Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-02/tgmwc-02-16.02
Last-Modified: 1999/09/17

As was hinted in the original "Barbarossa" Order, Directive No.
21, which I discussed earlier, the plan originally contemplated
that the attack would take place about the 15th May, 1941. In the
meantime, however, the Nazi conspirators found themselves involved
in a campaign in the Balkans, and were forced to delay
"Barbarossa" for a few weeks. Evidence of this postponement is
found in a document, which bears our Number C-170This document has
been identified by the defendant Raeder as a compilation of
official extracts from the Naval War Staff War Diary. It was
prepared by naval archivists who had access to the Admiralty
files, and contains file references to the papers which were the
basis for each entry.

I offer that document in evidence as Exhibit USA 136.

Although I shall refer to this document again later, I should like
at present to read only an item which appears in the second
paragraph of Item 142 On Page 19 of the English translation, and
which is in the text in a footnote on Page 26 in the German
original. This item is dated 3rd April, 1941, and reads as
follows:-

   "Balkan Operations delayed 'Barbarossa' at first for about
   five weeks. All measures which can be construed as offensive
   actions are to be stopped according to the Fuehrer's order."

By the end of April, however, things were sufficiently
straightened out to permit the Fuehrer to definitely set "D" day
as 22nd June, more than seven

                                                        [Page 240]

weeks away. Document 873-PS, in our series, is a "Top Secret"
report of a conference with the Chief of the Section
"Landesverteidigung" of the "Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab" on 30th
April, 1941.

I now offer that document in evidence as Exhibit USA 137.

I think it will be sufficient to read the first two paragraphs of
this report:

   "(1) Timetable 'Barbarossa' report:
   
   The Fuehrer has decided:-
   
   Action 'Barbarossa' begins on 22nd June. From 23rd May,
   maximum troop movements performance schedule. At the beginning
   of operations, the O.K.H. reserves will have not yet reached
   the appointed areas.
   
   (2) Proportion of actual strength in the plan 'Barbarossa'
   
   Sector North: German and Russian forces approximately of the
   same strength.
   
   Sector Middle: Great German superiority.
   
   Sector South : Russian superiority."

Early in June, practically three weeks before D-day, preparations
for the attack were so complete that it was possible for the High
Command to issue an elaborate timetable, showing in great detail
the disposition and missions of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

This timetable is Document C-39 in our series, and I offer it in
evidence now as Exhibit USA 138.

This document was prepared in 21 copies, and the one offered here
was the third copy which was given to the High Command of the
Navy. Page 1 is in the form of a transmittal, and reads as
follows:-

   "Top Military Secret.
   Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
   
   Nr. 44842/41 Top Military Secret W.F.S.T. Abt. L (I op)
   
   Fuehrer's Headquarters (no date)
   
   Top Secret (Chefsache) 21 copies
   
   Only through officer   1 op. 00845/41
        Received 6 June
        Enclosures:-
   
   The Fuehrer has authorised the appended timetable as a
   foundation for further preparations for "Barbarossa". If
   alterations should be necessary during execution, the Supreme
   Command of the Armed Forces must be informed.
   
   Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
   (signed) KEITEL

I shall not bother to read to you the distribution list which
indicates where the 21 copies went.

The next two pages of the document are in form of a text outlining
the state of preparations as of 1st June, 1941.

THE PRESIDENT : Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal does not think it
necessary that you should read all those preliminary matters at
the head of these documents, "Top Secret," "Only through officer,"
and then the various reference numbers and file information, when
you give identification of a document.

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.

                                                        [Page 241]

The next two pages of the document are in the form of a text,
outlining the state of preparations as of 1st June, 1941. The
outline is in six paragraphs covering the status on that date
under six headings: General, Negotiations with Friendly States,
Army, Navy, Air Force and Camouflage.

I think it unnecessary to read into the record any of this textual
material. The remainder of the paper is in tabular form with six
columns headed from left to right at the top of each page-Date,
Serial Number, Army, Navy, O.K.W., Remarks. Most interesting among
the items appearing on this chart-

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you read the first paragraph,
for that seems to be important. There are two lines there.

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: The heading "General" on Page 2.

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.

   "1. General
   
   The timetable for the maximum massing of troops in the East
   was put into operation on 22nd May."

