Archive/File: imt/nca/nca-02/nca-02-15-criminality-07-06
Last-Modified: 1996/10/16

   Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression, Volume II, Chapter XV

                                                  [Page 389]

Another affidavit which sheds light on the relations between
the Wehrmacht and the SS at the top level with respect to
antipartisan warfare (3711-PS) is sworn to by Wilhelm
Scheidt, a retired captain of the German Army who worked in
the War History Section of OKW from 1941 to 1946:

     "I, Wilhelm Scheidt, belonged to the War History
     Section of the OKW from the year 1941 to 1946.
     
     "Concerning the question of partisan warfare I state
     that I remember the following from my knowledge of the
     documents of the Operations Staff of the OKW as well as
     from my conversations in the Fuehrer's headquarters
     with Generalmajor Walter Scherff, the Fuehrer's
     appointee for the compilation of the history of the
     war.
     
     "Counterpartisan warfare was originally a responsibility of 
     Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler, who sent police forces 
     to handle this matter.
     
     "In the years 1942 and 1943 however counter-partisan
     warfare developed to such an extent that the Operations
     Staff of the OKW had
     
                                                  [Page 390]
                                                            
     to give it particular attention. In the Army Operations
     Section of the Operations Staff of the OKW a specific
     officer was assigned the development of counter-
     partisan warfare as his special job. It proved
     necessary to conduct extensive operations against the
     partisans with Wehrmacht troops in Russian as well as
     Yugoslavian territory. Partisan operations for a long
     while threatened to cut off the lines of communication
     and transport routes that were necessary to support the
     German Wehrmacht. For instance, a monthly report
     concerning the attacks on the railroad lines in
     occupied Russia revealed that in the Russian area alone
     from 800 to 1,000 attacks occurred each month during
     that period, causing among other things, the loss of
     from 200 to 300 locomotives.
     
     "It was a well-known fact that partisan warfare was
     conducted with cruelty on both sides. It was also well-
     known that reprisals were inflicted on hostages and
     communities whose inhabitants were suspected of being
     partisans or of supporting them. It is beyond question
     that these facts must have been known to the leading
     officers in the Operations Staff of the OKW and in the
     Army's General Staff. It was further well-known that
     Hitler believed that the only successful method of
     conducting counter-partisan warfare was to employ cruel
     punishments as deterrents.
     
     "I remember that at the time of the Polish revolt in
     Warsaw, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein reported to
     Generaloberst Guderian and Jodl about the atrocities of
     the Russian SS Brigade Kaminski, which fought on the
     German side."
     
                                   "(Signed) Wilhelm Scheidt
                  "Retired Captain of the Reserve" (3711-PS)

The foregoing documents show the arrangements which were
made between the OKW, OKH and Himmler's headquarters with
respect to anti-partisan warfare. They show conclusively
that the plans and arrangements were made jointly, and that
the High Command of the Armed Forces was not only fully
aware of but an active participant in these plans. The same
is true of the field commanders. General Roettiger, who
attained the rank of General of Panzer Troops (the
equivalent of a Lt. General in the American Army), has made
three statements (3713-PS, 3714-PS). Roettiger was Chief of
Staff of the German 4th Army, and later of Army Group
Center, on the Eastern Front during the period of which he speaks:

     "As Chief of Staff of the 4th Army from May 1942 to
     June 1943, to which was later added the area of the 9th
     Army, I often had occasion to concern myself officially
     with antipartisan warfare. During these operations the
     troops received orders from the highest authority, as
     for example even the OKH, to use the harshest methods.
     These operations were carried out by troops of the Army
     Group and of the Army, as for example security
     battalions.
     
     "At the beginning, in accordance with orders which were
     issued through official channels, only a few prisoners
     were taken. In accordance with orders, Jews, political
     commissars and agents were delivered up to the SD.
     
