Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-02/tgmwc-02-14.09
Last-Modified: 1999/09/13

As the Tribunal will shortly see, in the Norwegian Vidkun
Quisling the defendant Rosenberg found a very model of the
Fifth Column agent, the very personification of perfidy.

The evidence as to the early stages of the Nazi conspiracy
to invade Norway is found in a letter which the defendant
Raeder wrote on 10th January, 1944, to Admiral Assmann, the
official German Naval historian.

I put in this letter, the Document C-66, which will be
Exhibit GB 81, and which the Court will find further on in
this book of documents. I should explain that in this book
of documents the documents are inserted in the numerical
order of the series to which they belong and not in the
order of their submission to the Court. I trust that that
will be a more convenient form of bundling them together
than to set them down in the order of presentation.

THE PRESIDENT: 66?

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: C-66. It is headed "Memorandum for
Admiral Assmann, for his own information; not to be used for
publication."

The Court will observe that the first page deals with
"Barbarossa."

If the Tribunal turns to the next page, headed "(b) Weser-
Ubung," the Tribunal will find from documents which I shall
shortly be submitting to the Court, that "Weser-Ubung" was
the code name for the invasion of Norway and Denmark.

I will omit the first sentence. The document, which, as I
have said, is a communication from the defendant Raeder to
Assmann, reads as follows:

"During the weeks preceding the report on 10th October,
1939, I was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who, in a
detailed letter to me, first pointed out the importance of
an occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany. I passed
this letter on to C/SK1" - which is the Chief of Staff of
the Naval War Staff - "for their information and prepared
some notes based on this letter, for my report to the
Fuehrer,

                                                  [Page 180]

   which I made on 10th October, 1939, since my opinion was
   identical with that of Admiral Carls, while, at that
   time, SK1 was more dubious about the matter. In these
   notes, I stressed the disadvantages which an occupation
   of Norway by the British would have for us - control of
   the approaches to the Baltic, outflanking of our naval
   operations and of our air attacks on Britain, pressure
   on Sweden. I also stressed the advantages for us of the
   occupation of the Norwegian coast - outlet to the North
   Atlantic, no possibility of a British mine barrier, as
   in the year 1917-1918. Naturally, at the time, only the
   coast and bases were considered; I included Narvik,
   though Admiral Carls, in the course of our
   correspondence thought it could be excluded. The Fuehrer
   saw at once the significance of the Norwegian problem;
   he asked me to leave the notes and stated that he wished
   to consider the question himself."

I will pause in the reading of that document at that point
and return to it later, so that the story may be revealed to
the Court in a chronological order.

That report of Raeder, in my submission, shows that the
whole evolution of this Nazi campaign against Norway affords
a good example of the participation of the German High
Command in the Nazi conspiracy to attack inoffensive
neighbours.

This letter, an extract from which I have just read, has
revealed that Raeder reported to Hitler on 10th October,
1939 -

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When was that report?

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: The report C-66 was made in January,
1944, by the defendant Raeder to Assmann, who was the German
Naval historian, and so, presumably, was for the purposes of
history.

Before Raeder's report of 10th October, 1939 was made to the
Fuehrer, he got a second opinion on the Norwegian invasion.
On 3rd October, Raeder made out the questionnaire to which I
now invite the Court's attention. It is Document C-122, and
the Court will find it next but one to C-66 in the document
book. That will now be Exhibit GB 82.

That, as the Tribunal will observe, is headed "Gaining of
Bases in Norway (extract from War Diary)," and bears the
date of 3rd October, 1939. It reads:-

  "The Chief of the Naval War Staff (who was the defendant
  Raeder) considers it necessary that the Fuehrer be
  informed as soon as possible of the opinions of the Naval
  War Staff on the possibilities of extending the
  operational base to the North. It must be ascertained
  whether it is possible to gain bases in Norway under the
  combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the aim of
  improving our strategic and operational position. The
  following questions must be given consideration:-
  
     (a) What places in Norway can be considered as bases?
     
     (b) Can bases be gained by military force against
     Norway's will, if it is impossible to carry this out
     without fighting?
     
     (c) What are the possibilities of defence after the
     occupation?
     
     (d) Will the harbours have to be developed completely
     as bases, or have they already advantages suitable for
     supply position?"
  
Then there follows in parentheses:

  ("F.O. U-boats" - which is a reference, of course, to the
  defendant Donitz - "already considers such harbours
  extremely useful as equipment and supply bases for
  Atlantic U-boats to call at temporarily.")

                                                  [Page 181]

And then Question (e): "What decisive advantages would
exist, for the conduct of the war at sea, in gaining bases
in North Denmark, e.g., Skagen?"

There is, in our possession, a Document C-5, to find which
it will be necessary for the Court to go back in the
document book to the first of the C Exhibits. This will be
Exhibit GB 83.

This is a memorandum written by the defendant Donitz on
Norwegian bases. It presumably relates to the questionnaire
of the defendant Raeder, which, as I have indicated, was in
circulation at about that time. The document is headed "Flag
Officer Submarines, Operations Division," and is marked
"Most Secret." The subject is "Base in Norway."

