Archive/File: imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-02/tgmwc-02-11.02
Last-Modified: 1999/09/09
                                                                  

In May, June, July, and August of 1938, conferences between Hitler
and his political and military advisers resulted in the issuance
of a series of constantly revised directives for the attack on
Czechoslovakia. It was decided that preparations for Xday, the day
of the attack, should be completed not later than 1st October. I
now invite the attention of the Tribunal to the more important of
these conferences and directives.

On 28th May, 1938, Hitler called a conference of his principal
advisers. At this meeting he gave the necessary instructions to
his fellow conspirators to prepare the attack on Czechoslovakia.
This fact Hitler later

                                                          [Page 7]
publicly admitted. I now refer and invite the notice of the
Tribunal to Document 2360-PS, a copy of the Vo1kischer Beobachter
for 31st January, 1939. In a speech before the Reichstag the
preceding day, reported in this newspaper, reading now from
Document 2360-PS, Hitler spoke as follows:

   "On account of this intolerable provocation which has been
   aggravated by a truly infamous persecution and terrorisation
   of our Germans there, I have resolved to solve once and for
   all, and this time radically, the Sudeten-German question. On
   28th May I ordered (1) that preparation should be made for
   military action against this State by 2nd October; I ordered
   (2) the immense and accelerated expansion of our defensive
   front in the West."

After this conference, on 30th May, 1938, Hitler issued the
revised military directive for Case Green. This directive is Item
11 in the "Big Schmundt" file, Document 388-PS. It is entitled,
"Two-front war, with main effort in the South-east," and this
directive replaced the corresponding section, Part 2, Section 11,
of the previous quote, "Directive for unified preparation for
war," which had been promulgated by von Blomberg on 26th June,
1937, and which I have already introduced in evidence as our
Document C-175, Exhibit USA 69. This revised directive represented
a further development of the ideas for political and military
action discussed by Hitler and Keitel in their conference on 21st
April. It is an expansion of a rough draft submitted by the
defendant Keitel to Hitler on 20th May, which may be found as Item
5 in the Schmundt file. It was signed by Hitler. Only five copies
were made. Three copies were forwarded with a covering letter from
defendant Keitel to General von Brauchitsch for the Army, to
defendant Raeder for the Navy, and to defendant Goering for the
Luftwaffe. In his covering memorandum Keitel noted that its
execution must be assured; I quote, "As from 1st October, 1938, at
the latest." I now read from this document, which is the basic
directive under which the Wehrmacht carried out its planning for
Case Green, a rather lengthy quotation:

"1. Political Prerequisites. It is my unalterable decision.."

THE PRESIDENT: Which page is this?

MR. ALDERMAN: From the first page of Item II. It is Page 16.

   "It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by
   military action in the near future. It is the job of the
   political leaders to await or bring about the politically and
   militarily suitable moment.
   
   An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia
   or other political events in Europe, creating a surprisingly
   favourable opportunity and one which may never come again, may
   cause me to take early action.
   
   The proper choice and determined and full utilisation of a
   favourable moment is the surest guarantee of success.
   Accordingly the preparations are to be made at once.
   
   2.Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the Action.
   
   The following are necessary prerequisites for the intended
   invasion:
   
      (a) suitable, obvious cause and, with it
      
      (b) sufficient political justification,
      
      (c) action unexpected by the enemy, which will find him
      prepared to the least possible degree.
   
                                                          [Page 8]
   
   From a military as well as a political standpoint the most
   favourable course is a lightning-swift action, as the result of
   an incident by which Germany is unbearably provoked so that at
   least a part of world opinion will grant the moral
   justification of such action.
   
   But even a period of tension, more or less preceding a war,
   must terminate in slidden action on our part, action which must
   have the elements of surprise both of time and extent, before
   the enemy is so advanced in military preparedness that he
   cannot be surprised.
   
   3. Conclusions for the Preparation of 'Fall Grun'
   
   For the Armed War it is essential that the surprise element, as
   the most important factor contributing to success, be made full
   use of by appropriate preparatory measures in peace-time, and
   by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action. It is therefore
   essential to create a situation within the first four days
   which plainly demonstrates to hostile nations eager to
   intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military
   situation, and which at the same time will give nations with
   territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene
   immediately against her. In such a case, intervention by Poland
   and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be expected, especially
   if France - due to the obvious pro-German attitude of Italy -
   fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war by
   intervening against Germany. Attempts by Russia to give
   military support to Czechoslovakia, mainly by the Air Force,
   are to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by
   the land operations within the first few days, a European
   crisis will certainly result. This knowledge must give
   commanders of all ranks the impetus to decide on bold action.
   
   The Propaganda War must on the one hand intimidate
   Czechoslovakia by threats and soften her power of resistance
   and on the other hand issue directions to national groups for
   support in the Armed War and influence the neutrals to our way
   of thinking. I reserve further directions and determination of
   the date.
   
   4. Tasks of the Armed Forces.
   
   Armed Forces preparations are to be made on the following
   basis:
   
      (a) The mass of all forces must be employed against
      Czechoslovakia.
      