     "The number of enemy dead mentioned in official reports
     was very high in comparison with our own losses. From
     the documents which have been shown to me I have now
     come to realize that the order from highest authorities
     for the harshest conduct of the antipartisan war can
     have been intended to make possible a ruthless
     liquidation of Jews and other undesirable elements by
     using for this purpose the military struggle of the
     army against the partisans." (3713-PS)

Roettiger's second statement reads: "Supplementary to my
above declaration I declare:

     "As I stated orally on 28 November, my then Commander-
     in-Chief of the Fourth Army instructed his troops many
     times not to wage war against the partisans more
     severely than was required at the time by the position.
     This struggle should only be pushed to the annihilation
     of the enemy after all attempts to bring about a
     surrender failed. Apart from humanitarian reasons we
     necessarily had an interest in taking prisoners since
     very many of them could very well be used as members of
     native volunteer units against the partisans.
     
     "Alongside the necessary active combatting of partisans
     there was propaganda directed at the. partisans and
     also at the population with the object, by peaceful
     means, of causing them to give up partisan activities.
     For instance, in this way the women too were
     continually urged to get their men back from the
     forests or to keep them by other means from joining the
     partisans. And this propaganda had good results. In the
     spring of 1943 the area of the 4th Army was as good as
     cleared of partisans. Only on its boundaries and then
     from time to time were partisans in evidence at times
     when they crossed into the area of the 4th Army from
     neighboring areas. The army was obliged on this account
     on the orders of the Army Group to give up security
     forces to the neighboring army to the south.
     
                              "(signed) Roettiger" (3713-PS)

                                                  [Page 892]
                                                            
Roettiger's third statement reads:

     "During my period of service in 1942/3 as chief of
     staff of the 4th Army of the Central Army Group, SD
     units were attached in the beginning, apparently for
     the purpose of counter-intelligence activity in front-
     line areas. It was clear that these SD units were
     causing great disturbances among the local civilian
     population with the result that my commanding officer
     therefore asked the commander-in-chief of the army
     group, Field Marshal von Kluge, to order the SD units
     to clear out of the front-line areas, which took place
     immediately. The reason for this first and foremost was
     that the excesses of the SD units by way of execution
     of Jews and other persons assumed such proportions as
     to threaten the security of the Army in its combat
     areas because of the aroused civilian populace.
     Although in general the special tasks of the SD units
     were well known and appeared to be carried out with the
     knowledge of the highest military authorities, we
     opposed these methods as far as possible, because of
     the danger which existed for our troops.
     
                              "(Signed) Roettiger" (3714-PS)

An extract from the War Diary of the Deputy Chief of the
Armed Forces Operational Staff (Warlimont), dated 14 March
1943, deals with the problem of shipping off suspected
partisans to concentration camps in Germany (1786-PS). It
appears clearly from this extract that the Army was chiefly
concerned with preserving a sufficient severity of treatment
for suspected partisans, without at the same time
obstructing the procurement of labor from the occupied
territories:

     "The General Quartermaster [General Quartiermeister]
     together with the Economic Staff (East)
     [Wirtschaftsstab Ost] has proposed that the deportees
     should be sent either to prison camps or to 'training
     centres in their own area,' and that deportation to
     Germany should take place only when the deportees are
     on probation and in less serious cases.
     
     "In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff
     [Wehrmachtfehrungstab] this proposal does not take
     sufficient account of the severity required and leads
     to a comparison with the treatment meted out to the
     'peaceful population' which has been called upon to
     work. He recommends therefore transportation to
     concentration camps in Germany which have already been
     introduced by the Reichsfuehrer SS for his sphere and
     which he is prepared to introduce for the Armed Forces
     [Wehrmacht] in the case of an extension to the province
     of the latter. The High Command of the Armed Forces
     [Ober-
     
                                                  [Page 393]
                                                            
     kommando der Wehrmacht] therefore orders that partisan
     helpers an(l suspects who are not to be executed should
     be handed over to the competent Higher SS and Police
     Leader [Hoehrer SS und Polizeifuehrer] and orders that
     the difference between 'punitive work' and 'work in
     Germany' is to be made clear to the population." (1786-
     PS)

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