Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-02/tgmwc-02-15.08
Last-Modified: 1999/09/14

And then the next paragraph, to which I would particularly
draw the Tribunal's attention:

   "The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible
   loyalty declarations of the new government, to make all
   preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily
   and as a national unit. No diplomatic inquiries will be
   made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the
   Yugoslav Government, which cannot be trusted anyhow in
   the future, will be taken note of. The attack will start
   as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are
   ready.
   
   It is important that action be taken as soon as
   possible. An attempt will be made to let the bordering
   States participate in a suitable way. Actual military
   support against Yugoslavia is to be requested of Italy,
   Hungary, and in certain respects of Bulgaria too.
   Roumania's main task is the protection against Russia.
   The Hungarian and the Bulgarian ambassadors have already
   been notified. During the day a message will be
   addressed to the Duce.
   
   Politically it is especially important that the blow
   against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful
   harshness and that the military destruction is done in a
   lightning-like undertaking. In this way Turkey would
   become sufficiently frightened and the campaign against
   Greece later on would be influenced in a favourable way.
   It can be assumed that the Croats will come to our side
   when we attack. A corresponding political treatment
   (autonomy later on) will be assured to them. The war
   against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy,
   Hungary and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to
   be promised to these states; the Adriatic coast for
   Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and Macedonia for
   Bulgaria.
   
   This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all
   preparations and use such strong forces that the
   Yugoslav collapse will take place within the shortest
   time."

Well, of course, the Tribunal will have noted that in that
third paragraph - two days after the pact had been signed
and the assurances given - because there has been a coup
d'etat, and it is just possible that the operations against

                                                  [Page 222]

Greece may be affected - the destruction of Yugoslavia is
decided upon without any question of taking the trouble to
ascertain the views of the new Government.

Then there is one short passage on Page 5, the next page of
the document, which I would like to read.

   "5. The main task of the Air Force is to start as early
   as possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian Air
   Force ground installations and to destroy the capital
   Belgrade in attacks by waves."

I pause there to comment; we now know, of course, how
ruthlessly this bombing was done, when the residential areas
of Belgrade were bombed at 7 o'clock on the following Sunday
morning, the morning of the 6th.

THE PRESIDENT: The 6th April?

COLONEL PHILLIMORE: The 6th April.

Then again, still in the same document, the last part of it,
Part V, at Page 5; a tentative plan is set out, drawn up by
the defendant Jodl, and I would read one small paragraph at
the top of the following page, Page 6:

   "In the event of the political development requiring an
   armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German
   intention to attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as
   soon as possible, to destroy her armed forces and to
   dissolve her national territory."

I read that because the plan is issued from the office of
the defendant Jodl.

Now, passing to the next document in the bundle, C-127, I
put that in as Exhibit GB 125. It is an extract from the
order issued after the meeting, from the minutes of which I
have just read, that is, the meeting of 27th March, recorded
in PS-1746, Part II. It is worth reading the first
paragraph:

   "The military putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the
   political situation in the Balkans. Yugoslavia must, in
   spite of her protestations of loyalty, for the time
   being be considered as an enemy and therefore be crushed
   as speedily as possible."

I pass to the next document, PS-1835, which I put in
evidence as Exhibit GB 126. It is an original telegram,
containing a letter from Hitler to Mussolini, forwarded
through the German Ambassador in Rome by Hitler and the
defendant Ribbentrop. It is written to advise Mussolini of
the course decided on and under the guise of somewhat
fulsome language the Duce is given his orders. If I might
read the first five paragraphs:

   "Duce, events force me to give you, Duce, by this the
   quickest means, my estimation of the situation and the
   consequences which may result from it.
   
   (1) From the beginning I have regarded Yugoslavia as a
   dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece.
   Considered from the purely military point of view,
   German intervention in the war in Thrace would not be at
   all justified as long as the attitude, of Yugoslavia
   remained ambiguous, and she could threaten the left
   flank of the advancing columns on our enormous front.
   
   (2) For this reason I have done everything and honestly
   have endeavoured to bring Yugoslavia into our community
   bound together by mutual interests. Unfortunately these
   attempts did not meet with success, or they were begun
   too late to produce any definite result. Today's reports
   leave no doubt as to the imminent turn in the foreign
   policy of Yugoslavia.

                                                  [Page 223]

   (3) I do not consider this situation as being
   catastrophic, but nevertheless it is a difficult one,
   and we on our part must avoid any mistake if we do not
   want, in the end, to endanger our whole position.
   
   (4) Therefore I have already arranged for all necessary
   measures in order to meet a critical development with
   necessary military means. The change in the deployment
   of our troops has been ordered also in Bulgaria. Now I
   would cordially request you, Duce, not to undertake any
   further operations in Albania in the course of the next
   few days. I consider it necessary that you should cover
   and screen the most important passes from Yugoslavia
   into Albania with all available forces.
   