      (b) For the West, a minimum of forces is to be provided as
      rear-cover as this may be required, the other frontiers in
      the East against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be
      protected, and the Southern frontiers to be watched.
      
      (c) The sections of the army which can be rapidly employed
      must force the frontier fortifications with speed and
      decision, and must break into Czechoslovakia with the
      greatest daring, in the certainty that the bulk of the
      mobile army will follow them with the utmost speed.
      Preparations for this are to be made and timed in such a way
      that the sections of the army which can be rapidly employed,
      cross the frontier at the appointed time, simultaneously
      with the penetration by the Air Force, before the enemy can
      become aware of our mobilisation. (In a footnote: 'For this,
      a timetable between Army and Air Force is to be worked out
      in conjunction with O.K.W. and submitted to me for
      approval.')
   
                                                          [Page 9]
   
   "5. Missions for the Branches of the Armed Forces.
   
   (a) Army. The basic principle of the surprise attack against
   Czechoslovakia must not be endangered by the inevitable time
   required for transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail,
   nor the initiative of the Air Force be wasted. Therefore it is
   first of all essential to the Army, that as many assault
   columns as possible be employed at the same time as the
   surprise attack by the Air Force. These assault columns - the
   composition of each, according to their tasks at that time-must
   be formed with troops which can be employed rapidly owing to
   their proximity to the frontier or to their having been
   motorised and specially made ready. It must be the purpose of
   these thrusts to break into the Czechoslovakian fortification
   lines at numerous points and in a strategically favourable
   direction, to achieve a break-through or to break them down
   from the rear. For the success of this operation, co-operation
   with the SudetenGerman frontier population, with deserters from
   the Czechoslovakian army, with parachut1sts or airborne troops
   and with units of the sabotage service, will be of importance.
   The bulk of the army has the task of frustrating the
   Czechoslovakian plan of defence, of preventing the
   Czechoslovakian army from escaping ."


THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to read all this detail?

MR. ALDERMAN: I was just worried about not getting it into the
transcript.

THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me that this is all detail, that before
you pass from the document you ought to read the document on Page
15, which introduces it and which gives the date of it.

MR. ALDERMAN: I think so. It is a letter dated Berlin, 30th May,
1938. Copy of the 4th Copy. "Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces. S.O. Only. Access only through officer. Written by an
officer. Signed Keitel. D1stributed to C.-in-C. Army, C.-in-C.
Navy, C.-in-C. Air Force. By order of the Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces, Part 2, Section II of the directive of the unified
preparations for war of the Armed Forces dated 24th June, 1937,
(0b.d.W.)", with some symbols, including "Chefsache", or Top
Secret; " Two-Front War with main effort on the South-east -
strategic concentration 'Grun', is to be replaced by the attached
version. Its execution must be assured as from 1st October, 1938,
at the latest. Alterations in other parts of the directives must
be expected during the next few weeks.

By order of Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Signed Keitel.

Certified a true copy, Zeitzler, Oberstleutnant on the General
Staff."

In line with the suggestion of the presiding Justice, I shall omit
the detailed instructions which are set out for action by the
Luftwaffe and by the Navy, and I turn next to the last paragraph
of the directive, which will be found on Page 19 of the English
version:

   "In war economy it is essential that in the field of the
   armament industry a maximum deployment of forces is made
   possible through increased supplies. In the course of
   operations, it is of value to contribute to the reinforcement
   of the total - economic war strength - by rapidly reconnoitring
   and restarting important factories. For this

                                                         [Page 10]

   reason the sparing of Czechoslovakian industrial and works
   installations - in so far as military operations permit - can
   be of decisive importance to us."

In other words, the Nazi conspirators, four months before the date
of their planned attack, were already looking forward to the
contribution which the Czechoslovakian plan would make to further
Nazi war efforts and economy.

Then the final paragraph of this directive, Paragraph 7, on Page
19:

   "All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made by
   O.K.W. They will be made, in agreement with and according to
   the requirement of the branches of the armed forces, so that
   their effects accord with the operations of the Army and Air
   Force.
   
   Signed Adolf Hitler. Certified Copy.
   
   Signed Zeitzler, Oberstleutnant on the General Staff."

Three weeks later, on 18th June, 1938, a draft for a new directive
was prepared and initialled by the defendant Keitel. This is Item
14 at Pages 27 to 32 of the large Schmundt file. It did not
supersede the 30th of May directive. I shall read the third and
fifth paragraphs on Page 28 of the English translation, and the
last paragraph on Page 29.

   "The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my
   own, free decision; this stands in the foreground of my
   political intentions. I am determined to use to the full every
   favourable political opportunity to realise this aim."

Then, skipping a paragraph:

   "However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia
   only if I am firmly convinced, as in the case of the occupation
   of the demilitarised zone and the entry into Austria, that
   France will not march and that therefore England will not
   intervene."

And then, skipping to the last paragraph on the 29th page:

   "The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself
   will be issued by me from time to time."

Initials K of Keitel and Z of Zeitzler.

