
   conflict with Germany. The entire behaviour of the Government,
   as well as the attitude of the Press, which reports all events
   concerning Germany in a factual, indisputable manner, supports
   this view. The loyal fulfilment of the economic treaty with
   Germany proves the same thing". - Now, that is the German
   Ambassador talking to you.

The reasons, therefore, which led to the attack on the Soviet
Union could not have been self-defence or treaty breaches. In
truth, no doubt, as has been necessarily implied from the
materials presented on planning and preparation, more than one
motive entered into the decision of the Nazi conspirators to
launch their aggression against the U.S.S.R. All of them, however,
appear to blend into one grand motive of Nazi policy. The pattern
into which these various reasons impelling the decision to attack
may be said to fall, is the traditional Nazi ambition for
expansion to the East at the

                                                        [Page 258]

expense of the U.S.S.R. This Nazi version of an earlier Imperial
imperative the "Drang nach Osten" or the drive to the East, had
been a cardinal principle of the Nazi Party almost since its
birth, and rested on the twin bases of political strategy and
economic aggrandisement. Politically such action meant the
elimination of the powerful country to the East, which might
constitute a threat to German ambitions and acquisition of
"Lebensraum", while on the economic side, it offered magnificent
opportunities for the plunder of vast quantities of food, raw
materials and other supplies, going far beyond any legitimate
exploitation under the Geneva Convention principles for military
purpose. Undoubtedly the demands of the German War economy for
food and raw material served to revive the attractiveness of the
economic side of this theory, while the difficulties Germany was
experiencing in defeating England reaffirmed for the Nazi
conspirators the temporarily forgotten Nazi political imperative
of eliminating, as a political factor, their one formidable
opponent on the continent.

As early as 1923, Hitler outlined this theory in some detail in
Mein Kampf, where he stated - and I quote from Page 641 of the
Houghton Mifflin English edition - as follows:-

   "There are two reasons which induce me to submit to a special
   examination the relation of Germany to Russia:
   
   1.Here perhaps we are dealing with the most decisive concern of
   all German foreign affairs; and
   
   2.This question is also the touchstone for the political
   capacity of the young National Socialist movement to think
   clearly and to act correctly."

And again at Page 654 of the same edition:-

   "And so we National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath
   the foreign policy tendency of our pre-war period. We take up
   where we broke off 600 years ago. We stop the endless German
   movement to the South and West, and turn our gaze toward the
   land in the East. At long last we break off the colonial and
   commercial policy of the pre-war period and shift to the soil
   policy of the future.
   
   If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in
   mind only Russia and her vassal border States."

The political portion of this economy or purpose is clearly
reflected in the stated purposes of the organisation which the
defendant Rosenberg set up to administer the occupied Eastern
territories. I have already discussed this material and need not
repeat it now. In a speech, however, which he delivered, two days
before the attack, to the people most interested in the problem of
the East, Rosenberg re-stated, in his usual somewhat mystic
fashion, the political basis for the campaign and its inter-
relationship with the economic goal. I should like to read a short
extract from that speech, which is Document 1058-PS, and which I
now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA 147. The part I read is from
Page 9 of the German text:-

   "The job of feeding the German people stands, this year,
   without a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany's claims on
   the East; and here the Southern territories and the Northern
   Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the
   German people. We see absolutely no reason for any obligation
   on our part to feed also the Russian people with the products
   of that surplus territory. We know of course that this is a
   harsh necessity, bare of any feelings. A very extensive
   evacuation

                                                        [Page 259]

   will be necessary, without any doubt, and it is sure that the
   future will hold very hard years in store for the Russians. A
   later decision will have to determine to what extent industries
   can still be maintained there (wagon factories, etc.). The
   consideration and execution of this policy in the Russian area
   proper, is for the German Reich and its future, a tremendous
   and by no means negative task, as might appear, if one takes
   only the harsh necessity of the evacuation into consideration.
   The conversion of Russian dynamics towards the East is a task
   which requires the strongest characters. Perhaps this decision
   will also be approved by a coming Russia later, not in 30 but
   maybe in a 100 years."

As I have indicated, the failure of the Nazi conspirators to
defeat Great Britain had served to further strengthen them in
their belief in the political necessity of eliminating the Soviet
Union as a European factor, before Germany could completely
achieve her role as the master of Europe.

The economic motive for the aggression was brought out clearly in
our discussion of the organisation set up under Goering and
General Thomas, to carry out the economic exploitation of the
territories they occupied. The purely materialistic basis for the
attack was unmistakable, and if any doubt existed that at least
one of the main purposes of the invasion was to steal the food and
raw material needed for the Nazi war machine regardless of the
horrible consequences such robbery would entail, that doubt is
dispelled by Document 2718-PS which I introduced earlier during my
opening
statement as Exhibit USA 32, showing clear and conscious
recognition that these Nazi plans would no doubt result in
starving to death millions of people by robbing them of
their food.

Along the similar line, on 20th June, 1941, General Thomas wrote a
memorandum in which he stated that General Keitel had confirmed to
him Hitler's present conception of the German economic policy
concerning raw material. This policy expressed the almost
unbelievably heartless theory that less manpower would be used in
the conquest of sources of raw materials than would be necessary
to produce synthetics in lieu of such raw materials. This is our
Document 1456-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA 1481
should like to read the first two paragraphs.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we better do that after the adjournment.