   These measures should not be considered as designed for
   a long period of time, but as auxiliary measures
   designed to prevent for at least fourteen days to three
   weeks a crisis arising.
   
   I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should
   reinforce your forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with
   all available means and with utmost speed.
   
   (5) I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything
   which we do and order be shrouded in absolute secrecy
   and that only personalities who necessarily must be
   notified know anything about them. These measures will
   completely lose their value should they become known."

Then he goes on to emphasise further the importance of
secrecy.

I pass to R-95, the next document in the bundle, which I put
in as Exhibit GB 127. It was referred to by my learned
friend, the Attorney General. It is an operational order,
signed by General von Brauchitsch, which is merely passing
to the Armies the orders contained in Directive No. 25,
which was the Document C-127, an extract of which I put in
as Exhibit GB 125. I will not trouble the Tribunal with
reading it.

I pass to TC-93, which has already been put in with TC-92 as
Exhibit GB 114. The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia took
place on this morning, 6th April, on which Hitler issued the
proclamation from which this passage is an extract:-

   "From the beginning of the struggle it has been
   England's steadfast endeavour to make the Balkans a
   theatre of war. British diplomacy did, in fact, using
   the model of the World War, succeed in first ensnaring
   Greece by a guarantee offered to her and then finally in
   misusing her for Britain's purposes.
   
   The documents published today afford" - that refers to
   the German 'White Book' which they published of all the
   documents leading up to the invasion - "The documents
   published today afford a glimpse of a practice which, in
   accordance with very old British recipes, is a constant
   attempt to induce others to fight and bleed for British
   interests.
   
   In the face of this I have always emphasised that:
   
   (1) The German people have no antagonism to the Greek
   people but that
   
   (2) We shall never, as in the first World War, tolerate
   a power establishing itself on Greek territory with the
   object, at a given time, of being able to advance thence
   from the South-east into

                                                  [Page 224]

   German living space. We have swept the Northern flank
   free of the English; we are resolved not to tolerate
   such a threat inn the South."

Then the paragraph to which I would draw the Tribunal's
particular attention:-

   "In the interests of a genuine consolidation of Europe
   it has been my endeavour since the day of my assumption
   of power above all to establish a friendly relationship
   with Yugoslavia. I have consciously put out of mind
   everything that once took place between Germany and
   Serbia, I have not only offered the Serbian people the
   hand of the German people, but in addition have made
   efforts as an honest broker to assist in bridging all
   difficulties which existed between the Yugoslav State
   and various nations allied to Germany."

One can only think that when he issued that proclamation
Hitler must momentarily have forgotten the meeting with
Ciano in August, 1939, and the meeting with the defendant
Ribbentrop and the others on 27th March a few days earlier.

I pass to the last document in the bundle. It is a document
which has already been put in, L-172, and it was put in as
Exhibit USA 34. It is a record of a lecture delivered by the
defendant Jodl on 7th November, 1943. At Page 4 there is a
short passage which sets out his views two and a-half years
later on the action taken in April, 1941. I refer to
Paragraph 11 on Page 4:-

   "What was, however, less acceptable was the necessity of
   affording our assistance as an ally in the Balkans in
   consequence of the 'extra-turn' of the Italians against
   Greece. The attack which they launched in the autumn of
   1940 from Albania with totally inadequate means was
   contrary to all agreement, but in the end led to a
   decision on our part which-taking a long view of the
   matter-would have become necessary, in any case, sooner
   or later. The planned attack on Greece from the North
   was not executed merely as an operation in aid of an
   ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from
   gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our
   Roumanian oil area from that country."

If I might summarise the story: The invasion of Greece was
decided on at least as early as November or December, 1940,
and planned for the end of March or the beginning of April,
1941 No consideration was at any time given to any
obligations under treaties or conventions which might make
such invasion a breach of International Law. Care was taken
to conceal the preparations so that the German forces might
have an unsuspecting victim.

In the meanwhile Yugoslavia, though to be liquidated in due
course, was clearly better left for a later stage. Every
effort was made to secure her co-operation for the offensive
against Greece or, at least, to ensure that she would
abstain from any interference.

The coup d'etat of General Simovic upset this plan and it
was then decided that, irrespective of whether or not his
government had any hostile intentions towards Germany, or
even of supporting the Greeks, Yugoslavia must be
liquidated.

It was not worth while to take any steps to ascertain
Yugoslavia's intentions when it would be so little trouble,
now that the German troops were deployed, to destroy her
militarily and as a national unit. Accordingly, in the early

[Page 225]

hours of Sunday morning, 6th April, German troops marched
into Yugoslavia without warning, and into Greece
simultaneously with the formality of handing a note to the
Greek Minister in Berlin, informing him that the German
forces were entering Greece to drive out the British. M.
Koryzis, the Greek Minister, in replying to information of
the invasion from the German Embassy, replied that history
was repeating itself and that Greece was being attacked by
Germany in the same way as by Italy. Greece returned, he
said, the same reply as in the preceding October.