Then there are set out "suppositions, advantages and
disadvantages," and, over the page, "conclusions." I am
proposing to read the last paragraph, III:-

  "The following is therefore proposed:-
  
  (1) Establishment of a base in Trondheim, including:
  
     (a) Possibility of supplying fuel, compressed air,
     oxygen, provisions.
     
     (b) Repair opportunities for overhaul work after an
     encounter.
     
     (c) Good opportunities for accommodating U-boats
     crews.
     
     (d) Flak protection, L.A. anti-aircraft armament,
     petrol and M/S units.
  
  (2) Establishment of the possibility of supplying fuel in
  Narvik as an alternative."

That is a Donitz memorandum.

Now, as the Tribunal saw in the report of Raeder to Assmann,
in October, 1939, Hitler was merely considering the
Norwegian aggression and had not yet committed himself to
it, although, as the Tribunal will see very shortly, he was
most susceptible to any suggestions of aggression against
the territory of another country.

The documents will show that the defendant Raeder persevered
in pressing his point of view with regard to Norway, and at
this stage he found a powerful ally in the defendant
Rosenberg.

The Nazi employment of traitors and the stimulation of
treachery as a political weapon are now unhappily proven
historical facts, but, should proof be required of that
statement, it is found in the remarkable document which I
now invite the Court to consider. I refer to Document 007-
PS, which is after the TC and D series in the document book.
That will be Exhibit GB 84.

That is headed on Page 1, "Brief Report on Activities of the
Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Party (Aussenpolitisches Amt
der N.S.D.A.P.) from 1933 to 1943." It reads: -

   "When the Foreign Affairs Bureau (Aussenpolitsche Amt)
   was established on 1st April, 1933, the Fuehrer directed
   that it should not be expanded to a large bureaucratic
   agency, but should rather develop its effectiveness
   through initiative and suggestions.
   
   Corresponding to the extraordinarily hostile attitude
   adopted by the Soviet Government in Moscow from the
   beginning, the newly-established Bureau devoted
   particular attention to internal conditions in the
   Soviet Union, as well as to the effects of World
   Bolshevism, primarily in other European countries. It
   entered into contact with the most variegated groups
   inclining towards National Socialism in combating
   Bolshevism, focussing its main attentions on nations and
   States bordering on the

                                                  [Page 182]

   Soviet Union. On the one hand, those nations and States
   constituted an Insulating Ring encircling the Bolshevist
   neighbour; on the other hand they were the laterals of
   German living space and took up a flanking position
   towards the Western Powers, especially Great Britain. In
   order to wield the desired influence by one means or
   another" - and the Court will shortly see the
   significance of that phrase - "The Bureau was compelled
   to use the most varying methods, taking into
   consideration the completely different living
   conditions, the ties of blood, intellect and history of
   the movements observed by the Bureau in those countries.
   
   In Scandinavia an outspokenly pro-Anglo-Saxon attitude,
   based on economic considerations, had become
   progressively more dominant after the World War Of 1914-
   1918. There the Bureau put the entire emphasis on
   influencing general cultural relations with the Nordic
   peoples. For this purpose it took the Nordic Society in
   Lubeck under its protection. The Reich conventions of
   this society were attended by many outstanding
   personalities, especially from Finland. While there were
   no openings for purely political co-operation in Sweden
   and Denmark, an association based on Greater Germanic
   ideology was founded in Norway. Very close relations
   were established with its founder, which led to further
   consequences."

If the Court will turn to the end of the main part of the
statement, which is four pages forward - in the intervening
pages, I may say, there is an account of the activity of
Rosenberg's in various parts of Europe and indeed of the
world, to which I am not proposing to call the tribunal's
attention at this stage - but if the Tribunal will look at
the last paragraph of the main body of the report, the last
two sentences read:-

   " With the outbreak of war, the Bureau was entitled to
   consider its task as terminated."

THE PRESIDENT: I have not got the place.

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: I beg your Lordship's pardon; it is Page
4 of the report, which bears the signature of the defendant
Rosenberg.

   "With the outbreak of war it was entitled to consider
   its task as terminated. The exploitation of the many
   personal connections in many lands can be resumed under
   a different guise."

If the Tribunal will turn to the Annex to the document,
which is on the next page, the Tribunal will appreciate what
"exploitation of personal connections" involved.

Annex One to the document is entitled, "To Brief Report on
Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Nazi Party
from 1933 to 1943." It is headed, "The Political Preparation
of the Military Occupation of Norway During the War Years
1939-1940", and it reads:-

   "As previously mentioned, of all political groupings in
   Scandinavia only 'Nasjonal Samling', led in Norway by
   the Former Minister of War and Major of the Reserve,
   Vidkun Quisling, deserved serious political attention.
   This was a fighting political group, possessed by the
   idea of a Greater Germanic Community. Naturally, all
   ruling powers were hostile and attempted to prevent, by
   any means, its success among the population. The Bureau
   maintained constant liaison with Quisling and
   attentively observed the attacks he conducted with
   tenacious energy on the middle class, which had been
   taken in tow by the English.