(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)

THE PRESIDENT: I understand that the defendant Kaltenbrunner is
now in Court. Will you stand up, please. (Whereupon the defendant
Kaltenbrunner stands up in the defendants' box.)

THE PRESIDENT: In accordance with Article 24 of the Charter, you
must now plead either guilty or not guilty.

THE DEFENDANT KALTENBRUNNER: I do not believe that I have made
myself guilty.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please this Tribunal. I have just put into
evidence Document 1456-PS as Exhibit USA 148. I now read from this
document on Page 1:-

   "The following is a new conception of the Fuehrer, which
   Minister Todt has explained to me and which has been confirmed
   later on by Field Marshal Keitel: Paragraph 1. The course of
   the war shows that we went too far in our autarkical
   endeavours. It is impossible to try and manufacture everything
   we lack by synthetic procedures, or
   
                                                        [Page 260]
   
   other measures. For instance, it is impossible to develop our
   motor fuel economy to a point where we can entirely depend on
   it. All these autarkical attempts ask for a tremendous amount
   of manpower, and it is simply impossible to provide it. One has
   to choose. another way. What one does not have, but needs, one
   must conquer. The commitment of men which is necessary one
   single time, will not be as great as the one that is currently
   needed for the running of the synthetic, factories in question.
   The aim must also be to secure all territories which are of
   special interest to us for the war economy, by conquering them.
   At the time the Four Year Plan was established, I issued a
   statement where I made it clear that a completely autarkical
   economy is impossible for us, because the need of men will be
   too great. Nevertheless, my solution was always to provide the
   necessary reserves for depleted stocks, and secure their
   delivery in war-time through economic alliances."

On this macabre note I come to the end of the story of this
aggression. We have seen the Nazi conspirators as they planned,
prepared, and finally initiated their wanton attack upon the
Soviet Union. Others will carry on the tale and describe the
horrible manner in which they waged this war of aggression, and
the countless crimes they committed in its wake. When I consider
the solemn pledge of non-aggression, the base and sinister motives
involved, the months of secret planning and preparation, and the
unbelievable suffering intentionally and deliberately wrought -
when I consider all of this, I feel fully justified in saying that
never before - and, God helping us, never again - in the history
of relations between sovereign nations, has a blacker chapter been
written than the one which tells of the Nazi conspirators'
unprovoked invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union. For
those responsible - and they are here before you, the defendants
in this case - it might be just to let the punishment fit the
crime.

I now turn to the final phase of the detailed presentation of the
aggressive war case, German collaboration with Italy and Japan,
and aggressive war against the United States. The relevant
portions of the Indictment are set forth in Subsection 7 under
Section IV (F) of Count 1, appearing at Pages 9 and 10 of the
printed English text of the Indictment. The materials relating to
this unholy alliance of the three Fascist powers, and to the
aggressive war against the United States, have been gathered
together in a document book, marked with the letter "Q", which I
now submit to the Tribunal.

Before moving to the subject matter of this tripartite
collaboration, I should like to invite the attention of the
Tribunal to the significance of this phase. In the course of the
joint presentation by the British and American prosecution in the
past several days, we have seen the swastika carried forward by
force of arms from a tightly controlled and remilitarised Germany
to the four corners of Europe. The elements of a conspiracy which
I am now about. to discuss, project the Nazi plan upon a universal
screen, involving the "Older World" of Asia, and the "New World"
of the United States of America. As a result, the wars of
aggression that were planned in Berlin, and launched across the
frontiers of Poland, ended some six years later, almost to the
day, in surrender observed upon a United States battleship, riding
at anchor in the Bay of Tokyo.

                                                        [Page 261]
The first formal alliance between Hitler's Germany and the
Japanese Government was the Anti-Comintern Pact signed in Berlin
on 25th November, 1936. This agreement, on its face, was directed
against the activities of the Communist International. It was
subsequently adhered to by Italy on 6th November, 1937.

I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these official State
documents, in accordance with Article 21 of the Charter. The
German text of these treaties - the original German-Japanese Anti-
Comintern Pact, and the subsequent Protocol of Adherence by Italy
- are to be found in Volumes 4 and 5 of the "Dokumente der
Deutschen Politik ", respectively. The English translation of the
German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of 25th November, 1936, is
contained in our Document 2508-PS; the English translation of the
Protocol of Adherence by Italy of 6th November, 1937, is contained
in our Document 2506-PS. Both of these documents are included in
the document books which have just been handed up to the Tribunal.

It is an interesting fact, especially in light of the evidence I
shall submit regarding the defendant Ribbentrop's active
participation in collaboration with the Japanese, that it was he
who signed the Anti-Comintern Pact for Germany, at Berlin, even
though at that time, November, 1936, he was not the German Foreign
Minister, but simply Hitler's Special Ambassador Plenipotentiary.

On 27th September, 1940, some four years after the Anti-Comintern
Pact was signed, and one year after the initiation of war in
Europe, the German, Italian and Japanese Governments signed
another pact at Berlin, a ten-year military-economic alliance.
Again I note that the defendant Ribbentrop signed for Germany,
this time in his capacity as Foreign. Minister. The official
German text of this pact, as well as the Japanese and Italian
texts, together with an English translation, is contained in our
Document 2643-PS, which has been certified by the signature and
seal of the United States Secretary of State. I now offer in
evidence Document 2643-PS as Exhibit USA 149.

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