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. ALDERMAN: Most interesting among the items appearing on this
Chart, in my opinion, are those appearing on Pages 9 and 10. These
are at Page 8 of the German version. At the bottom of Page 9, it
is provided in the columns for Army, Navy and Air Force, and I
quote:

   "Till 1300 hours latest time at which operation can be
   cancelled."

Under the column headed O.K.W. appears the note that, and again I
quote-:

   "Cancelled by code word 'Altona' or further confirmation of
   start of attack by code word: 'Dortmund'."

In the Remarks column appears the statement that:-

   "Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point of
   main effort, concentration of armour and artillery must be
   reckoned with."

The second entry on Page 10 of the chart for 22nd June, under
Serial No. 31, gives a notation which cuts across the columns for
the Army, Air Force, Navy and O.K.W., and provides as follows,
under the heading:

   "Invasion Day.
   
   H-hour for the start of the invasion by the Army and crossing
   of the frontier by the Air Forces. 0330 hours."

In the Remarks column, it states that:

   "Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting, owing
   to weather, on the part of the Air Force."

The other parts of the chart are similar in nature to those
quoted, and give, as I have said, great detail concerning the
disposition and missions of the various components of the Armed
Forces.

On 9th June, 1941, the order of the Fuehrer went out for final
reports on "Barbarossa" to be made in Berlin on i4th June, 1941,
which was just eight days before "D-day". This order is signed by
Hitler's Adjutant, Schmundt, and is C-78 in our numbered series of
documents.

I offer it in evidence now as Exhibit USA 139.

                                                        [Page 242]

I read from Page 1 the matter under the heading "Conference
'Barbarossa'".

   "1. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has
   ordered reports on 'Barbarossa' by the Commanders of Army
   Groups, Armies and Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank.
   
   2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14th June, 1941, at
   the Reich Chancellery, Berlin.
   
   3. Time Table.
   
   (a) 1100 hours. 'Silver Fox'.
   
   (b) 1200-1400 hours. Army Group South.
   
   (c) 1400-1530 hours. Lunch party for all participants in
   conference.
   (d) From 1530 hours. Baltic, Army Group North, Army Group
   Centre in this order."

It is signed by Schmundt.

There is attached a list of participants, and the order in which
they will report, which I shall not read. The list includes,
however, a large number of the members of the defendant High
Command and General Staff Group, as of that date. Among those to
participate were, of course, the defendants Goering, Keitel, Jodl
and Raeder.

I believe that the documents which I have introduced and quoted
from, are more than sufficient to establish conclusively the
premeditation and cold-blooded calculation which marked the
military preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union.
Starting almost a full year before the commission of the crime,
the Nazi conspirators planned and prepared every military detail
of their aggression against the Soviet Union with all of that
thoroughness and meticulousness which has come to be associated
with the German character. Although several of these defendants
played specific parts in this military phase of the planning and
preparation for the attack, it is natural enough that the leading
roles were performed, as we have seen, by the service figures -
the defendants Goering, Keitel, Jodl and Raeder.

Next, preparation for plunder-plans for the economic exploitation
and spoliation of the Soviet Union.

Not only was there detailed preparation for the invasion from a
purely military standpoint, but equally elaborate and detailed
planning and preparation was undertaken by the Nazi conspirators
to ensure that their aggression would prove economically
profitable.

A little later in my presentation, I shall discuss with the
Tribunal the motives which led these conspirators to attack,
without provocation, a neighbouring power. I shall, at that time,
show that the crime was motivated by both political and economic
considerations. The economic basis, however, may be simply
summarised at this point as the greed of the Nazi conspirators for
the raw material, food and other supplies which their neighbour
possessed, and which they considered they needed for the
maintenance of their war machine. To these defendants, such a need
was translated indubitably as a right, and they early began
planning and preparing with typical care and detail to ensure that
every bit of the plunder which it would be possible to reap in the
course of their aggression would be exploited to their utmost
benefit.

I have already put into the record evidence showing that as early
as August, 1940, General Thomas, the Chief of the Army Group B,
received a hint from the defendant Goering about a possible attack
on the U.S.S.R.,

                                                        [Page 243]

a hint which prompted him to begin considering the Soviet war
economy. I also said at that time that I would later introduce
evidence that in November, 1940 - eight months before the attack -
Thomas was categorically informed by Goering of the planned
operation in the East, and preliminary preparations were commenced
for the economic plundering of the territories to be occupied in
the course of such operation. Goering, of course, played the
leading role in this activity, by virtue of his position at the
head of the Four Year Plan.