The second and third parts of this directive contain general
directions for the deployment of troops and for precautionary
measures, in view of the possibility that during the execution of
the Fall Grun or Case Green, France or England might declare war
on Germany. Six pages of complicated schedules which follow this
draft in the original have not been translated into English. These
schedules, which constitute Item 15 in the Schmundt file, give a
timetable of specific measures for the preparation of the Army,
Navy, and Luftwaffe for the contemplated action.

Corroboration for the documents in the Schmundt file is found in
General Jodl's diary, our Document 1780-PS, and Exhibit USA 72,
from which I quoted portions during the Austrian presentation. I
now quote from three entries in this diary written in the spring
of 1938. Although the first entry is not dated it appears to have
been written several months after the annexation of Austria, and
here I read under the heading on Page 3 Of the English
translation, "Later undated entry:

   After annexation of Austria the Fuehrer mentions that there is
   no hurry to solve the Czech question, because Austria has to be
   digested first. Nevertheless, preparations for Case Green will
   have to be carried out energetically. They will have to be
   newly prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position
   because of the annexation of Austria. State

                                                         [Page 11]

   of preparation, see Memorandum L-1-A of 19th April, reported to
   the Fuehrer on 21st April.
   
   The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech problem as
   yet is changed because of the Czech strategic troop
   concentration of 21st May, which occurs without any German
   threat and without the slightest cause for it. Because of
   Germany's self-restraint the consequences lead to a loss of
   prestige for the Fuehrer, which he is not willing to suffer a
   second time. Therefore, the new order is issued for Green on
   30th May."

And then the entry, 23rd May:

   "Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Fuehrer for the
   conferences, which gradually reveals his exact intentions and
   which takes place with the Chief of the Armed Forces and High
   Command O.K.W. on 28th May, 3rd and 9th June - see enclosures."

Then the entry Of 30th May:

   " The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he states his final
   decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon, and thereby initiates
   military preparation all along the line. The previous
   intentions of the Army must be changed considerably in the
   direction of an immediate break-through into Czechoslovakia on
   D-day - (X-Tag) - combined with aerial penetration by the Air
   Force.
   
   Further details are derived from a directive for strategic
   concentration of the Army. The whole contrast again becomes
   acute between the Fuehrer's intuition that we must do it this
   year, and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it as yet,
   as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are
   not as yet equal to them."

During the spring and summer of 1938 the Luftwaffe was also
engaged in planning in connection with the forthcoming Case Green
and the further expansion of the Reich.

I now offer in evidence Document R-150, which will be Exhibit USA
82. This is atop secret document dated and June, 1938, issued by
Air Force Group Command 3, and entitled "Plan Study 1938,
Instruction for Deployment and Combat, 'Case Red'."

"Case Red" is the code name for action against the Western Powers
should that be necessary. Twenty-eight copies of this document
were made, of which this is Number 16. This is another staff plan,
this time for mobilisation and employment of the Luftwaffe in the
event of war with France. It is given significance by the
considerable progress by this date of the planning for attack on
Czechoslovakia.

I quote from the second paragraph on Page 3 of the English
translation, referring to the various possibilities under which
war with France might occur. You will note that they are all
predicated on the assumption of a German-Czech conflict.

   "France will either (a) interfere in the struggle between the
   Reich and Czechoslovakia in the course of 'Case Green', (b)
   start hostilities simultaneously with Czechoslovakia or (c)
   begin the fight while Czechoslovakia still remains aloof-a
   possible but unlikely contingency."

And then, reading down lower on the page under "Intention:

   Regardless of whether France enters the war as a result of
   'Case Green' or whether she makes the opening move of the war
   simultaneously with Czechoslovakia, the mass of the German
   offensive formations will, in conjunction with the Army, first
   deliver the decisive blow against Czechoslovakia."

                                                         [Page 12]

By mid-summer direct and detailed planning for Case Green was
being carried out by the Luftwaffe. In early August at the
direction of the Luftwaffe General Staff the German Air Attache in
Prague reconnoitred the Freudenthal area of Czechoslovakia south
of Upper Silesia for suitable landing grounds.

I offer in evidence Document 1536-PS as Exhibit USA 83, a report
of the Luftwaffe General Staff, Intelligence Division, dated 12th
August, 1938. This was a top secret document for general officers
only, of which only two copies were made.

Attached as an enclosure was the report of Major Noericke, the
German Attache in Prague, dated 4th August, 1938. I quote the
first four paragraphs of the enclosure:

   "I was ordered by the General Staff of the Air Force to
   reconnoitre the land in the region of Freudenthal-
   Freihermersdorf -

THE PRESIDENT: Page 3 of the document?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

   - for possible landing grounds.
   
   For this purpose I obtained private lodgings in Freudenthal
   with the manufacturer Macholdt, through one of my trusted men
   in Prague.
   
   I had specifically ordered this man to give no details about me
   to M., particularly about my official position.
   
   I used my official car (Dienst Pkw) for the journey to
   Freudenthal taking precautions against being observed."

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