                                                  [Page 183]

   From the beginning, it appeared probable that without
   revolutionary events, which would stir the population
   from their former attitude, no successful progress of
   'Nasjonal Samling' was to be expected. During the winter
   1938-1939, Quisling was privately visited by a member of
   the Bureau.

   When the political situation in Europe came to a head in
   1939, Quisling made an appearance at the convention of
   the Nordic Society, in Lubeck, in June. He expounded his
   conception of the situation, and his apprehensions
   concerning Norway. He emphatically drew attention to the
   geopolitically decisive importance of Norway in the
   Scandinavian area, and to the advantages that would
   accrue to the power dominating the Norwegian coast, in
   case of a conflict between the Greater German Reich and
   Great Britain.
   
   Assuming that his statement would be of special interest
   to the Marshal of the Reich, Goering, for aero-
   strategical reasons, Quisling was referred to State
   Secretary Korner by the Bureau. The Staff Director of
   the Bureau, handed the Chief of the Reich Chancellery a
   memorandum for transmission to the Fuehrer."

In a later part of the document, which I shall read at a
later stage of my presentation of the evidence, if I may,
the Court will see how Quisling came into contact with
Raeder. The prosecution's submission with regard to this
document is that it is another illustration of the close
interweaving between the political and the military
leadership of the Nazi State, of the close link between the
professional soldiers and the professional thugs.

The defendant Raeder, in his report to Admiral Assmann,
admitted his collaboration with, Rosenberg, and I will
invite the Court's attention once more to Document C-66,
which is Exhibit GB 81. In the page headed "Weser-Ubung,"
the second paragraph of the Raeder report reads as follows:

   "In the further, developments, I was supported by
   Commander Schreiber, Naval Attache in Oslo, and the M-
   Chief personally - in conjunction with the Rosenberg
   Organisation. Thus, we got in touch with Quisling and
   Hagelin, who came to Berlin in the beginning of December
   and were taken to the Fuehrer by me-with the approval of
   Reichsleiter Rosenberg."

I will later draw the attention of the Tribunal to the
developments in
December.

The details of the manner in which the defendant Raeder did
make contact personally with Quisling are not very clear.
But I would draw the Court's attention to the Document C-65,
which precedes -

THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the end of that paragraph?

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: With your Lordship's permission, I would
like to revert to that in a later stage of my unfolding of
the evidence.

In the Document C-65, which will be Exhibit GB 85, we have a
report of Rosenberg to Raeder, in which the full extent of
Quisling's preparedness for treachery and his potential
usefulness to the Nazi aggressors was reported and disclosed
to the latter.

Paragraph I of that report deals with matters which I have
already dealt
with, in reading Rosenberg's statement, 007-PS. But if the
Court will look at the second paragraph of Exhibit GB 85, C-
65, it reads as follows:

                                                  [Page 184]

   "The reasons for a coup, on which Quisling made a
   report, would be provided by the fact that the
   Storthing" - that is to say the Norwegian Parliament -
   "had, in defiance of the constitution, passed a
   resolution, which is to become operative on January
   12th, prolonging its own life. Quisling still retains in
   his capacity as a long-standing officer and a former
   Minister of War, the closest relations with the
   Norwegian Army. He showed me the original of a letter
   which he had received only a short time previously from
   the Commanding Officer in Narvik, Colonel Sunlo. In this
   letter, Colonel Sunlo frankly lays emphasis on the fact
   that if things went on as they were going at present,
   Norway was finished."

If the Court will turn to the next page of that document,
the last two paragraphs, the details of a treacherous plot
to overthrow the government of his own country, by the
traitor Quisling, in collaboration with the defendant
Rosenberg, will be indicated to the Court.

   "A plan has been put forward which deals with the
   possibility of a coup, and which provides for numbers of
   selected Norwegians to be trained in Germany with all
   possible speed for such a purpose, being allotted their
   exact tasks, and provided with experienced and die-hard
   National Socialists, who are practised in such
   operations. These trained men should then proceed with
   all speed to Norway, where details would then require to
   be further discussed. Some important centres in Oslo
   would have to be taken over immediately, and at the same
   time, the German Fleet, together with suitable
   contingents of the German Army, would go into operation,
   when summoned specially by the new Norwegian Government,
   in a specified bay, at the approaches to Oslo. Quisling
   has no doubts that such a coup, having been carried out
   with instantaneous success - would immediately bring him
   the approval of those sections of the Army with which he
   at present has connections; and thus it goes without
   saying that he has never discussed a political fight
   with them.

As far as the King is concerned, he believes that he would
respect it as an accomplished fact."

How wrong Quisling was in that anticipation was shown, of
course, by subsequent developments.

The last sentence reads:-

   "Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops
   required, which accord with German calculations."

The Tribunal may think that there are no words in the whole
vocabulary of abuse sufficiently strong to describe that
degree of treachery.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that document dated?

MAJOR ELWYN JONES: That document does not bear a date.

THE PRESIDENT: We will break off now.

(The Tribunal adjourned until 7th December, 1945, at 1000
hours.)

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