Thomas describes his receipt of the information and this early
planning at Page 369 of his draft, which is our Document 23S3-PS,
introduced earlier as Exhibit USA 35; the part I shall read is at
Pages 10 and 11 of the English translation.

   "In November, 1940, the Chief of Wi. Rue, together with
   Secretaries of State Korner, Neumann, Backe and General von
   Hanneken were informed by the Reich Marshal of the action
   planned in the East.
   
   By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for
   the action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi. Rue
   at the end of 1940. The preliminary preparations for the
   action in the East included first of all the following tasks:
   
   1.Obtaining a detailed survey of the Russian armament
   industry, its location, its capacity and its associate
   industries.
   
   2. Investigation of the capacities of the different big
   armament centres and their dependency one on the other.
   
   3. Determining the power and transport system for the industry
   of the Soviet Union.
   
   4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and petroleum
   (crude oil).
   
   5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament
   industries in the Soviet Union.
   
   These points were concentrated in one big compilation 'War
   Economy of the Soviet Union' and illustrated with detailed
   maps, etc."

I am still quoting:-

   "Furthermore a card index was made, containing all the
   important factories in Soviet Russia and a lexicon of economy
   in the German-Russian language for the use of the German war
   economy organisation.
   
   For the processing of these problems a task staff, 'Russia',
   was created, first in charge of Lt.-Col. Luther and later on
   in charge of Brigadier General Schubert. The work was carried
   out according to the directives from the chief of the office,
   respectively" - I suppose - "by the group of departments for
   foreign territories (Ausland) with the co-operation of all
   departments, economy offices and any other persons possessing
   information on Russia. Through these intensive preparative
   activities an excellent collection of material was made, which
   proved of the utmost value later on for carrying out the
   operations and for administering the territories." -That ends
   the quotation.

By the end of February, 1941, this preliminary planning had
reached a point where a broader plan of organisation was needed,
and so General Thomas held a conference with his subordinates on
28th February, 1941, to call for such a plan. A memorandum of this
conference, classified "Top Secret" and dated 1st March, 1941, was
captured, and is our Document 1317-PS. I now offer it in evidence
as Exhibit USA 140. The text of this memorandum reads as follows:-

                                                        [Page 244]

   "The General ordered that a broader plan of organisation be
   drafted for the Reich Marshal.
   
   Essential Points:-
   
   1. The whole organisation to be subordinate to the Reich
   Marshal. Purpose: Support and extension of the measures of the
   Four Year Plan.
   
   2. The organisation must include everything concerning war
   economy, excepting only food, which is said to be made already
   a special mission of State Secretary Backe.
   
   3. Clear statement that the organisation is to be independent
   of the military or civil administration. Close co-ordination,
   but instructions direct from the Central Office in Berlin.
   
   4. Scope of activities to be divided into two steps:-
   
        (a) Accompanying the advancing troops directly behind the
        front lines, in order to avoid the destruction of supplies
        and to secure the removal of important goods.
        
        (b) Administration of the occupied industrial districts,
        and exploitation of economically complementary districts."

And then, on the bottom of Page 1:-

   "5. In view of the extended field of activity, the term 'war
   economy inspection' is to be used preferably, instead of
   'armament inspection.'
   
   6. In view of the great field of activity, the organisation
   must be generously equipped and personnel must be
   correspondingly numerous. The main mission of the organisation
   will consist in seizing raw materials and taking over all
   important concerns. For the latter mission reliable persons
   from German concerns will be interposed suitably from the
   beginning, since successful operation from the beginning can
   only be performed by the aid of their experience. (For
   example, lignite, ore, chemistry, petroleum.)
   
   After the discussion of further details, Lt.-Col. Luther was
   instructed to make an initial draft of such an organisation
   within a week.
   
   Close co-operation with the individual sections in the
   building is essential. An officer must still be appointed for
   the Wi. and Rue with whom the operational staff can remain in
   constant contact. Wi. is to give each section chief and Lt.-
   Col. Luther a copy of the new plan regarding Russia.
   
   Major General Schubert is to be asked to be in Berlin the
   second half of next week. Also, the four officers who are
   ordered to draw up the individual armament inspections are to
   report to the office chief at the end of the week.
   (Signed) Hamann."

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