That concludes the evidence in respect of Greece and
Yugoslavia. But, as I have the honour to conclude the
British case, I would like, if the Tribunal would allow me,
to draw their attention, very shortly indeed, to one common
factor which runs through the whole of this aggression. I
can do it, I think, in five minutes.

It is an element in the diplomatic technique of aggression,
which was used with singular consistency, not only by the
Nazis themselves but also by their Italian friends. Their
technique was essentially based upon securing the maximum
advantage from surprise, even though only a few hours of
unopposed military advance into the country of the
unsuspecting victim could thus be secured. Thus there was,
of course, no declaration of war in the case of Poland.

The invasion of Norway and of Denmark began in the small
hours of the night of 8th-9th April, and was well under way
as a military operation before the diplomatic explanations
and excuses were presented to the Danish Foreign Minister,
at 4.20 a.m. on the morning of the 9th, and to the Norwegian
Minister, between 4.30 and 5 on that morning.

The invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland began not
later than 5 o'clock, in most cases earlier, in the small
hours of 10th May, whilst the formal ultimatum, delivered in
each case with the diplomatic excuses and explanations, was
not presented until afterwards. In the case of Holland, the
invasion began between 3 and 4 o'clock in the morning. It
was not until 6 o'clock, when The Hague had already been
bombed, that the German Minister asked to see M. van
Kleffens. In the case of Belgium, where the bombing began at
5 o'clock, the German Minister did not see M. Spaak until 8
o'clock. The invasion of Luxembourg began at 4 o'clock and
it was at 7 o'clock when the German Minister asked to see M.
Beck.

Mussolini copied this technique. It was 3 o'clock on the
morning of 28th October, 1940, when his Minister in Athens
presented a three-hour ultimatum to General Metaxas.

The invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia, as I have said, both
began in the small hours of 6th April, 1941. In the case of
Yugoslavia, no diplomatic exchange took place even after the
event, but a proclamation was issued by Hitler - a
proclamation from which I read an extract - at 5 o'clock
that Sunday morning, some two hours before Belgrade was
bombed.

In the case of Greece, once again, it was at 5.20 a.m. that
M. Koryzis was informed that German troops were entering
Greek territory.

The manner in which this long series of aggressions was
carried out is, in itself, further evidence of the
essentially aggressive and treacherous character of the Nazi
regime. Attack without warning at night to secure an initial
advantage and proffer excuses or reasons afterwards. Their
method of procedure is clearly the method of the barbarian,
of the State which has no respect for its own pledged word,
nor for the rights of any people but its own.

                                                  [Page 226]

One is tempted to speculate whether this technique was
evolved by the honest broker himself or by his honest clerk,
the defendant Ribbentrop.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you be ready to go on
after a short adjournment. That is what you were intending
to do

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes.

(A recess was taken.)

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, before proceeding
with the presentation of the evidence relating to the
aggression against the Soviet Union, I shall take about 15
minutes to offer two further documents relating to the
aggression against Austria.

These two documents are stapled in a supplementary book,
supplement to document Book N.

Both documents are correspondence of the British Foreign
Office. They have been made available to us through the
courtesy of our British colleagues.

First, I offer in evidence Document 3045-PS as Exhibit USA
127. This is in two parts. The first is a letter dated 12th
March, 1938, from Ambassador Neville Henderson, at the
British Embassy, Berlin, to Lord Halifax. It reads:-

   "My Lord,
   
   With reference to your Telegram No. 79 of 11th March, I
   have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a
   copy of a letter which I addressed to Baron von Neurath
   in accordance with the instructions contained therein
   and which was delivered on the same evening.
   
   The French Ambassador addressed a similar letter to
   Baron von Neurath at the same
   time."

The enclosure is the note of 11th March, from the British
Embassy to defendant von Neurath and it reads as follows

   "Dear Reich Minister,
   
   My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was
   delivered this afternoon at Vienna demanding, inter
   alia, the resignation of the Chancellor and his
   replacement by the Minister of the Interior, a new
   Cabinet of which two-thirds of the members were to be
   National Socialists, and the readmission of the Austrian
   Legion to the country with the duty of keeping order in
   Vienna.
   
   I am instructed by my Government to represent
   immediately to the German Government that if this report
   is correct H. M.G." - meaning His Majesty's Government -
   "in the U.K. feels bound to register a protest in the
   strongest terms against such use of coercion backed by
   force against an independent state in order to create a
   situation incompatible with its national independence.
   
   As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already
   been informed in London, such action is bound to produce
   very great reactions, of which it is impossible to
   foretell the issues."

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